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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION
This dissertation constitutes a rhetorical criticism of the discourse surrounding Edward
Snowden. Through ideographic analysis, it analyzes public exchanges between media outlets and
U.S. governmental officials during the two years following Snowden’s revelations of illegal and
unethical U.S. government surveillance programs. The Snowden narrative begins on June 5,
2013 with the public exposure of classified government information. This analysis engages all
media exchanges with U.S. officials where Snowden is directly referenced until June 15, 2015,
two weeks after the expiration of Section 215 of the PATRIOT ACT of 2001. Section 215 of the
PATRIOT ACT authorized the U.S. National Security Agency (NSA) to collect mass
communication data, like phone and email records, of U.S. citizens. The analysis allows for two
weeks of discourse after the expiration of Section 215 for any retroactive remarks. In sum, 126
artifacts are analyzed within this study.
Snowden’s disclosures publicized dozens of NSA practices that were disconcerting to
U.S. allies and citizens of democracy, both in the U.S. and around the world. It was revealed that
the NSA was tracking internet activity of U.S. citizens through sites like Google and Facebook,
and that, through a loophole, the NSA was able to view communication data of U.S. citizens
without obtaining a warrant. The NSA also regularly utilized its capabilities to electronically
surveil citizens of other countries. The NSA regularly hacked into the communication, security,
and information systems of other countries, including U.S. allies, and the NSA bugged multiple
European Union offices domestically and abroad. It was also published that an internal audit
revealed that the NSA violated privacy laws over a thousand times annually. With a multitude of
other revelations relevant to discussions on surveillance and democracy, Snowden’s disclosures
have undoubtedly maintained a significant political impact.
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Prior to May of 2013, Snowden was an unknown figure. His anonymity disappeared
when he identified himself as the person responsible for leaking classified data on U.S.
government surveillance practices. Employed by Booz Allen Hamilton, a subcontractor of the
NSA, Snowden had access to extensive intelligence databases. Snowden flew from Hawaii to
Hong Kong on May 20, 2013 and met with journalists from The Guardian with the hope of
publishing documents he deemed vital information for the citizens of a democracy. Snowden
also sent the classified information to The Washington Post. This information was an extensive
collection of data detailing government surveillance practices. The documents were highly
classified and included phone and email records the U.S. government had illegally obtained.
While not officially authorized to obtain, review, and collect such information, Snowden did so,
citing concerns of governmental malfeasance as they related to the public. Rather than releasing
any information directly to the public, Snowden had all information vetted by The Guardian and
The Washington Post. The involved parties have maintained that appropriate due diligence was
upheld in the release of the information. As well, The Washington Post and The Guardian
contended that a significant amount of information was not publicly released, citing journalistic
ethics. As per both news outlets, all information was carefully reviewed and publicly released
only if it exposed illegal or unethical governmental surveillance. Snowden contended that
government transparency should be of the utmost importance in a democracy. He charged that
the civil liberties of U.S. citizens, as well as the citizens of foreign countries, were being severely
violated by American surveillance programs.
The Guardian began releasing the information on June 5, 2013. First released was the
Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court (FISC), also known as FISA Court, demand that Verizon
release the communication information of its customers on a daily basis. Then on June 6, 2013,

3
both The Guardian and The Washington Post published information on the Planning Tool for
Resource Integration, Synchronization, and Management (PRISM) security program that
collected real-time data on American citizens. A barrage of information then followed, sparking
an ongoing, intense public debate on governmental measures of surveillance in the name of
national security. Given their journalistic efforts in consciously reporting on Snowden’s
information, The Washington Post and The Guardian were both awarded a Pulitzer Prize for
public service on April 14, 2014.
U.S. officials were stunned by the revelations. On June 14, 2013 the United States
government charged Edward Snowden with theft of government property, willful
communication of classified intelligence with an unauthorized person, and unauthorized
communication of national defense information. As a legal matter, Snowden’s charges were
extensions of the Espionage Act of 1917. Snowden sought clemency from the United States
government and was denied. He was eventually granted asylum in Russia, where he has
remained since his departure from Hong Kong. Despite the threats and demands of the United
States government that Snowden returns to face criminal charges for three felonies, Snowden
refuses to comply and remains in exile. Government officials argued that Snowden’s actions
were breaches of national security and seriously damaged U.S. intelligence capabilities. Citing
concerns for national security, U.S. officials maintained that Snowden’s revelations threatened
the U.S. citizenry and abetted U.S. enemies. While Snowden garnered international support,
from organizations such as Human Rights Watch, Amnesty International, and the American Civil
Liberties Union, U.S. officials adamantly denied Snowden’s importance and repeatedly
criminalized Snowden in public statements.
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Informed by contemporary theories of democracy, this dissertation addresses three
primary research questions:
Research Question 1: Within the Snowden narrative, how are established ideographs
utilized by U.S. government officials to maintain power imbalance?
Research Question 2: Are there any terms within the Snowden discourse that can be
theorized as ideographs, and, if so, how do they interact with other ideographs within the
discourse?
Research Question 3: In accordance with contemporary ideographic theory, how does the
Snowden narrative engage the intersection of whistleblowing and democracy?
The second chapter constitutes a review of literature on the relevant topics and theories
related to the Snowden discourse. Within this section, there are two primary tracts: democratic
theories and whistleblowing. Snowden’s revelations put contemporary democracies at a
proverbial crossroads. In a post-9/11 world, the classic inherent tensions of democratic theory,
namely liberty and security, are primed for public discussion. It is argued here that the situation
regarding Snowden’s release of U.S. surveillance information was pivotal in the historical
narrative of democracy and its theorization. The progression from historical democratic theory
through modern and postmodern conceptions provides the context in which to position the
discourse regarding Snowden.
As a form of freedom of expression, whistleblowing, especially against institutions of
power within a <democracy>, creates some unique challenges, since whistleblowing is protected
under the liberal conceptions of freedom of expression. Using whistleblowing techniques,
Snowden’s disclosures criticized the surveillance practices of the U.S. government.
Governmental authorities have, however, refused to recognize Snowden as a whistleblower. This
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situation and others like it, most notably WikiLeaks, open the channels for rigorous debate as to
the implications that whistleblowing has on democracy. The second chapter explores these
implications, focusing on the relationship between whistleblowing and democratic theory.
The third chapter identifies and explains ideographic criticism, the methodological
approach employed in the dissertation. This chapter examines the specificities of ideographic
criticism, discussing its history, theoretical formulations, and applications. The chapter outlines
the purposes of the method and how the method is applied in the dissertation. Using traditional
and contemporary approaches to ideographic criticism, this dissertation analyzes media
engagements with U.S. officials on the topic of Snowden.
The fourth chapter analyzes noted ideographs within a synchronic schema. Ideographs
can be measured and evaluated diachronically or synchronically. Diachronic studies examine
ideographic interplay and progression over time. A synchronic analysis of ideographs is done
when ideographs are examined within a stated context as they relate to, and interact with, each
other. In conducting a synchronic analysis of the political discourse surrounding Snowden, this
project assists in developing an overarching critical rhetorical project in which scholars are
working to map societal ideologies. Analyzing the appropriate ideographs within the framework
of Snowden provides deeper understanding of the language and symbolism of U.S. hegemony.
The ideographs studied within the dissertation are as follows: <liberty>, <privacy>, <security>,
<terrorism>, <equality>, <justice>, <democracy>, <citizenship>, and <patriotism>. An
understanding of the relationship among these ideographs informs an understanding of how
power relations are maintained and perpetuated within the context of Snowden.
As well, chapter four develops ideographic theory and provides a methodological
contribution to ideograph criticism. The fourth chapter identifies that Snowden operated
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ideographically within the examined exchanges. Over time, it is demonstrated how U.S. officials
obfuscated the concept of Snowden through rhetorical processes of abstraction. As a term,
Snowden became more than a simple referent to a person, but was operationalized ideologically
for statist purposes. The synchronic analysis of this chapter engages the aforementioned
ideographs in conjunction with <Snowden>, as a newly formulated ideograph.
Taking the ideographic criticism forward, the fifth chapter of this dissertation specifically
examines the term “whistleblowing” within the Snowden narrative. This chapter delves into a
rigorous explanation of the conceptualizations of whistleblowers from the perspectives of the
state, media, and citizenry. This chapter explores the synchronic relationship between
whistleblowing and the aforementioned ideographs. It is recognized that U.S. officials
approached the relationship between Snowden and whistleblowing in three distinct phases. In the
first phase, officials generally refrained from public commentary on Snowden’s status as a
whistleblower. In the second phase, officials outwardly denied Snowden of legal whistleblower
status, contending that Snowden failed to follow government whistleblower protocol. In the third
phase, the term whistleblowing is almost entirely absent from the discourse, despite the
regularity of discussions on Snowden. Critical valuations are made regarding these three postures
by U.S. officials. Of primary importance to the analysis is the recognition that government
officials labored to purge whistleblowing from the Snowden narrative. This is read as an
antidemocratic measure by U.S. officials. It is antithetical to theories of democracy for state
officials to dictate the rules of whistleblowing. Whistleblowing is a tool of a democratic
populace and, while paradoxical, it is productive for democratic discourse. Informed by
synchronic ideographic analysis, the fifth chapter exposes the rhetorical means by which statist
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institutions controlled the discourse surrounding Snowden and disarmed the public of
whistleblowing, a fundamental democratic instrument of dissent.
Lastly, through the information gathered in this ideographic analysis, the dissertation
draws critical conclusions regarding the relationship between whistleblowing and democracy
within the parameters of the Snowden narrative. The sixth and final chapter concludes the
dissertation through a synthesis of ideas.
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CHAPTER 2: LITERATURE REVIEW OF THEORIES OF DEMOCRACY AND
WHISTLEBLOWING
1. Introduction
This chapter begins by discussing the history of democracy. Secondly, it explains the
fundamental tenets of democratic theory. Given these tenets, this chapter then explores the
literature surrounding the inherent paradoxicality of democracy. To follow, this chapter moves
into a discussion on radical democracy, a post-structural response to democracy’s innate
tensions. The chapter then engages the concepts of security and surveillance as they relate to
democracy. Lastly, this chapter discusses the intersection of whistleblowing and democracy, with
considerable attention paid to relevant cases studies. While the concept of democracy is
paramount within contemporary discussions on governance, its definitional existence is
nevertheless fluid.
2. History of Democracy
Although recent scholarship posits the earliest democracy to be in the Mycenaean period,
it is with Cleisthenes and Athenian democracy that the West typically associates (Keane. 2009).
Around 508 BCE, the Athenian constitution forwarded a system of government unlike that of
other nations (Keane, 2009). It granted the power of governance to the polis. Such a move
required a different conception of identity within the body of the state. Historically, controlled
lands had a very small ruling class while the vast majority of the population lived as subjects.
The conceptualization of democracy was an overt move to notate the citizen as a member of the
governing body. While persons in feudal, tyrannical, monarchical, and other such societies were
subjugated, the citizen, in its theoretical formulation, moves out of subjugation and into the
ruling class. Within this newly established ruling class, members of the citizenry each shares
equity of political voice, and possess the liberty by which they afford themselves.
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Sustained democratic states were few in number for the centuries following these origins.
The inception of U.S. democracy, representative in form, formally began with the Declaration of
Independence in 1776. While U.S. democracy has changed over the years, the concepts of
citizenship, liberty, and equality have always been at the core of political discourse. In particular,
the idea of political equality has been paramount since the origination of the U.S. (Tocqueville,
2003). Upon these core concepts, U.S democracy has found its salience, both as at the domestic
level, and in international ventures. While citizenship, liberty, and equality have always been
essential to democratic theory, these principles have been further accentuated by the American
mythos. Such an assertion is not to say that such ideals exist or are implemented in practice;
indeed it is easy to build an argument to the contrary. Nevertheless, the idea of democracy has
found a way to gain traction.
3. Democracy Conceptualized
Democracy is a multi-faceted phenomenon with considerable variability in its
theorization and application (Haggerty and Samatas, 2010). There is no singular democracy, but
rather different and competing democracies (Kaul, 2012). Common to all democratic theories
however, are the principles of citizenship, equality, and liberty, though their applications vary. At
its core, as it moves from theory to praxis, democracy functions as a decision making process
(Cohen, 1998). Decisions affecting the polis are made by the polis. By their nature, democracies
must be committed to governance by the populace, wherein concerns of the public are decided
collectively (Shapiro, 1999). By allowing free and full discussion on public issues, democracy
can be exacted (Pennock, 1979). Democracy is a system of governance practiced by the whole of
the people who are equally represented (Mill, 1861). Generally speaking, democracy can be
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understood as a form of government in which the decision making process rests in the hands of
the people (Rousseau, 1893).
As the democratic process unfolds, the populace is charged with the task of upholding the
ideals of citizenship, liberty, and equality to the greatest possible degree (Pennock 1979). Within
the democratic paradigm, citizens must recognize and uphold the shared social interests of their
counterparts (Dewey, 1922). Decisions should be made to benefit the greater social order, rather
than individuals themselves. In this, democracies are not set up to be static societies. To the
contrary, they can often be impulsive, flowing with the will of the people (Tocqueville, 2003).
The democratic process is most productive, Dewey (1922) argues, through public discourse. The
undertaking of the public deliberative process presumes that opinions can be revised through
discourse (Rawls, 1993). Healthy democracy exists when ideas are exchanged freely within the
political realm amongst equal participants (Habermas, 1991). Within this discourse, equality of
political voice must be protected as it correlates with civil liberties and free thought (Rawls,
1971).
3.1 Elements of Democracy
3.1.1 Citizenship
Democratic citizenship is the defined relationship between an individual and the concept
of the state (Heater, 2004). Citizenship works to distinguish a member of a state from those
existing externally from its borders. Traditionally, citizens are classified in a manner that
intentionally excludes outsiders (Cammaerts & Audenhove, 2005). Certain definitional factors
differentiate between members and non-members of the decision-making class. The demos,
based out of homogeneity, is the governing body for itself and that which it controls (Schmitt,
1985). As a core tenet of democracy, citizenship is the ability to actualize one’s civil liberties,
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including that of engaging in the political sphere, without state intervention (Yashar, 2005).
Within an effective democratic order, all those who maintain the status of citizen have equal
access to the political sphere (Dahl, 2007).
3.1.2 Equality
As a member of the democratic collective, the citizen is of equal standing with the rest of
the citizenry. Equality within the political sphere is vital in the realization of democracy (Dahl,
2007). Democratic citizens are equal to their counterparts, but are also able to think freely as
individuals within the political process (Schmitt, 1985). Although democratic theorists agree that
citizenship, equality, and liberty are all integral for democratic societies, but differ on whether
equality or liberty should be more highly regarded.
Many democratic theorists, like Rousseau (1893), place an emphasis on equality as the
most important democratic principle. Stressing the necessity of social equality in the public
sphere, Rousseau (1893) asserts that nothing is more detrimental than private interests
controlling the fate of the public. It is up to the citizenry to ensure that each member of the polis
is granted equal voice within the political sphere (Rawls, 1993). Democratic equality in this
context strictly covers the political sphere, which necessitates the equality be monitored due to
innate human differences (Dewey, 1937). Maintenance of political equality is of the utmost
importance in the actualization of democracy (Rawls, 1993).
3.1.3 Liberty
Much like citizenship and equality, liberty is difficult to define. Generally, it is the ability
for members of the polis to have some qualified existence without state interference. Citizens
decide for themselves what liberties they shall afford themselves. Largely, democratic
institutions strive to uphold liberty of conscience, liberty of thought, and liberty of person
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(Rawls, 1971). The liberty to express oneself and be free from arbitrary obstructions has become
highly regarded as an inalienable human right, elemental to the practice of democracy (Diamond,
2003).
Unlike Tocqueville (2003) and Rousseau (1893) who equate democracy with equality,
Aristotle (1998) contended that liberty is the most basic element of democracy. Furthermore,
while theorists like Rawls (1993) and Rousseau (1893) unequivocally favor the principle of
equality, theorists like Mill (1961) and Habermas (1991) argue that democracy should seek more
fervently to espouse liberty. Mill (1961) theorized that individual liberty is essential to protect
the minority from the majority. Systems of majority rule lend themselves to subjugate the
minority if liberty is sacrificed for the sake of equality. Such tyranny functions to the demise of
democracy (Mill, 1861). Habermas (1991), a proponent of deliberative democracy where social
agents convene freely to discuss political issues, also advocated for the preservation of liberty
through a differentiation between the public and private spheres. Citizens must be able to enter
the public sphere uninhibited. Productive civil discourse occurs when private liberties are
protected and social agents are able to freely express themselves (Habermas, 1991).
3.3 Paradoxes of Democracy
The explanation of democracy and its principles does more than simply inform; it
elucidates the inherent tensions of democratic institutions. The fluidity of democratic theory,
coupled with the elusiveness of its ideals, makes the actualization of democracy intrinsically
problematic. Mouffe (2000) argued that while the concepts of liberty and equality are both
integral to democracy, they exist in stark contrast with each other. Equality and liberty, while
both fundamental values of democracy, cannot be fully realized in accordance with each other.
Schmitt (1996) contended that the ideas of liberalism and democracy are insoluble. There is a
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great amount of discordance between the ideas of democratic equality and ideas of liberty
(Lefort, 2007). Tocqueville (2003) went so far as to say that democratic states will sacrifice their
most basic civil liberties for sake of equality. Engel (2006) agreed, stating that equality in
principle inherently restricts liberty, and that liberty undermines formulations of equality.
Democracy then as an ideology, suffers the struggles of its own contradiction, falling victim to
its own paradoxes (Mastropaolo, 2012). The polysemic nature of democracy is both its strength
and its weakness. As democracy takes ownership of the ethics equality and liberty, it also
harbors the inherent confliction of democracy.
Within democratic societies, the state and the polis are conflated in a way that counters
adequate governance (Burckhardt, 1943). The citizenry, based out of a specified relationship, is
the governing body for itself and that which it controls. Schmitt (1985) explained how
democracy, as a political enterprise, faces two options, both of which are paradoxical. First, a
structured democracy, while maintaining its stance on homogeneity, ultimately denies political
voice to those on the outside. In this, democracy promotes equality among its citizens, but
requires inequality in denying those outside its political borders. Secondly, should democracies
attempt to alleviate this division and accept heterogeneity, they would be in violation of the ethic
which binds together democracy: that of equality. Universal heterogeneity here lacks all
practicality. Even in envisaging the abolition of such borders and accepting a global community
to create equality for humanity, democracy would subject itself to utter incompetence. The
vastness of such a project would only further produce the inequality and oppression it set out to
eliminate (Schmitt, 1985). Any attempt at actualizing democracy counters as a means of
inhibiting democracy (Thomson, 2005).
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Derrida (2005) contemplated “in what sense may one still speak of equality – indeed of
symmetry – in the dissymmetry and boundlessness of infinite alterity? What right does one have
to speak still of the political, of law, and of democracy?” (p.233). This deconstructionist take on
democratic theory illuminates the inherent contradiction of the concept of democracy. Theorized
as a double movement, democracy cannot live up to its own standards (Thomson, 2005).
Democracy does not have any means of protecting itself against totalitarianism or
complete social apathy (Blackell, 2006). Innately then, democracy must afford itself its own
means of destruction (Keane, 2009). The primary elements which uphold democracy
paradoxically stand as tools of self-destruction. For instance, freedom of speech can be used to
the detriment of democracy if invoked in a counterproductive manner (Foucault, 1983). In
essence, the citizenry can use its freedom of choice to choose tyrannical oppression, or even to
completely abstain from the democratic process. Fundamentally, democracy must allow itself to
be destroyed by itself (Chou, 2012). Indeed, it would be anti-democratic for democracy to
structure itself in a manner that prohibits failure. “The very structure of the concept of
democracy implies that there can be no full democracy in the terms of the ideal which determines
the concept, there will be no democracy which does not sustain an anti-democratic current, no
democracy worthy of the name” (Thomson, 2005, p. 25).
In order for this system of self-governance to function, the citizenry must be kept
informed. As technology has progressed, so too have the means by which the populace is
informed on issues of merit. The advent and evolution of the internet further complicate the
actualization of democracy. Individual agency and the consummation of political voice online
seem to suggest that internet communities, while not able to replace physical communities, foster
a democratic activity that a hierarchical system of broadcast media could not. However, much
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like other mass media, the realization of democracy online is significantly hindered by corporate
interests and institutional control of content, bandwidth, software, and management, which limit
the freedom of expression and access to information (Feenberg, 2009). Undoubtedly the internet
increases the layers of paradoxicality of a democratic society. Greater access to media allows for
a greater presence of dissenting voices, but solidarity is far more difficult to attain (Mancini,
2013). The existence of an online political space allows for a larger number of political agents,
but the increased nuances constrain political efficacy (Davis, 2010). New media also sanction
more nuanced opinions, but foster greater polarization. As well, while the internet is conducive
for mobilization on social issues, it lacks structure, making whatever benefits that accessibility
provides nearly moot (Mancini, 2013). Increased attention to the paradoxes contemporary
democracies face, critical scholars have attempted to theorize democracy in a manner that
accepts these inevitabilities while still maintaining democratic principles.
3.4 Radical Democracy
In response to the difficulties democratic institutions face, post-structural scholars have
theorized more radical conceptions of democracy. This move is an attempt to salvage the ethics
of democracy in the face of uncertainty. Radical democratic theory posits that while democracy
may be inherently difficult, if not impossible, this decision-making process is still more desirable
than any other alternative.
Understanding the inherent tensions existent within democratic theory, Dahl (1989)
posits that democracy, though integral, is not the ultimate end. Instead, democracy is an element
of a greater purpose toward that which is for the social good. Democracy as a process does not
seek finality; it is a process which assists in the creation of the favorable society. Democracy
should be understood as a boundless enterprise (Dahl, 1989). Democracy cannot be recognized
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as a singular, overt socio-political theory. It is an ever expanding, ever adapting ideology (Dahl,
1989). The shift in theory toward a more radicalized democracy is in large part due to the
theoretical conceptions of Lefort (Inston, 2010). In shifting the power of governance to the
citizenry, a central space became necessary for the decisions relevant to the public. Yet, the
people can never actually govern themselves directly, so the place of power must always remain
where political decisions are made (Inston, 2010). Lefort conceptualized this as an empty
medium wherein the political discourse of a democracy takes place. In this, the democratic
political process is never static, and is in an ongoing method of contestation and reformulation
(Inston, 2010). Laclau and Mouffe (2001) built off of this conception of democracy to postulate
the sheer impossibility of the realization of democracy. Democracy then, being structurally
incomplete and impossible, becomes radicalized (Inston, 2010). Democracy is more than
government; it is a state of being. Democracy should not seek to eradicate antagonism, but
rather, embrace it (Inston, 2010). Butler agreed, rejecting the realizability of democracy (Lloyd,
2007). Democracy’s inability to actualize itself should not be seen as a deterrent, and the
impossibility should be celebrated. Democracy’s impossible nature is its strength (Lloyd, 2007).
Democracy is necessarily open-ended. It is the unending contestation over democratic ideals, like
liberty, equality, and justice that makes democracy radical (Lloyd, 2007).
Contemporary democratic theorists Agamben (1998), Mouffe (2005), and Derrida (2005),
have articulated ideas of a radical democracy that supports democracy writ large while admitting
its unrealizability. They recognized that the ideals of democracy necessarily inhibit the
realization of democracy. Mouffe (2005) theorized that it is impossible for a political actor to
concurrently enjoy absolute liberty and absolute equality. Liberty and equality counter each other
in praxis. Derrida explained how the very concept of citizenship is paradoxical in noting how
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each individual citizen, while posited as a unique form, is a vital element of the collective.
Unending human uniqueness contradicts the very premise upon which equality operates
(Derrida, 2005). Likewise, Agamben (1998) explained how the citizen is both the subject and the
object of political power. In this, democracy is both liberating and oppressive at the same time.
The basic tenets of democracy, including freedom, citizenship, liberty, and equality, all force
political actors and democratic societies writ large into an ongoing paradox.
Connolly (2005) contended that this radicalized democracy exists in three parts. First, it
solicits a regime of deep, multidimensional pluralism. Second, and more critically, radical
democracy envisions a society in which the whole operates to reduce social inequity. Last, it
recognizes humanity’s interdependent relationship with the greater natural world (Connolly,
2005). Radical democracy cannot be exercised in the contemporary bourgeois conception of the
public sphere (Fraser, 1990). Inadequate for a critical formulation of democracy, this bourgeois
conception must be abandoned in favor of a posture without distinction between the state and
civil society (Fraser, 1990). Seeking a more fluid approach, Fraser (1990) posited that greater
public discourse among equal entities is possible if the public sphere is reconceptualized. In this,
it is not the realization of democracy that becomes important, but rather the expansive
possibilities of the democratic process.
The birth of radical democratic theory recognizes the self-destructive nature of
democracy as being its greatest strength. In this, democracy does not function through its
actualization, but rather through the processes that seek its actualization. This is Derrida’s (2005)
idea of “democracy-to-come”. Although a new conceptualization of democracy, Derrida (2005)
argued that this has been the strength of democracy since its inception. Radical democratic
theory postulates that while equality, liberty, and thus democracy, cannot exist in praxis, the
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democratic process helps reduce social inequity. Thus, while paradoxical, it is in this that
democracy justifies itself.
Despite this paradoxicality, theorists contend that democracy and democratic theory
should not be abandoned. While admitting that pure democracy is unreachable, scholars have
argued that democracy should not be intent on finding a solution for itself. As Mouffe (2005)
discussed, while liberty and equality may be inherently disharmonious, the discourse which takes
place as a result of this tension is the true essence of democracy. Radical democracy is one way
to deal with the inherent tensions of democracy in theory and practice. Contestation and conflict
are inherent within democratic discourse and are the driving force of democracy (Laclau and
Mouffe, 2001).
However, in order for the citizen to be engaged with the democratic state, there must be
some type of boundary. The state cannot be a universal entity which creates fundamental
paradoxes. Blackell (2006) likened democracy to totalitarianism in that both refuse “all certain
external metaphysical markers, or transcendent sources, of authority” (p.56). A state defines
itself, in theory, by submitting itself to no other external entity. In this, democracies and
autocracies seek the same end, to be ruled by no one. Thus, all humanitarian ethics of democracy
become ancillary to the survival of the state.

The democratic citizen is placed into a

contradiction. In its immediate practice, citizenship functions as an internal decision making
process, but in its full application, it serves the totalitarian interests of a state’s survival.
Democracies stand to lose the social elements of citizenship when classes and groups can no
longer be resolved within the political sphere (Blackell, 2006). Statist ideology thus, remains at
the center of all national and international policies among democracies and non-democracies
alike.
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4. Surveillance and Security
Contemporary theorists are now tasked with rationalizing democracy in a world of
rapidly increasing measures of security. “In a surveillance society privacy is political” (Fiske,
1998, p.75). Technological advancements, coupled with threats of mass destruction, have rapidly
moved the world into a state of constant surveillance. Citizens in the digital age are constantly
monitored by corporations for marketing purposes, by means linked to growing American
militarism (McChesney, 2015). Whereas the domestic sphere once existed as a space of privacy,
contemporary surveillance mechanisms boast an intrusive, yet covert capacity (Prior, 2015).
Operating upon Bentham’s concept of the panopticon, where prison cells are constructed around
a singular guard watchtower, Foucault (2012) forwards the argument that society has
metamorphosed into a state of constant visibility where people are able to be monitored at all
times. The panopticon creates the continuous and inevitable exposure of the individual (Prior,
2015). This state of existence informs not only the practices of the populace, but also of the state.
As a means of managing and controlling people, surveillance, particularly at the domestic level,
has seen a significant evolution since 9/11. With the advent of new technologies, people are
inescapably visible, subjugated to state and corporate interests (Prior, 2015).
Citizens within a mediated world are now constant subjects of data monitoring. This is
done predominantly without the knowledge or consent of the citizenry (Lyon, 2002). In
technologically progressive societies, the watchperson in the panopticon has been replaced with
a multiplicity of watchpersons within media, the state, and the corporatized world (Prior, 2015).
Biopower is actualized in the visibility of seemingly every activity of members of a mediated
society (Prior, 2015). The security state is present and observant at all times, but also exists as a
safety net for the citizenry to rely upon during difficult times (Foucault, Senellart, Ewald, and
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Fontana, 2009). This reduction of privacy is disempowering as it transforms dead information
into live knowledge (Fiske, 1998). Operating under the guise of security, constant surveillance is
altogether inevitable, covert, and controlling. Such practices have stealthily pervaded democratic
society writ large, creating yet another tension between the theorization and actualization of
democracy.
4.1 Security, Surveillance, and Democracy
The central principles of democracy are fundamentally in opposition to state and
corporate sponsored surveillance. Continuous surveillance, while operating in the name of
national security, infringes not only upon the liberties of every individual, it also detracts from
the equity of political voice. Mill argued that citizens should enjoy their liberties freely and
uncoerced (Mill, 1869). In a society where surveillance invades all public and private spaces,
individuals, knowing they are being watched, are likely to refrain from exercising their liberties
(Haggerty and Samatas, 2010). With everything act in cyberspace virtually trackable,
surveillance is inevitable (Schwartz, 1999). The identifiability of social actors within the
mediated realm by institutions of power dismantles the connective tissue of democracy. The
systems and techniques for data collection are the same for both the state and the greater
corporate conglomerate (De Zwart, 2014). The absence of a sense of privacy serves to inhibit the
citizenry from engaging in democratic discourse (Schwartz, 1999).
Surveillance systems showcase the paradoxicality of democracy (Prior, 2015). When the
privacy of the citizenry is counterposed with the necessity to keep the citizenry safe, democratic
states fundamentally self-destruct (Prior, 2015). Democratic societies are further problematized
when media sources, the only viable means by which the populace can be informed, are
controlled by corporate interests. As media outlets progress according to a capitalistic model, the
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interests of the public, as a democratic voice, are grossly superseded by the interests of
neoliberalism (McChesney, 2015). Thus, not only are the tenets of a mediated society structured
to benefit the state, they are structured to benefit hypercommercialism, further widening the
chasm between the citizenry and the actualization of democratic principles. Within a democratic
society, everything should be held accountable by the demos, including surveillance (de Zwart,
Humphreys, and Van Dissel, 2014). Democratic governments nevertheless have transformed
expediently into security states, particularly since 9/11.
4.2 Legalism
Threats to national security have long been used to justify increased state surveillance,
but these arguments have experienced the greatest salience in the wake of 9/11 (Simone, 2009).
The idea of national identity is a driving force in creating the “other” from which the U.S. needs
secured. The ideas of communism and terrorism are two of the more recent fears planted upon
the American citizenry. The political discourse surrounding these fears promotes state sponsored
surveillance (Simone, 2009). Institutions of power use discourse to create a state of fear, which
in turn expedites political change in favor of state and corporate interests (Collins and Glover,
2002). The discourse of fear is integral in the development of U.S. legislation that restricts the
liberties of the citizenry.
Much of what is examined today within security studies can be traced back to 1947 when
the U.S. passed the National Security Act. This piece of legislation vastly increased the power of
the armed services in the name of national security, establishing the National Security Council
(NSG) and the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) (Prior, 2015). To follow in 1952, President
Truman instituted the Armed Forces Security Agency, since renamed the National Security
Agency (NSA). The NSA pioneered wiretapping, data interceptions, and other information
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monitoring systems (Prior, 2015). The NSG, CIA, and NSA were made possible by the
Espionage Act, and were further cultivated by fears of national security threats, accentuated by
the attack on Pearl Harbor in 1941.
4.2.1 Espionage Act
In 1791, the newly formed United States of America ratified the initial amendments to
the Constitution, starting first with the freedom of expression. This First Amendment to the
Constitution of the United States prohibits the restriction of the freedoms of speech, press,
assembly, religion, and petition. The freedom of speech, unchallenged for over 125 years
thereafter, saw its first formal contestation in the United States Supreme Court when fears of
obstruction of wartime efforts manifested at the governmental levels (Hall and Patrick, 2006).
Entering World War I on April 6, 1917, President Wilson contended that new legislation was
required to protect national security, and the Espionage Act of 1917 was passed soon thereafter.
Approved by Congress in 1917, and enacted on June 15 of that year, the Espionage Act
did little to address actual domestic or international espionage. Rather, it was formulated and
initially exercised primarily to quell anti-war efforts (Howlett, 2011). The 1917 Espionage Act
was a response to the backlash from the Selective Service Act, which was approved by Congress
on May 18 of that same year which allowed the U.S. government to draft American men into the
military. Government officials, in an effort to curb criticism of the war and silence war critics,
threatened the public with fines and imprisonment for obstructing wartime efforts. With the
enactment of the Espionage Act, it became felonious to show any level of public disloyalty to the
military, or obstruct military enlistment in any way (Howlett, 2011).
Despite President Wilson’s urging, Congress voted down the portion of the bill that
called for press censorship during times of war (Caso, 2008). Congress did pass two portions of
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the bill which directly affected democratic citizenship. It became illegal, to “cause or attempt to
cause insubordination, disloyalty, mutiny, or refusal of duty, in the military or naval forces of the
United States” (Caso, 2008, p. 25). As well, Congress passed the provision which authorized the
censorship of mailings that worked against the war effort (Caso, 2008). In the first few months
after the bill’s passing, over 900 people were sent to prison, and countless more hindered from
expressing their anti-war sentiments (Ball, 2004).
The coming years would see many more people arrested and numerous court trials as
legal limitations on free speech were being imposed. In the Supreme Court case U.S. v. Debs
(1919), Eugene V. Debs, was convicted under the Espionage Act for delivering an anti-war
speech in Canton, Ohio (Howlett, 2011). In arguably the most famous case surrounding the
Espionage Act, the U.S. Supreme Court ruled that free speech was not absolute in the case of
U.S. v. Schenk (1919) (Howlett, 2011). At this Supreme Court trial, Justice Oliver Wendell
Holmes delivered the legal opinion which reads “The most stringent protection of free speech
would not protect a man in falsely shouting fire in a crowded theater, and causing a panic”
(Caso, 2008, p.26). Leftist activists such as Emma Goldman, Bill Haywood, Philip Randolph,
Victor Berger, John Reed, Max Eastman, were imprisoned during this time in accordance to the
stipulations of the Espionage Act (Ball, 2004). By the end of World War I, over 2000 Americans
were tried as a consequence of the Espionage Act, with more than 1,000 of them being convicted
(Hall and Patrick, 2006).
Anti-war groups vehemently opposed to World War I (WWI) communicated primarily
through mass mailings during the early 20th century. The Espionage Act gave the United States
Postmaster the ability to pursue groups distributing disloyal flyers. Albert Burleson, postmaster
during this time period, had the authority to ban any mailings that violated the Espionage Act, or
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advocated treason, insurrection, or resistance to United States law (Howlett, 2011). In 1918,
Congress passed the Sedition Act, which levied heavier fines and lengthier prison sentences for
those convicted of hampering wartime efforts (Howlett, 2011). While the Sedition Act was short
lived, repealed by Congress immediately after WWI, it was still able to justify more arrests and a
mass deportation frenzy (Caso, 2008). Led by Attorney General A. Mitchell Palmer, the Palmer
Raids was the mass corralling and deportation of “radicals” and antiwar/antigovernment
activists. The Palmer Raids were also successful in deterring the strike talks of labor unions
(Caso, 2008).
In the decades following World War I, the strikes against “espionage” would wane, and
the “clear and present danger” language employed by Justice Holmes was substantially loosened
(Caso, 2008). In the present world of heightened security following the attacks of September 11,
2001, the Espionage Act of 1917 has taken a unique turn. Focusing on governmental officials
and members of the media in regards to leaking classified intelligence information, formal
indictments have risen significantly in recent years. Between World War II (WWII) and 2008,
three people were indicted under the Espionage Act for leaking classified government
information (Currier, 2013). President Barack Obama’s administration attempted to repress
governmental whistleblowing and truth-telling however, and Edward Snowden was the seventh
government employee, contractor, or subcontractor to have been charged with espionage
(Currier, 2013).
4.2.2 PATRIOT Act
The Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to
Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism Act (USA PATRIOT Act, or PATRIOT Act) of 2001, while a
response to the attacks of 9/11, was not purely out of the fear associated with that day.
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Progressively throughout the 20th Century, and into the new millennium, the United States drew
closer to such legislation. While 9/11 served as a catalyst, decades of increasing terrorist activity
served to justify the passing of the PATRIOT Act. The Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act
(FISA) created a system where United States officials in the CIA and FBI could engage in
foreign surveillance if approved by a FISA appointed court (Pohlman, 2008). The U.S. Congress
passed the Aviation Security Improvement Act in response to the explosion of Pan Am 103,
where a bomb was detonated forty minutes into a flight from London to New York. A joint
resolution in 1993 authorized the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) to develop
early detection systems for potential terrorist threats (Ball, 2004). The United States Congress
passed the Defense Against Weapons of Mass Destruction Act in 1996, responding to the
bombing of the summer Olympics in Atlanta that same year (Ball, 2004). The most integral piece
of legislation to the forthcoming PATRIOT Act of 2001, however, was the Antiterrorism and
Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996. Passed in response to the Oklahoma City bombing on April
19, 1995, this bill expanded the authority of the federal government. It allowed for increased
wiretapping and extended sanctioned the United States military to assist with criminal
investigations involving weapons of mass destruction (Ball, 2004). With the dissolution of the
USSR, fears of communism in the West were gradually replaced with fears of terrorism.
Ideological power structures began to build a system of legal safeguards against terrorism, much
like they had done to combat communism.
While an independent piece of legislation, the PATRIOT Act can be seen as an extension
of the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act. Much of the PATRIOT Act was a formal
extension of the powers afforded by the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act. In
essence, the PATRIOT Act gave federal agencies the authority to “hunt, arrest, indict or deport,
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and try suspected terrorists” (Ball, 2004, p. 17). Passed out of an atmosphere of terror, this
legislation significantly increased the surveillance abilities of the U.S. government (Simone,
2009). Legally, the PATRIOT act allowed the NSA to access not only telephone and email
records, but also online search histories, online chat conversations, and presence on major
internet companies like Google, Facebook, Skype, etc., all of which can be done in real time
(Prior, 2015). In its totality, the PATRIOT Act is comprised of ten titles and amongst them, 1016
sections. Of these titles, Title II and its subsections, is arguably the most relevant as it authorized
the acquisition of private communications, whether oral, telephonic, or electronic (Smith, 2009).
4.3 Surveillance and National Security
Within contemporary political discourse in the U.S., surveillance practices have been
positioned as integral to national security. The state has argued that for the U.S. to be protected
from threats to security, the government must be able to practice deep levels of surveillance.
Ongoing surveillance in a society of fear transforms a citizenry from a freer democratic populace
into a society where everyone is simultaneously watching and being watched. In effect, all
citizens are simultaneously the police officer and the suspect (Haggerty and Samatas 2010). The
George W. Bush Administration pushed hard for increased national security while repetitively
affirming a supposed allegiance to democratic principles (Romano, 2012). U.S. presidents have
constructed themselves as authoritarians in recent decades, with mediated assistance in
appropriating the superhero mantra. This posture affords the President with an unquestioned
secrecy, particularly in regards to intelligence and national security. While the state argues that
these secretive measures are necessary for national security, these measures work against
democracy by providing an information channel that surveils the masses, but is inaccessible to
the masses (Nelson, 2008).
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4.4 Surveillance and Civil Liberties
The American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) vehemently opposed the Antiterrorism and
Effective Death Penalty Act and the PATRIOT Act, claiming that such actions infringed upon
the civil liberties of the American citizenry and created more harm than good (Ball, 2004).
Through analysis of governmental websites, Simone found that the information is controlled like
propaganda; it is a one-sided argument claiming that security, through legislation like the
PATRIOT Act, is necessary for liberty (2009). The U.S. government, with the assistance of
major media outlets, has perpetuated a state of fear in contending that the liberties of the
American people, threatened by terrorists, need to be secured by state surveillance. Appealing to
liberty is a means of justification for the state to invade the privacy of the populace (Simone,
2009).
5. Whistleblowing
Whistleblowing gives democratic theory an added layer of complexity. It is an exercise of
one’s freedom of expression, yet calls into question institutions of power. While there has been a
recent focus on the relationship between whistleblowing and democracy, the theoretical
postulations regarding this relationship still require significant development. This section will
outline some of the academic work that has been done on the rhetorical implications of this
relationship.
Lewis and Vandekerckhove (2011), in recognizing that whistleblowing is exercised
freedom of expression, argue that whistleblowing is an essential element of democracy.
Democracy, as a decision making process, requires a citizenry to be informed. Because the
governmental proceedings are handled by the populace within a democracy, citizens must be
knowledgeable on the topics at hand. Whistleblowing they claim, has epistemological value, and
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thus is an important means of democratic progress. The act of blowing the whistle, regardless of
intent, is an informative process. The argument made by Lewis and Vandekerckhove (2011)
contends that anything that is informative is beneficial for the democratic process, thus making
whistleblowing a productive activity for democratic societies. Sauter and Kendall (2011) liken
Foucault’s idea of parrhesia to contemporary whistleblowing. They assert that democracy and
truth-telling are both conditions for, and threats to, one another.
Mansbach (2011) equated whistleblowing and truth telling in these instances to fearless
speech. Mansbach argued that fearless speech is the process of publicly disclosing the illegal or
unethical practices of powerful actors, despite the risks. These fearless speakers, or
whistleblowers, adopt tenuous positions. Whistleblowers are inherently defenseless, speaking out
against extremely powerful social actors or institutions (Mansbach, 2011). Whistleblowers risk
their jobs, friends, and livelihoods. The risks are exponentially greater within the context of the
nation state. Whistleblowers thus, challenge democratic ethics citizens as they exist in a situation
of great social inequity.
Fearless speech, Mansbach theorized (2011), preserves and extends the value systems of
democracy and further suggested that this position aligns with the theoretical postulations of
Laclau and Mouffe (2001) regarding radical democracy. While the actualization of democracy is
not possible due to the inherent tension between democratic ideals, radical democracy stresses
that the process is what is important. The space in which democratic discourse takes place
between equal social actors is the space where Mansbach (2011) sees whistleblowing to have the
greatest utility. Furthermore, Mansbach (2011) argued that actors within a democratic society
must continually critique and discuss the fundamental principles of democracy. Radical
democracy must remain committed to upholding its ideals in order to ensure that liberty,
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equality, and justice remain at the forefront of the discourse within the state. Fearless speech is a
means of ensuring those ideals are sought. This process helps keep democratic ideals from being
solely ideological tools of the state. Fearless speech helps regulate the supervisory bodies of the
state (Mansbach, 2011).
The outgrowth of fearless speech is at the crux of the radical democratic theory where
argumentative discourse occurs (Mansbach, 2011). The debate between the public sphere and the
private sphere is akin to the intrinsic debate Mouffe (2000) discussed regarding equality and
liberty. The ongoing tension between the liberty and equality allows for productive democratic
discourse. The whistleblower does not work against the democratic collective, despite speaking
at the autonomous and singular level. The public and private spheres, existing in tension,
intersect, concurrently desiring to coexist without actually being able to do it. This tension
should not be reduced or avoided, but rather it is the strength of democracy. This reifies the same
paradox Derrida described in The Politics of Friendship (2005). It is the tension between equality
and identity. Whereas democracy requires a populace made up of equal parts, those parts are
ultimately unique. Democracy desires a populace of unique citizens that make up the whole, with
no one person having more political value than another. Derrida (2005) recognized that this
unending alterity is fundamentally contradictory to the concept of equality. Mansbach (2011)
expounded upon this concept, recognizing that truth-telling as an independent and autonomous
action functions to promote the collective.
5.1 Case Studies
This section discusses acts of whistleblowing as they have occurred in American history,
focusing on well-known cases of whistleblowers against the state. This will include a review of
literature on three of the more well-documented cases: Daniel Ellsberg, Thomas Drake, and
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Chelsea (formerly Bradley) Manning. The chapter will then discuss the truth-telling organization
WikiLeaks, which pushes the conceptual boundaries of whistleblowing.
5.2 Daniel Ellsberg
Daniel Ellsberg began working for the U.S. Department of Defense in 1964 as a special
assistant to the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs. Ellsberg has
described that he was primarily directed to generate ways to escalate the war in Vietnam. After
spending considerable time in Vietnam, Ellsberg went back to work for the RAND Corporation
in 1967, where he was commissioned to research and author a top-secret report on U.S. defense
decision-making in Vietnam. The document exposed a barrage of objectionable practices by the
U.S. government in Vietnam, including war crimes and the intentional fabrication of false news
stories. Perhaps most damning of the revelations was the decision to continually send military
troops to Vietnam despite the consensus of top U.S. officials that the Vietnam War was
unwinnable. Ellsberg’s revelations became publicly known as The Pentagon Papers. Ellsberg
first shared the information privately with certain members of Congress, but none of them would
agree to make the matter public. Ellsberg then released the documents to the New York Times
which began publishing the information until a federal court issued an injunction against them.
When the New York Times was ordered to cease the publication of the Pentagon Papers, Ellsberg
provided the papers to The Washington Post. The New York Times eventually won its case
against the federal government in the Supreme Court, and was able to resume publishing the
information.
Daniel Ellsberg was accused and tried under the Espionage Act. The presiding judge
eventually threw out the case due to the amount of misconduct which had occurred on behalf of
government officials. Most notably, former President Richard Nixon had hired secret
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investigators to illegally gather information to be used against Ellsberg. The search included
illegally wiretapping Ellsberg’s telephone and raiding offices where Ellsberg was associated.
Since the dismissal of his trial, Ellsberg has been hailed by many as a hero of democracy for
blowing the whistle on government malfeasance.
5.3 Thomas Drake
Former senior executive of the National Security Agency (NSA) Thomas Drake also
faced charges under the Espionage Act for releasing information to The Baltimore Sun on the
fraud and misuse of funds within the NSA. Drake made attempts to share the information with
supervisors and members of Congress to no avail. Drake was charged on multiple counts of
espionage and illegal use of government information. Drake was the first U.S. citizen to be
indicted under the Espionage Act since Ellsberg. Given the available details about government
misconduct, Drake was able to strike a plea deal prior to standing trial. All charges against
Ellsberg were dropped in exchange for a misdemeanor guilty plea for misuse of government
property.
5.4 Chelsea Manning
As a member of the U.S. Army involved in war operation in Iraq, Chelsea Manning
released hundreds of thousands of war documents to the public through WikiLeaks. Published in
2010, the classified documents included war video footage, internal communications, and
military strategies of the U.S. Department of Defense. Manning was apprehended and
immediately imprisoned, often in solitary confinement. Manning faced trial for dozens of
criminal charges and was convicted in 2013 for twenty counts, including misuse of government
property, fraud, and most seriously, espionage. Manning was sentenced to 35 years in prison.
After serving seven years, Obama commuted the sentence and Manning was released. Manning’s
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actions align more with conceptions of truth-telling than whistleblowing, like that of Ellsberg
and Drake. The difficulty in defining such actions highlights the paradoxicality of these actions
within democratic discourse.
5.5 WikiLeaks
WikiLeaks is a uniquely contemporary phenomenon that gives voice to truth-telling
through a cyberspace medium. WikiLeaks exists as a response to the contemporary mediated
society, where democracy is functionally inhibited as media access is granted almost exclusively
to powerful elites (Marlin, 2011). Journalism in particular, a primary means by which the demos
is informed, has been usurped by corporate interests (McChesney and Nichols, 2010). WikiLeaks
is a productive response to corporatized journalism, which now largely functions to perpetuate
power inequity (Rosner, 2011). With voice given back to the lower classes, democratic discourse
can be reignited through WikiLeaks (Marlin, 2011).
As one might expect, WikiLeaks has not received a warm reception from institutions of
power. To the detriment of these elite classes that hold plutocratic control, WikiLeaks and other
truth-telling organizations encourage uninhibited discourse. Powerful elites fiercely oppose
WikiLeaks in an effort to remain in power. Such political posturing is ideological and exposes
the class power struggle (Fuchs, 2011). New media, like WikiLeaks, allow for power structures
to be challenged in ways they never were before. These new media like WikiLeaks create chaos
for institutions of power, and make the management of these institutions incredibly more
difficult (McNair, 2012). In particular, WikiLeaks assists in reducing the ability for governments
to keep secrets, which is can be seen as productive to radical democracy (Dreyfus, Lederman,
Bosua, and Milton, 2011).
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Yet, WikiLeaks presents an added layer of paradoxicality. WikiLeaks asserts itself as a
borderless, stateless, truth-telling organization. This stance affords itself a level of fluidity that
challenges the concept of the state. However, given the repercussions experienced by Manning,
Assange, and others, it can be argued that organizations like WikiLeaks have only strengthened
the power of the nation state (Christensen, 2014).
6. Conclusion
Advancements in technology have significantly altered the ways information is created,
stored, and shared. Citizens and institutions go to great lengths to protect their data from hackers
and cyber threats. The “seize and share” tactics of hackers, pranksters, and truth-tellers have
significantly blurred the lines of whistleblowing. The value of these actions is particularly
difficult to assess within the democratic discourse. Ellsberg and Drake used calculated methods
to release information to reputable news agencies to review and publish at their discretion. In
using a system of checks and balances, Ellsberg and Drake arguably used the most ethical tactics
that were available to them. Manning also exposed unethical practices of the U.S. government,
but did so rather haphazardly through WikiLeaks. Truth-telling organizations like WikiLeaks do
little to vet information prior to releasing it publicly, which raises serious questions about
information ethics and privacy, even if the victim is a hegemonic state. Manning’s information
undoubtedly illuminated unethical practices by the U.S. military, but other truth-tellers seem
more inclined to pranksterism for the sake of pranksterism.
For the purposes of this study, Edward Snowden is recognized as a viable whistleblower
for relying upon renowned news agencies to vet and release information with discretion.
Snowden’s status as a whistleblower is based heavily upon the illegal and unethical activities of
the U.S. government that the disclosures exposed. Snowden’s revelations are valued as
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productive for democracy. While valid arguments can be made as to the value of unchecked
truth-telling, especially in relation to institutions of power, this dissertation focuses solely on
Snowden’s actions and the measured approach to whistleblowing. Informed by this perspective,
rooted in the above literature, this dissertation moves into a discussion on methodology in order
to engage and analyze the Snowden discourse.
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Chapter 3: METHODOLOGY: IDEOGRAPHIC CRITICISM
1. Introduction
The methodological approach to this dissertation constitutes an ideographic criticism,
understood as a critical rhetorical analysis of ideographs, of the discourse regarding Edward
Snowden and his exposition of United States surveillance practices. Affixed in the crux of a
contemporary struggle over power relations between governmental bodies and <democratic>
<citizens>, the political discourse surrounding Edward Snowden is primed for ideographic
analysis.1 Methodologically speaking, this rhetorical analysis functions to better understand
ideological power relations and how they are manifested and perpetuated through discourse.
Operating from a critical perspective, this analysis identifies instances where language is used as
an ideological tool to maintain chasmic power inequity between governmental authority and the
mass populace. Ideological criticism is a form of academic inquiry in which texts and other
artifacts are analyzed to reify underlying values and attitudes of a society (Gunn, 2009). The
greater implications of this dissertation reify the inherent paradoxicality of <democracy>. In
advancing a vibrant discussion on the obstructions that democratic theories face in meeting
democratic actualization, this dissertation further exposes the lack of viability of <democracy>
writ large. The seeming inevitability of democracy’s inability to realize itself is illuminated
through this critical rhetorical analysis of known ideographs, namely <democracy>, <privacy>,
<liberty>, <equality>, <security>, <terrorism>, <patriotism>, and <justice> and, it is further
accentuated through the dissertation’s theorization of the term <Snowden> as ideographic. In
sum, the methodology of this project, ideographic criticism, fits within the greater realm of
academic inquiry regarding democratic theory.
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Of significant relevance to this project is the democratic element of <freedom> of
expression and the problematization it actuates at the intersection of ideology and rhetoric within
political discourse, particularly within the U.S. While this dissertation provides a rigorous
ideographic criticism of the narrative surrounding Snowden in order to elucidate power
imbalance, it does so within the scope of democratic theory and the critiques thereof. The
element of <freedom> of expression, which is vital to American <democracy>, theoretically
allows for a wide array of expressive acts, including that of whistleblowing. Yet, as the discourse
surrounding Snowden demonstrates, the U.S., a self-proclaimed <democratic> society, finds
itself in a conundrum. The relationship between whistleblowing and <freedom> of expression
poses perplexing questions in relation to democratic theory writ large, especially within
discussions on <security>. Whistleblowing, a form of <freedom> of expression, is exercised to
the dismay of structures of power, as it can publicly reveal unethical and/or illegal institutional
behaviors. Whistleblowing operates paradoxically however, as it maintains the potentiality to
fortify agents who threaten democracy. In the case of Snowden, the exposure of surveillance
information and the techniques and mechanisms employed to acquire that information, has led to
a vigorous debate regarding the authority of <security> institutions like the U.S. National
Security Administration (NSA). Covert surveillance begs questions regarding the relationship
between governmental power and the populace as it relates to the tenets of democratic theory.
The ideographic criticism employed here examines this conundrum of whistleblowing’s
relationship to <democracy> on the grander theoretical scale. The process of exploring this
relationship first begins by discussing the conception and development of ideographic criticism.
As a methodology within the realm of rhetorical criticism, ideographic criticism found
formal recognition with McGee’s (1980) seminal article “The Ideograph”. When appropriately
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employed, ideographic criticism can produce significant critical scholarship through two primary
means. First, it advances argument and “endless talk”, or ongoing discourse, which function to
continue essential academic discourse within primary topic areas (Brockriede, 1974). Here
Brockriede contends that a primary function of rhetorical scholarship is the continuation of
discourse on theories and concepts through “endless talk”. Secondly, such analyses contribute to
the growth and validity of critical rhetorical theory (McGeough, 2014). Thus, ideographic
criticism is integral to the development and legitimation of critical rhetorical scholarship.
Ideographic criticism fits under the umbrella of ideological criticism, and is informed by a
number

of

perspectives,

including

structuralism,

Marxism,

deconstructionism

or

poststructuralism, postmodernism, and cultural studies (Foss, 2009). Kuypers (2009) furthers this
conceptualization, contending that ideographic criticism is heavily informed by rhetorical
materialism, which assumes an inherent relationship amongst rhetoric, discourse, and ideology.
The patterns of public consciousness noted by the rhetorical critic signify the evolution
and reiteration of power. Considered a method of value analysis (Sillars and Gronbeck, 2001), or
critical rhetorical analysis (McKinnon, 2009), ideographic criticism admits its subjective posture
and seeks to make conclusions of judgment. “The definitions of values and their
operationalizations in social activity become the communication critic’s entry, often, into the
foundational notions defining a people, their orientations to the world outside their heads, and the
relationships they construct among themselves” (Sillars and Gronbeck, 2001, p.189).
Ideographic criticism is apropos at this juncture, given the unwavering intensity of the
political climate in the United States and around the globe since <9/11>, especially as it relates to
the ideas of <liberty>, <equality>, <security>, and <democracy>. Furthermore, the political
discourse surrounding Snowden and the leaks of U.S. systems of surveillance are largely
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underexplored by rhetorical critics. This dissertation helps fill that void, and in working with the
concept of the ideograph, fundamentally adopts a critical posture as it examines the inequities of
power within political discourse and the ideological impetus that discourse has on social and
political relations in the U.S.
This methodological chapter consists of five primary segments. First, it examines the
formulation of the ideograph as the intersection between rhetoric and ideology. Second, it
discusses the theoretical construction of the ideograph. This overview discusses the conception
and original postulations of the ideograph, and its place within the discourse regarding the
relationship between rhetoric and ideology. Thirdly, this chapter explicates how ideographs serve
as artifacts with significant utility for rhetorical critics. Herein, ideographic criticism as a method
of academic inquiry is formalized. Fourth, varying analyses of the ideograph and the theoretical
conceptions thereof are provided. This section examines relevant critiques regarding the
ideograph and ideographic criticism with particular attention paid to the studies which lay the
groundwork for this dissertation, notably publications which discuss the topics relating to
democratic theory. Fifth, and finally, the application of this methodology is described as it
pertains to the discourse surrounding Snowden’s disclosing of government documents pertaining
to U.S. surveillance strategies. This concluding portion outlines the scope of this dissertation and
the application of ideographic criticism within this specified discourse.

2. Formulation of the Ideograph
2.1 Ideology
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In discussing ideographic criticism as a methodology, we recognize how ideology uses
symbolism to influence collective consciousness. Ideographic theory operates upon the basic
premise that humans behave differently as a part of a collective than they do when they are in
isolation (McGee, 1980). Prior to the conceptualization of the ideograph, Marxist critics focused
on the false consciousness of the masses created by ideology, while rhetorical critics endeavored
to explain human behaviors through narratives and cultural mythos (McGee, 1980).
Historically, Marxists have focused on the ideology of materialism, (McGee, 1980). This
fundamental divide served to restrict the rhetorical scholar from analyzing ideology. Seeking an
intersection of sorts, McGee theorized the ideograph, a means by which Marx’s materialism
could be reconciled with the rhetoricians’ symbolism. The Marxist perspective on ideology left
little room for agency within the sociopolitical realm. Although people think they have agency
within a political discourse, it is really only a “trick of the mind” which has deluded humankind
since the beginning of our individual cognitions (McGee, 1980). The interpellation processes of
ideology cognitively manipulate subjects of authority (Althusser, 1971). From this perspective,
our collective political consciousness is created and maintained by institutions and persons of
power. Unknowingly, the masses partake in their own subjugation while thinking they have free
will, a process generating false consciousness and a skewed collective reality.
While there are discernable differences in scholarly conceptualizations of ideology,
generally it is assumed that ideology fashions intellectual boundaries, effectively shaping reality
as it manipulates the cognitive capacity of the masses. Seeking ultimate control, ideology moves
toward hegemony, creating an unquestionable worldview for the unsuspecting masses beholden
to it. Force-feeding their ideals, institutions of power impart ideas of nationalism, moralism, etc.
upon an unassuming populace (Althusser, 1971). A hegemonic ideology directs individuals to
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understand the world in particular ways, while fundamentally excluding other worldviews (Foss,
2009). Dominant ideologies function by controlling what social participants understand as
natural or obvious. Normal discourse helps maintain the ideology, and any challenges to those
norms seem egregious to the controlled masses (Foss, 2009). As hegemony is desired, ideology
is the crux of the struggle between the powerful and the powerless. Eagleton (1991) contends
that the struggle between subjects and institutions of power exists at the point of signification
and discourse. Rhetorical scholars posit that discourse is a primary means by which we come to
understand reality (McKerrow, 1989), with dilemmas arising when discourse is manipulated in
suppressive ways.
2.2 Rhetoric
Traditionally, rhetorical scholars have studied mythos and the narratives therein when
dealing with power relations (McGee, 1980). Critical scholars in this realm posit that power is
manifested through these narratives and the symbols that comprise them (van Dijk, 2006).
Narratives are constitutive in that they create and perpetuate a mass consciousness within the
social realm (Jasinski, 2001). Thus, <citizens> of a state are generally unaware of their cultural
roles within the grand mythos, and exist as social agents only insofar as is conceivable within the
boundaries of their corresponding culturally constructed narratives. Distinctive of culture,
narratives play significant roles in how people come to understand their relative realities
(Kuypers, 2004).
Traditionally, rhetorical scholars have studied these realities through analyzing the
pervasive symbolism which structures our worldviews (McGee, 1980). In critiquing this
symbolism, rhetoricians do not focus their efforts on the intent of the author. Instead, attention is
paid to what is produced by these symbols. With the populace fixated within a narrowed reality,

41
institutions of power benefit from this situation. Rhetorical critics focus on the ways that
symbolism relates to relationships of power, and how these relationships create reality (Jasinski,
2001). Such processes, while revealing, fundamentally kept the field of rhetoric outside of
ideological studies.
2.3 The Intersection of Rhetoric and Ideology
Prior to the ideograph, rhetorical scholars, entrenched in the creation, appropriation, and
perpetuation symbols and meaning through discourse, fundamentally lacked the medium through
which they could analyze ideology. The ideograph functions as a means to bridge the chasm
between materialism and symbolism. McGee (1979) contended that the most advantageous
linkage of rhetoric and ideology is methodological. Like Chinese symbols, ideographs signify
ideological commitment as they are elemental in the construction and maintenance of an
ideology (McGee, 1980). McGee was primarily concerned with analyzing the ways in which
ideographs manage political consciousness and public motives. The ideograph operates as an
extension of Weaver’s ideas on “God” terms and “Devil” terms, which address how political
meaning is imparted into terminology (Jasinski, 2001). “God” terms and “Devil” terms help
construct cultural identity, and the concept of the “other” within political discourse. In this
manner, the term “freedom” acts as a “God” term or unifier, while the term “tyranny” acts as a
“Devil” term and promotes exceptionalism by vilifying other societies (Weaver, 1953). While
Weaver’s theoretical postulations failed to unearth the core of the relationship between discourse
and ideology, it did move rhetoric closer to ideological analysis.
McGee’s concept of the ideograph created the theoretical link between rhetoric and
ideology. As a linguistic tool, the ideograph assists an ideology in maintaining its supremacy,
moving the public to act as the entities of power desire (DeChaine, 2005). Conceptually, the
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ideograph is rooted in the rhetorical scholarship of appropriated meaning. This form, manifested
as an artifact for the rhetorical critic, transcends elements of space and time and acts in a manner
which creates, perpetuates, and directs the ideology of a society. The ideograph then is a primary
means by which institutions of power control the cognition of the masses (Delgado, 1995). The
concepts of ideology and rhetoric can be linked without the need for poetic metaphors (McGee,
1980). This linkage produces a complete description and explanation of a hegemonic ideology
and helps elucidate the relationship between institutions of power and the consciousness of its
people (McGee 1980).
Ortega (1957) argued that language inhibits cognition, and that while language helps
citizens conceptualize reality, it paradoxically restricts free thought. Because reality is largely
understood through language, our understandings of reality are limited (Ortega, 1957). For
example, the history of the ideograph <liberty> fundamentally informs our contemporary
conception of <liberty> (McGee 1980). Concepts like <liberty> cannot be taken out of their
historical context. Language is intrinsically tied to culture, and the ideograph develops over time
out of the ordinary lexicon of a specific culture. The public then engages and enacts the
hegemonic ideology through language (Potter, 2014). While ideology acts through a variety of
means, its linguistic manifestations link it specifically to the processes of symbolism. Hence, the
rhetorical critic can locate specific artifacts, ideographs, for analysis. Ideographs are not
artificially manufactured by social subjects to describe public behavior. Rather, they are artfully
crafted ideological terms with significant political valence (McGee, 1979). Institutions of power,
through ideology, use the language within political discourse as a means to defend the status quo,
effectively muting and containing dissent and resistance to reinforce its own dominance (Foss,
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2009). While existing in ordinary discourse, ideographs are highly influential through multiple
defining characteristics.
3. Elements of the Ideograph
McGee (1980) postulated four primary features of ideographs, and authors such as Condit
and Lucaites (1993) and Winkler (2012) have condensed and isolated these features for a more
succinct understanding. Ideographs are largely understood according to how they function
(Jasinski, 2001), and can perhaps best be understood through examples (McGee, 1980). Thus, the
ideographs <liberty> and <equality> are used here to exemplify the conceptualization of the four
features of an ideograph.
Ideographs are linguistic terms that exist within ordinary political discourse. An
ideograph is a word or phrase that is well-known and often used by the masses in political
discussions. This definition excludes jargon, words highly technical in nature, and common
words that have minimal political valence. Ideographs work out of common political speech, as
this practice facilitates hegemonic institutions to engage discursively with the populace (McGee,
1980). This is a key means by which the ideology imposed by the institutions of power reaches
the collective. In order for these ideographs to affect the collective consciousness, they must be
easily accessible to the members of the society. Ideographs are the public vocabulary of an
ideology (Kuypers, 2004). As an apparatus of power, the ideograph is a way that inequity is
maintained unknowingly by the masses through their own iterations within their common
political discourse. The terms <liberty> and <equality> undeniably exist within the ordinary
political discourse of the U.S. These terms are core concepts within the American political
system and are part of the normalized lexicon of American culture. Thus, they fulfill the first
element of the ideograph.
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Secondly, ideographic terms must be ultimately ambiguous. As Winkler (2012) states, an
ideograph “must be a high order abstraction representing collective commitment to a particular
but equivocal and ill-defined normative goal” (p.12). Ambiguity enables the ideographic term to
have a multiplicity of meaning among the masses, but still work to perpetuate the overall
ideology. Ideographs thus exist as terms which the collective broadly understands, but
concurrently as terms that are all but impossible to specifically define. Ambiguity allows for the
ideographs to purposefully and uniquely affect each individual within the citizenry. Thus, the
ideological goals of the hegemonic ideologies become normative through the discursive power of
the ideograph. This definitional fluidity allows for ideographs to transcend context within a
society, and they can generally be utilized regardless of era.
<Liberty> and <equality> function in this manner. People generally understand the
concepts of <liberty> and <equality>, but these terms are not so easily defined. As McGee
(1980) explained, stating that no one has ever seen an <equality> walking down the street, but
everyone has a general idea of what <equality> should look like. Even if a citizen can quickly
articulate a definition of an ideograph, the nuances of that definition are undoubtedly unique.
Condit and Lucaites (1993) noted specifically how <equality> as an abstraction is impactful and
often calculated. These ideographs reference generally agreed upon ideals. The terms may be
perceived in slightly different ways, but in the end social agents want <equality> and <liberty>
as goals for the collective. Despite these shared goals, the populace lacks universal
understandings of what these terms mean.
The third element of the ideograph is that it warrants institutions to wield their power
(McGee, 1980). Ideographs excuse abnormal or unethical behaviors for the sake of the greater
institution. The ideas of <equality> and <liberty> serve as warrants for enacting policies that
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seem counterproductive to the ideas of <equality> and <liberty>. For instance, an institution of
power can fundamentally infringe on the civil liberties of a population in the name of <liberty>.
With help from such ideographs like <liberty> and <equality>, governmental institutions engage
in otherwise egregious or odd activities, like killing (war, capital punishment, etc.) and
confinement (incarceration, travel regulations, etc). Under normal circumstances, citizens are not
authorized to kill or restrict the <liberty> of other citizens in this same manner. The state
however, wields the power to restrict, arrest, imprison, and even kill in order to defend
<equality> or <liberty>. It does so quite regularly in the name of counterterrorism (Winkler,
2012), militarism (Hamilton, 2012), and American hegemony (Cloud, 2004).
Institutions of power can operate in ways that are destructive and eccentric, even
antithetical to their systems of ideographs, for the sake of the greater ideology. These behaviors
functionally allow the institutions of power, through ideology, to absolve themselves of any
wrongdoing as the public is led to believe that the institutions are acting on behalf of the
collective good. Examples of these measures include asset forfeiture, the monitoring of library
records, and revocation of free speech, all of which have been exercised by the U.S. government
(Winkler, 2012). The collective <citizenry>, having been cognitively conditioned to subscribe to
the ideograph, cannot reasonably challenge the established order, and thus is willing to excuse
abuses of power in the name of the ideograph.
Fourth and finally, while <liberty> and <equality> serve ideographic means in other
cultures, they are uniquely entrenched within American culture. These two terms are embedded
in the American narrative of American culture, and, unable to be separated from that narrative,
they exist definitively within its context. This is the fourth characteristic of an ideograph; it is
culturally bound (McGee, 1980). Language is ever-evolving, and public perceptions of
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<equality> and <liberty> may change over time, but ideographs cannot escape their past
connotations since present interpretations are intrinsically related to historical ones (Jasinski,
2001). Language, as an integral element of culture, helps fuel cultural evolution. Definitions may
change, but ideographic influence generally remains steady. To this end, while contemporary
conceptions of American ideographs like <liberty> and <equality> may vary from their earlier
manifestations, they are nevertheless entrenched within the narrative of American culture,
wielding significant power. Indeed, it is imperative that the ideograph is understood in
accordance with its cultural milieu (McGee, 1980).
While some elements of language transcend cultures, the ideograph is necessarily
confined within a specific culture (Winkler, 2012). This is one of the primary ways in which the
ideograph realizes its functionality. Culture works in ways which social actors must inherently
understand their own seeming exclusivity. A culture can only be recognized in relation to the
“other”. One can only feel invested in a culture if one understands how it is differentiated from
other cultures. Ideographs help facilitate this difference and foster a feeling of belonging. Being
culturally specific, ideographs cannot be applied from one culture to another. All ideologies have
their ideographs, but ideographs cannot transcend ideologies. They are rooted in the specificities
and historical contexts of the ideologies in which they were contrived. Members of society are
conditioned to know these ideographs; it serves as a prerequisite for belonging as a part of a
society and understanding a specific reality (Lee, 2009). While there is some tolerance for
variables, generally the citizens have a good conception of the applicable ideographs (Lee,
2009).
In review, ideographs are culturally bound terms within ordinary political discourse that
possess a high level of ambiguity and warrant excessive, eccentric behaviors and beliefs for the
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sake of the ideology. These actions serve then to secure and maintain the imbalance of power
wherein the ruling class is seemingly unchallenged by the general populace. It is also important
to iterate that the word as a linguistic form, which can be conceived of as an ideograph, does not
always function in an ideographic manner (Lee, 2009). The term liberty for instance can be used
in a non-ideographic fashion. The ideographic critic is concerned only with the term as it relates
to relationships of power and ideology. When ideographs exist within this relationship, they
serve as artifacts for the rhetorical critic.
4. Ideographs as Artifacts
Ideographs become artifacts for study through their regularity within the political
discourse of a society. Because ideographs serve as foundational values for the identity of a
culture, the political arena is a primary starting point for the identification of these artifacts
(Winkler, 2012). Ideographs can be identified by testing them against the aforementioned
characteristics. Kuypers (2009) stresses that ideographs, as artifacts, are data, and the patterns
they generate over time and in relation to each other give the rhetorical critic analyzable material.
In the case of the ideograph, it is traced across multiple texts which are informed by a much
larger ideology (Gunn, 2009). As a method, ideographic criticism is more than simply mapping
however; it is a means of examining and analyzing how terms within political discourse shape
and organize cultural values. Using these artifacts, rhetorical critics examine how they function
amongst each other to perpetuate the ideology.
5. Analysis of Artifacts
McGee (1980) theorized that a full ideographic analysis of a culture requires three things:
ideograph identification, diachronic analysis, and synchronic analysis. McGee contends that this
process of isolating and analyzing ideographs, both diachronically and synchronically, reifies a
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complete description of a society’s ideology. Such an endeavor would be an insurmountable task
for any researcher. Thus, these three elements of a full cultural analysis of ideology are broken
down into more manageable tasks. Even in a condensed form, critical conclusions can still be
drawn based upon the structures and patterns of ideographs (McGee, 1980). Condit and Lucaites
(1993) see ideographs as the sites of ideological and cultural struggle as meanings shift and
evolve. Describing and charting these most potent ideographs longitudinally, as well as within
specific contexts, helps illuminate the presence and influence of ideology within discourse
(Cloud, 1998).
The first task of ideographic analysis is identification. This requires an analyst to examine
the depths of political discourse to find the potent ideographs within a specific culture (McGee,
1980). In its complete form, this task constitutes the compilation of the entirety of a culture’s
ideographs. An overwhelming task for a singular critic at any given time, this first step is
typically condensed into the identification of only a small number of ideographs or artifacts.
These artifacts can be found within the common political discourse of a given society.
Once identified, the researcher may then trace the history of the ideographs
diachronically, or over time. This diachronic portion of the analysis requires the analyst to study
the evolution of individual ideographs (Potter, 2014). When analyzing diachronically, the
ideographic analyst can see how public discourse and public consciousness evolve with these
ideographs (Kuypers, 2004). The ideographic critic analyzes these developing values, finding the
ways in which a culture defines itself and how it constructs its attitudes regarding the external
world (Sillars and Gronbeck, 2001). Diachronic patterns look much like vertical structures
mapped on a timeline. Ideographs expand, contract, and shift meaning over time and in regards
to specific socio-historical context (Potter, 2014). Diachronic patterns can be traced through
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etymologies in historical dictionaries, as well as through usages in media, textbooks, popular
culture, and political discourse (Potter, 2014).
Rhetorical critics may also analyze the ideographs synchronically, or contextually, in
accordance with one another (Potter, 2014). Once the relevant ideographic artifacts are
identified, an understanding of a culture’s ideological directives can be found through a
synchronic and diachronic evaluation of each ideographic term (McGee, 1980). Synchronic
analysis examines the ideograph within a specific context and in relation to other ideographs in
that same setting. This is done by analyzing the ideographs of a society and understanding how
they are used in accordance with each other and cultural values (Sillars and Gronbeck, 2001).
Ideographic value is largely reliant upon contextual relationships, that is, ideographs get their
meaning, in part, in relation to other ideographs within a specific period of time (Jasinski, 2001).
<Liberty> is best understood when counterposed with ideographs like <security>. An ideograph
cannot exist as such without the presence of other ideographs. Much of this project is a
synchronic analysis of the ideographic artifacts present in the political discourse surrounding
Snowden’s revelations. Due to the recency of Snowden, this dissertation does not engage a full
diachronic analysis. The arguments made in this dissertation, however, can be utilized for a
subsequent diachronic analysis. Through synchronic analysis, the dissertation analyzes known
ideographs as they perpetuate ideology through discourse, specifically <democracy>, <privacy>,
<liberty>, <equality>, <security>, <terrorism>, <patriotism>, and <justice>, and as well
postulates that <Snowden> functions ideographically. This postulation is shown through both a
progression of ideographic theory and a synchronic analysis of <Snowden> as it interrelates with
other relevant ideographs.
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Doing a full historical analysis of a culture’s ideographs provides vital information for
understanding a culture’s ideology as a whole. As noted, ideographs, being fundamentally
ambiguous and indefinite, do not maintain a fixed meaning over time. To the contrary,
ideographs are inextricably fluid even within a particular context. Nevertheless, tracing these
meanings within their appropriate contexts can reveal a culture’s ideology by thoroughly
exposing this framework (McGee, 1980). While the diachronic analysis is vital for this process,
authors like McGee (1980), DeLuca (2012), and Hamilton (2012), have contended that the
synchronic examination is paramount. They have argued that the shape of an ideology can best
be revealed through a thorough analysis of a society’s ideographs within a particular context.
Outlining the entire diachronic and synchronic patterns of a society’s ideographs is
unfathomably daunting. Thus, rhetorical critics have condensed this methodology into more
attainable tasks. Connelly (2012) and Bridges (2008), for instance, have analyzed ideographic
influences within specific contexts. This narrow approach covers the synchronic patterns of
ideographs within a given framework. Other critics, such as Condit & Lucaites (1993) and
Winkler (2012) unveil the diachronic patterns of a singular ideograph, tracing the lineage and
cultural influence of the term. Meanwhile, certain scholars, like Hamilton (2012) and Potter
(2014) look at a more specific artifact, the pattern of one particular ideograph in a specified
context. These smaller scale analyses assist in describing the greater ideology of a society. They
are not the extensive ideographic analysis McGee (1980) originally postulated, but they
nevertheless contribute to the greater understanding of society and ideology. The patterns that
these scholars have identified work to regulate power and construct the reality of the populace
(Miller, 2004).

51
In addition, Kuypers (2004) argued that while ideographic criticism does not offer any
specific criteria which must be evaluated in accordance with the studied ideographs, such
critiques can functionally illuminate how cultural values relate to power, how those cultural
values shift, and lastly how those cultural values inform each other. The versatility of
ideographic criticism is thus elucidated (Lee, 2009). Informed by Brockriede’s (1974)
conception of rhetorical criticism, Lee (2009) discusses the implications of ideographic criticism,
namely, how rhetorical critiques can provide the reification of political irony, false
consciousness, and ideological-rhetorical trends. Ideographic criticism aims “to make us aware
of how specific articulations of ideographic terms can assist in tracing the workings of ideology
as it is instantiated into policy through rhetoric” (Stuckey, 2008, p.103).
6. Applications of Ideographic Criticism
Miller (2004) and Cawley (2013) contributed to ideographic theory by examining the
ways in which discursive ideological tools of the U.S. derive from the founding principle of
individuality. Cawley (2013) asserted that the <autonomous individual> functions as an
ideograph, helping to inform the public decisions of the United States since its inception. This
revelation contends that the contemporary Tea Party movement is functioning out of that element
of American ideology. Miller (2004) states that the ideographic <individual> differs from the
Western humanist conception of the individual, and that the ideographic individual must remain
diverse to maintain salience. Similarly, Connelly (2012), Hamilton (2012), and Hasian (2001)
advance McGee’s ideas that <privacy> and <national security>, <patriotism>, and <right to
privacy> respectively function as ideographs. As well, Winkler (2012) traces the diachronic and
synchronic patterns of <terrorism>, noting its ideographic influence on American society. The
United States, in what is now seemingly a perpetual state of war since invading Afghanistan in
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2001, continues its international conquest for the sake of American <security>. Winkler (2012)
contended that as this narrative has evolved, <terrorism>, and all of its variations, have become
ideographic.
Stuckey’s (2008) analysis of presidential rhetoric notes that <human rights> is one of the
ways U.S. Presidents Jimmy Carter, Ronald Reagan, Bill Clinton, and George W. Bush pushed
an ideology of American exceptionalism and neoliberalism. Equating <human rights> with free
markets and consumer citizenship, each of these Presidents found ways to justify their doctrines
(Stuckey, 2008). As security threats like <terrorism> impose potential harm upon this conception
of <human rights> surveillance initiatives become imperative for the sake of protecting the
power structure (Winkler, 2012). Oppression as it exists in this American narrative is not the
infringement upon civil liberties by the state. Rather, it counterposes this infringement as a
necessary practice in the maintenance of neoliberal <human rights>, where free trade and
consumer citizenship can be upheld through the constant surveillance of publics. These studies
have been integral in the advancement of our understandings of the intersection of rhetoric and
ideology.
7. Evolutionary Applications
In addition to exploring the concept of the ideograph in its original construction,
rhetorical critics have also begun to expand the breadth of the ideograph, and formulate it in a
broader sense. Amernic and Craig (2004) and Bridges (2008) have theorized that the ideograph
can transcend ordinary discourse. They make the claim that September 11, 2001, stylized as
“9/11” or “September 11th”, functions as an ideograph. The distinctive element of this
progression is that this is not a term of historical significance prior to its denotation. As well,
<9/11> functions as an event and is beyond the original terminological conception of the
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ideograph. While <9/11> moves outside of the confines of McGee’s initial postulation of the
ideograph, the argument is made that it still functions in an ideographic manner. Events like
<9/11> powerfully impact American culture, dynamically shift the political landscape, and are
referenced in ordinary political discourse to perpetuate power inequity.
Similarly, Edwards and Winkler (1997) have demonstrated how imagery can function
ideographically. While McGee’s (1980) concept of the ideograph did not account for visual
rhetoric, Edwards and Winkler (1997) claimed that images, like that of the American flag being
raised at Iwo Jima, can function in an ideographic manner. Images are fundamentally outside of
political terminology, but can often appear as much within a greater political discourse as known
ideographs like <liberty> and <equality>. As well, these images can be ambiguous yet
significant, and are often used to justify the wielding of power (Edwards and Winkler, 1997).
Thus, while images are not linguistic per se, they still function in an ideographic manner.
8. Application to Snowden
This dissertation specifically analyzes the responses from U.S. government officials when
directly discussing Edward Snowden. This analysis focuses on the operations of establishments
of power. First, this dissertation functions upon the premise that institutions of power effectively
manipulate mass consciousness, and is specifically concerned with the power of the U.S.
government. The revelations of Snowden put U.S. government officials, particularly those
presiding over surveillance practices, in a rhetorical exigency. Analyzing how these public
officials, as the managers of the political hegemony, responded to this situation is essential in
understanding relationships of power. Covert surveillance, a clear exertion of power by a
hegemon over an unknowing population, when revealed, begs an explanation. The state’s
response to this crisis is the core of this dissertation. Within this exigency it is theorized that
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ideographs are integral to the state response on this matter. Critical analysis of the U.S.
government’s response illuminates how discourse is used to maintain power imbalance.
Ideographs, being intrinsically cultural, lack sound applicability at the international level.
Thus, this dissertation looks only at the U.S. government’s response to <Snowden>. Specifically
examined are messages and responses delivered to the press, which are intended for public
viewing. These communications provide material regarding how the state, in a time of crisis,
responds rhetorically to absolve itself of blame, circumvent situational guilt, and most
importantly, use linguistic and rhetorical means in maintaining its dominant position of power.
The dissertation works to expose political irony and false consciousness within the
American political spectrum through an analysis of power relations reified in the discourse
surrounding <Snowden>. McGee (1980), in outlining the ideograph, and giving examples like
<liberty>, <privacy>, and <rule of law>, lays the theoretical groundwork for this project, as these
concepts are at the crux of the political discourse surrounding <Snowden>. Since Snowden’s
releasing of government surveillance documents, the state and the public alike, in accordance
with media coverage, have engaged in debates regarding the topics of individual <democracy>,
<privacy>, <liberty>, <equality>, <security>, <terrorism>, <patriotism>, and <justice>.
Snowden exposed political ironies and limitless exercises of power operating for the sake of
hegemony.
8.1 Artifacts of Study
The United States, as a mediated democracy, distributes information from government
officials through press outlets. In these moments of information transfer, from government to
media, the state works to control the narrative of any given situation. It is at the intersection of
media and government official that ideology often transforms into discourse, and thus is the
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primary grounds on which this study is based. The posture of this dissertation fundamentally
takes interest in the relations between state power and a <democratic> <citizenry>. This
ideographic criticism focuses on the discursive manifestations of ideology within the mediated
realm of distributed information as it is exchanged between state and media sources.
The dissertation analyzes the discourse between authorized U.S. government officials and
members of the press, where Snowden is specifically mentioned. The occurrences studied in the
dissertation are those of legitimate, government officials when they speak publicly with members
of the press. While it is not argued that the texts analyzed in this study are exhaustive, extensive
efforts were made to identify and examine as many of these occurrences as possible. The
dissertation analyzes all such occurrences over a two year period, between June 5, 2013 and June
15, 2015. This time frame assists in narrowing the scope of the project, but serves two primary
functions as well.
First, the USA PATRIOT Act saw many of its provisions expire at the dawn of June 1,
2015 as Congress opted not to approve the renewal of certain sections. Most notably of these
expired clauses was Section 215, which had allowed for the bulk data collection <Snowden>
brought to light. On June 2, 2015 Congress enacted the Uniting and Strengthening America by
Fulfilling Rights and Ending Eavesdropping, Dragnet-collection and Online Monitoring Act
(USA FREEDOM Act). While this Act broadly renewed many expired portions of the PATRIOT
Act, it specifically called for a ban on the activities allowed by Section 215. Regardless of the
how these acts evolved, it is argued here that the <Snowden> situation directly affected
legislation on government surveillance within the given time frame.
Secondly, this two year time span allows for the development of the narrative and the
underlying concepts. While such a time frame still justifies synchronic analysis, it also gives
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ample time for the ideology to find its way to mold the discourse. The dissertation will not be
doing a full diachronic analysis, but it does monitor the development of the discourse over these
two years which could inform a larger diachronic scope in future studies. Given the artifacts
encapsulated by these specifics, this dissertation uses ideographic criticism to advance two
primary arguments. First, it identifies and analyzes known ideographs as they exist within the
<Snowden> discourse. In doing so, it formulates the term <Snowden> as an ideograph,
identifying it according to the primary characteristics of an ideographic artifact. The reification
of the <Snowden> abstraction develops ideographic criticism as a methodology as it
demonstrates how political agents can be obfuscated for ideological purposes. This dissertation
then subsequently analyzes <Snowden> artifact synchronically with other ideographs. The
analysis articulates how the <Snowden> ideograph was utilized to paradoxically in defense of
governmental surveillance. Secondly, this dissertation examines the interplay of ideographs and
terms of whistleblowing within the discourse. Through synchronic analysis it is reified how U.S.
officials utilized ideography to purge whistleblowing from the public forum and isolate it behind
legislative initiatives in the name of national <security>. Through these processes, U.S. officials
absolved themselves of culpability and engaged in measures antithetical to <democracy>. A
complete list of the analyzed artifacts of this political discourse can be found in Appendix A.
8.2 Analysis of <Snowden> Discourse
This dissertation identifies and analyzes the usages of known ideographs within the
political discourse surrounding <Snowden>. The ideographs of particular relevance here are
<democracy>, <privacy>, <liberty>, <equality>, <security>, <terrorism>, <patriotism>, and
<justice>. These ideographs have already been recognized as such at the scholarly level (McGee
1980, Condit & Lucaites, 1993, Winkler, 2012, Connelly, 2012, Hamilton, 2012, etc.). The
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identification of these ideographs serves a number of purposes. First, it advances the scholarship
on ideographs as artifacts for rhetorical analysis. The continued usage of ideographs legitimates
the theoretical conception of the ideograph. Second, the identification of these ideographs
furthers the greater diachronic analysis of these terms. As noted, the understanding of a culture’s
ideology can be found through diachronic and synchronic analysis of all of its respective
ideographs. With the identification of these terms, this dissertation continues the ongoing
analysis of these ideographs over time. It also aids in the theoretical and analytical development
at the synchronic level. The ideographs will be examined and evaluated in accordance with each
other within a specified context. This synchronic analysis also illuminates various nuances, such
as political ironies, manipulation of terminology, and control of narratives, within American
ideology as it addresses the minutiae of these ideographs and how they function collectively to
perpetuate power imbalance.
This dissertation advances the theoretical development of the ideograph beyond the
limitations of the American political lexicon. As Amernic and Craig (2004) and Bridges (2008)
have noted, events can also function in an ideographic manner. In their work regarding
constructing <9/11> as an ideograph, they argue that ideographs can transcend specific instances
of language. It is in accordance with this concept that the dissertation advances theoretical
development. This project argues that <Snowden>, in transcending beyond the simple
signification of a name to a person, functions at the ideographic level. As the ideograph develops
a broader scope, becoming more inclusive of non-linguistic artifacts, the dissertation posits that
<Snowden> can be conceptualized as functioning in an ideographic manner. While not all
references to Snowden function ideographically, there is a distinct abstraction process of
<Snowden> dictated by the U.S. government over time. This dissertation argues that <Snowden>
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and the situation surrounding the NSA security leaks, transcend their immediate contextual
meanings and connote broader, more fluid manifestations of power. <Snowden> becomes more
than a term appropriated to a particular American citizen. Rather, it becomes a term that
markedly alters the path of history. Common within American political discourse, yet
nevertheless ambiguous, <Snowden> warranted governmental behavior which would otherwise
have been deemed as bizarre and eccentric. The hegemonic power of the U.S. government is
particularly evidenced in how officials methodically deprived U.S. citizens of whistleblowing
power, a vital tool of <democracy>.
Better understanding of how institutions of power maintain hegemonic ideology and
control mass consciousness allows for the collective to address inequity. As a piece of critical
scholarship, this dissertation reifies ideological manifestations of power through symbolism. In
the end, this piece serves not only as a means of identifying the inner workings of U.S. statist
ideology, but also as a step toward alleviating the oppression of the populace by the state. The
dissertation contends that the control of individual and collective cognition is a primary
obstruction in the realization of a society where citizens can fully engage in the <democratic>
process. Using ideographic criticism, this dissertation identifies, in the name of progress, the
discursive means by which statist institutions subjugate the masses.
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Chapter 4: THE <SNOWDEN> IDEOGRAPH
1. Introduction
Having revealed the covert surveillance tactics of the U.S., which violated laws and
agreements, both domestic and abroad, the <Snowden> disclosures served as serious threats to
U.S. hegemony. In order to combat these threats, U.S. officials labored to control the
<Snowden> narrative in their favor. U.S. officials systematically began a controlled public media
trial against <Snowden> wherein Snowden was transformed from a specific referent to a person
to a political abstraction laden with ideological meaning. The discourse of the trial set the
American public against itself as it assaulted certain fundamental tenets of <democracy> in the
name of <security>. The subtexts of the paradox as constructed by U.S. officials absolved the
U.S. of culpability, prosecuted <Snowden>, undermined American civil <liberties>, and
perpetuated a state of fear of <terrorism>. This chapter identifies how U.S. officials imparted
ideology into the term <Snowden> to transform it into a high order political abstraction. A
synchronic analysis follows which extrapolates upon the subtexts of <Snowden> as an
ideological construct.
Engaging in an exposition of the four qualifying elements of an ideograph as they relate
to <Snowden> requires a contextual understanding of the evolution of the ideograph. As
originally conceptualized, ideographs are ambiguously defined, culturally specific, ideologically
powerful terms used regularly within political discourse (McGee, 1980). While McGee’s (1980)
original postulations required ideographs to be linguistic, recent scholarship envisions that
ideographs are far more expansive. Edwards and Winkler (1997) theorize that ideographs
transcend the purely linguistic realm. As well, Armenic and Craig (2004) posit that significant
historical events can become ideographic. The subsequent analysis contends that people, or
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rather the names of people, can evolve into ideographs. Despite the advancement in application,
the criteria for ideographic construction remain the same. Ideographs have four distinct
characteristics: regularity within political discourse, definitional ambiguity, cultural uniqueness,
and they warrant ideological power (McGee, 1980). The following subsections apply these
characteristics to <Snowden> to demonstrate how, while an outward referent to a particular
person, <Snowden> functions at an ideographic level. Shortly after the revelations are made
public, Snowden enters the narrative as the person responsible. As the narrative progresses, U.S.
officials and media alike assist in fashioning the <Snowden> abstraction. It is common practice
for rhetoricians to signify ideographs by placing them in carats. This chapter will contain two
instances of Snowden: Snowden and <Snowden>. References without carats are specific of
Snowden as a person within the narrative. References with carats signify the <Snowden>
ideograph.
As will be extrapolated within the analysis, the <Snowden> abstraction afforded the U.S.
government significant control over the narrative. While Snowden’s actions were illegal, the
U.S. Court of Appeals ruled that the domestic surveillance tactics of U.S. security agencies were
also unlawful. As the narrative unfolded, U.S. officials methodically conflated Snowden with
numerous antagonists of U.S. hegemony, and, enveloped <Snowden> within a palpable
ambiguity. Through multiple process of abstraction, U.S. officials systematically indemnified
themselves of wrongdoing and criminalized not only Snowden, but also, the ideological concept
of <Snowden>. The abstraction process afforded U.S. officials the ability to maintain an ongoing
fear of terrorism. As a result, government officials effectively defended governmental overreach
in the name of national security. Paradoxically, through the fabrication of the <Snowden>
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ideograph, U.S. officials utilized <Snowden> to sustain the illegal practices Snowden had
reified.
2. Constructing <Snowden>
2.1 Political Regularity
In the immediate wake of the leaked documents The Guardian published in June 2013,
which revealed the illegal surveillance practices of U.S. security organizations, <Snowden>
existed almost exclusively as a referent to the person, Edward Snowden. Prior to the leaks,
<Snowden> was entirely absent from the American political narrative. Immediately after the
revelations however, <Snowden> became a focal point within daily political discourse. A LexisNexis search specific to this study was conducted to populate any news report that mentioned
“Edward Snowden” in the two weeks following the initial leaks on June 5, 2013. The search
yielded 1,968 results. Quite clearly, <Snowden> rapidly became commonplace within the
American political narrative. In a similar Lexis-Nexis search, “Edward Snowden” appeared in
937 news media stories in the month of June, 2015, a full two years after the initial release of
classified U.S. security documents. While the appearance of <Snowden> decreased over time,
most certainly the relevance of <Snowden> as a topic of political discourse overall was
maintained.
Vital to this dissertation is the recognition that <Snowden> not only existed regularly in
mediated discourse, but that many of these instances were engagements with U.S. government
officials. In the two years after the <Snowden> revelations, government officials publicly
discussed <Snowden> in 126 press events, thus producing 126 artifacts for this dissertation. In
each of the 126 artifacts analyzed, <Snowden> was directly mentioned at least once. Within the
126 artifacts, <Snowden> is directly referenced a total of 770 times. The high volume of direct
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references to <Snowden>, sustained over time, indicates the importance of <Snowden> within
the narrative.
These data demonstrate the fulfillment of the first ideographic requirement: consistency
within political discourse. While <Snowden> was entirely absent from the political narrative
prior to the <security> disclosures, with a certain immediacy, <Snowden> became commonplace
within national and international politics. The regularity of <Snowden> within U.S. political
discourse endured over time which further supports this first clause. As the <Snowden> storyarch developed, U.S. officials utilized <Snowden> as a rhetorical instrument to obscure public
perception. The constancy of <Snowden> within the political discourse thus, directly relates to
the ideographic characteristic of ambiguity.
2.2 Ambiguity
As the discourse developed, there was almost an immediate separation of <Snowden> the
concept from Snowden the person. Thrust into the political narrative, <Snowden> quickly
became the primary focus of intense political debate. Instantly, disputes arose as to whether
<Snowden> should be considered a hero or a traitor (Hampson, 2013). <Snowden> rapidly
became paramount in discussions of <terrorism> (Miller and Horwitz, 2013), was compared with
whistleblowers like Julian Assange and Chelsea Manning (Bradsher, 2013), was falsely
suspected of working with WikiLeaks (Feinstein, 2013, June 23) and was erroneously accused of
operating as a Chinese spy (Fox News, 2013, June 14). The metamorphosis from Snowden as a
person to <Snowden> as a malleable political concept began instantaneously. At the
terminological level, <Snowden> invariably became entrenched within an already vehement
political atmosphere. In this, the utility of <Snowden> within a political context became
exceedingly expansive.
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A primary indicator to the ambiguity of an ideograph is the ability of powerful political
agents to use political abstractions regardless of public perception. As of July 28, 2015, 167,954
signatures had amassed on the White House’s petition site asking for Edward Snowden to be
pardoned of all potential crimes (Rhodan, 2015). The petition was created on June 9, 2013,
immediately after the release of the NSA documents, and claims:
Edward Snowden is a national hero and should be immediately issued a full, free, and
absolute pardon for any crimes he has committed or may have committed related to
blowing the whistle on secret NSA surveillance programs.
Polls directly following the <Snowden> leaks indicated the deep complexities of the
circumstance. A 2013 USA Today/Pew Research Poll showed that while 54% of Americans
thought <Snowden> should be prosecuted, as opposed to 38% who did not, the public was torn
49% to 48% as to whether they approved or disapproved of the American security practices
<Snowden> revealed (Page, 2013). While the American populace remained uncertain regarding
<Snowden> and surveillance, publicly, U.S. officials were markedly firm in their views. Rather
than deliberate openly, U.S. officials worked swiftly to control the <Snowden> narrative. One of
the most illuminative examples of the manufacturing of the <Snowden> construct was the
engineering of the aforementioned debate as to whether <Snowden> should be deemed as a hero
or a traitor.
On Good Morning America on June 10, 2013, Speaker of the House John Boehner stated
of <Snowden>: “He's a traitor….. the disclosure of this information puts Americans at risk. It
shows our adversaries what our capabilities are and it's a giant violation of the law.” As well, on
June 23, 2013 on Meet the Press, Chair of the House Intelligence Committee Mike Rogers
accused <Snowden> of aiding <terrorist> networks overseas that wish to do harm to American
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citizens, and associated <Snowden> with North Korea, Iran, Cuba, Venezuela, and Russia, all of
whom have strained relationships with the U.S. This posture by U.S. officials was sustained
throughout the narrative. On May 28, 2014 on The Daily Rundown, Secretary of State John
Kerry branded <Snowden> as a coward who betrayed his country.
In addition to the disassociation of <Snowden> from concerns of governmental
overreach, the ways in which U.S. officials and media pundits referred to <Snowden> further
fostered the ambiguity. <Snowden> was applied to numerous international political matters.
Indicative of the interweaving of <Snowden> into international political discourse was an
exchange between the press and State Department Press Office Director Patrick Ventrell on June
25, 2013. Ventrell is asked “Patrick, a couple questions on China.” Before the reporter can finish
the question another member of the press interrupted, asking if the question was going to be
related to <Snowden>. When the initial reporter responded “Yes, on Snowden”, Ventrell asserted
“It’s all related.” Ventrell’s affirmation indicated the conflation of <Snowden> with international
politics writ large, demonstrating the extensive applicability of <Snowden> within the discourse.
This conflation was again seen on August 12, 2013 in a press conference with State Department
Deputy Spokesperson Marie Harf. Harf asks to move the conversation away from Syria. The first
reporter responded plainly “Russia, Snowden”. Such exchanges further accentuated the
coalescence of <Snowden> with topics of perceived political significance.
In a series of press conferences with White House Press Secretary Jay Carney in the
summer of 2013, <Snowden> was referenced in numerous different ways within the discourse
surrounding Russia’s relationship with the U.S. including the “Snowden situation” (2013, June
24), the “Snowden case” (2013, July 17), the “Snowden matter” (2013, August 1), the “Snowden
affair” and the “Snowden disagreement” (2013, August 8). During a press conference on July 12,
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2013, U.S. State Department Spokesperson Jen Psaki was asked a “non-Snowden Russia
question” as if to insinuate an inherent correlation between <Snowden> and U.S./Russia
relations. Furthermore, in a press conference on August 6, 2013, Psaki was asked about the
relationship between the U.S. and Russia with regard to “the Snowden thing.” This positioned
obscurity of <Snowden> functioned to support the broad utility of the term in political discourse.
In these references, there are no direct conversations regarding <Snowden>, as the respective
questions and answers revolved solely around U.S. and Russia relations.
Similarly in press conferences with Carney regarding U.S. and China relations,
<Snowden> existed at the crux of international tensions as <Snowden> appeared as the
“Snowden situation”, the “Snowden story”, and the “Snowden affair” on June 26, 2013, the
“Snowden case,” the “Snowden circumstance,” the “Snowden issue” on July 12, 2013, and the
“Snowden dispute” and the “Snowden matter” on August 1, 2013. Even in a discussion regarding
LGBTQ rights, the term <Snowden> appeared multiple times. Harf was questioned on July 31,
2013 regarding the calls to boycott Russia in the wake of Putin’s inflammatory comments on
homosexuality when vague references to the “Snowden case” were made twice. In addition to
the pertinence of <Snowden> in international relations, the applicability of <Snowden> existed
in domestic politics as well.
In discussions on national politics, regarding domestic surveillance, <Snowden> occurred
with a significant level of vagueness. In a press conference on June 11, 2013, Carney admitted
that the “Snowden incident” had sparked worthy discussion on government surveillance
concerning who should be authorized with access to U.S. surveillance systems. In a Department
of Defense press conference on June 26, 2013, Secretary of Defense Chuck Hagel mentioned the
“Snowden case” in a broad conversation on U.S. surveillance and <security>. Psaki discussed
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“one more Snowden thing” in regards to passport questions in a press conference on July 10,
2013. There was a reference to the “Snowden saga” in the opening of Meet the Press on July 28,
2013. Likewise, in a Hardball interview aired on December 5, 2013 with Chris Matthews,
President Obama referred to the “Snowden disclosures” and how they relate to NSA procedures.
As Obama expounded upon these “disclosures”, he elucidated a key underpinning of this project:
the innate tension between <security> and <liberty>. The direct relationship between
<Snowden> and this historic conundrum amplified the ideographic nature of <Snowden> as it
was being used in the rhetorical posturing of powerful politicians.
Political posturing by U.S. officials assisted in the <Snowden> abstraction process.
Government officials regularly made broad, unwarranted accusations of <Snowden> in order to
publicly associate <Snowden> with unfavorable concepts and concurrently indemnify U.S.
officials of wrongdoing. On June 23, 2013 in an interview on Meet the Press, Rogers states
“Well, it’s concerning. Obviously, what appears to be as of today that he is flying-- will-- will
catch another flight from Moscow, many believe to Cuba. We know that there is air traffic from
Moscow to Cuba, then on to Venezuela. And when you look at it, every one of those nations is
hostile to the United States. I mean if he could go to North Korea and Iran, he could round out
his government oppression tour by Snowden.” The assertions made by Rogers were nonsensical
and never occurred. Yet, in associating <Snowden> with entities that have hostile relations with
the U.S., Rogers obfuscated <Snowden>.
Additionally, U.S. officials used <Snowden>’s passport revocation to blur public
perception of <Snowden>. The U.S. government revoked <Snowden>’s passport when
<Snowden> was in Hong Kong prior to departing for Russia. Ventrell stated in a press briefing
on June 24, 2013: “Hong Kong authorities were well aware of our interest in Mr. Snowden and
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had plenty of time to prohibit his travel.” U.S. officials used <Snowden>’s revoked passport as a
means to further criminalize <Snowden> and deflect attention away from government
surveillance. At a press conference in Tanzania on July 1, 2013, Obama said “Mr. Snowden, we
understand, has traveled there without a valid passport, without legal papers.” Psaki also noted
<Snowden>’s revoked passport on multiple occasions, including in a press briefing on July 10,
2013: “he does not have a valid U.S. passport.” Carney scrutinized <Snowden>’s travels in a
press briefing on July 12, 2013, saying “Mr. Snowden should be returned to the United States
because of the charges filed against him and because -- which is normal practice when you've
been charged with felonies and the revocation of his passport, because he does not have travel
papers or a valid passport, that he ought to be returned to the United States, and where he will
face justice in a system that affords defendants all the rights that every American citizen enjoys.”
As a distraction maneuver, U.S. officials revoked <Snowden>’s passport and then publicly
derided <Snowden>’s travel choices, criminalizing <Snowden> for being abroad without a valid
passport. These rhetorical techniques by government officials deflected public attention away
from illegal governmental surveillance, and, drowned <Snowden> in discourse ancillary to the
informed packed within <Snowden>’s revelations. Overall, the existence of <Snowden> within
these wide-ranging dialogues showcases the ambiguous functionality of the term, which in turn
lent to the signification of its cultural context.
2.3 Culturally Bound
Showcased in the references below, the revelations of <Snowden> reified inherent
tensions within American <democracy>, as these disclosures resituated American political
discourse within the <liberty>/<security> continuum. The <Snowden> discourse evoked intense
dialogues on the limits of <democratic> voice, and how much influence an autonomous
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<individual> has within the political realm. <Snowden> also provoked discussion on the
difficulties a mediated <democracy> faces, particularly within a representative system of
governance.
Revisiting the interview with George Stephanopoulos on Good Morning America on June
10, 2013, Boehner was asked about the privacy of American citizens in the wake of the
<Snowden> revelations. Boehner situated his response firmly within American political and
historical narratives:
George, throughout our history we've had this tug between our principle responsibility as
the government to, to keep Americans safe and at the same time, protect their privacy.
And so there's this balancing act that goes on. And I believe that when you look at this
program and what it does, we, you'll find that we protect the privacy of the American
people while at the same time, giving us tools to keep Americans safe and to go after the
terrorists.
In the June 23 broadcast of This Week, George Stephanopoulos questioned Director of the
National Security Agency Keith Alexander on <Snowden> and the implications of the
revelations. Alexander stated:
It's clearly an individual who's betrayed the trust and confidence we had in him. This is
an individual who is not acting, in my opinion, with noble intent. And when you think
about what our mission is, I want to jump into that, because I think it reflects on the
question you're asking. You know, my first responsibility to the American people is to
defend this nation. And when you think about it, defending the nation, let's look back at
9/11 and what happened. The intel community failed to connect the dots in 9/11. And
much of what we've done since then were to give us the capabilities -- and this is the
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business record FISA [Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court], what's sometimes called
Section 215 and the FAA [Federal Aviation Administration] 702 -- two capabilities that
help us connect the dots. The reason I bring that up is that these are two of the most
important things from my perspective that helps us understand what terrorists are trying
to do. And if you think about that, what Snowden has revealed has caused irreversible
and significant damage to our country and to our allies. When -- on Friday, we pushed a
Congress over 50 cases where these contributed to the understanding and, in many cases,
disruptions of terrorist plots.
Alexander’s comments placed the <Snowden> discourse distinctly within an American context.
By employing the deeply entrenched ideographs of <terrorism> and <9/11>, Alexander
associated <Snowden> with the primary ideological adversaries of the U.S. The subtext of
Alexander’s commentary positioned <Snowden> as an antagonist to American culture by
embedding <Snowden> within the narrative of <terrorism>. The public perceptions of
<Snowden>, as well as the related political implications, were specific to the U.S. within this
framework.
U.S. officials contrasted <Snowden> with American cultural values throughout the
discourse, particularly through the lens of <terrorism>. Kerry remarked in an interview on May
28, 2014 on The Daily Rundown, almost a full year after the <Snowden> leaks, that <Snowden>
put Americans at risk and that <Snowden> is not a <patriot>. On January 16, 2015 in a joint
press conference with the U.K., Obama linked <Snowden> with al Qaeda, a known adversarial
entity of the U.S. White House Press Secretary Josh Earnest, who succeeded Jay Carney, in a
press conference on April 23, 2015 contended that <Snowden> had given insight to <terrorists>,
and condemned <Snowden> for aiding al Qaeda. On May 29, 2015 Carney, had made similar
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claims. The consistent assertion that <Snowden> functioned as an aide for al Qaeda operatives
vilified <Snowden> within the American narrative. As the perpetrators of <9/11>, al Qaeda has
resounding significance in American culture. Placing <Snowden> alongside al Qaeda, and
<terrorism> generally, within the narrative tightly wove <Snowden> into the cultural
underpinnings of the U.S.
Demonstrably, <Snowden> has significantly shaped the political landscape of the United
States. The sustained argument of U.S. officials juxtaposing <Snowden> with American values,
like <liberty> and <individuality>, indicates the cultural relevance of <Snowden>. The storyarch of <Snowden> fits within a greater narrative on <terrorism>, and thus the greater political
narrative of the U.S. The entrenchment of <Snowden> within the cultural narratives of the U.S.
undergirds the ideological leap that afforded U.S. officials with unassailable power.
2.4 Warrant of Power
The fourth and final characteristic which signifies the ideographic metamorphosis of
<Snowden> is the wielding of power by ideological institutions through the rhetorical
manifestations of the <Snowden> terminology. This fourth element distinctively positions the
ideograph at the intersection of rhetoric and ideology. Ideographs function rhetorically to assist
ideological powers in controlling the political cognizance of the masses. Indeed, the first three
elements discussed do not entirely separate ideographs from other political language. The
ideograph becomes uniquely tied to ideology when it grants and perpetuates unyielding powers
to institutional bodies, such as those of the state. The rhetorical magnitude of the fourth
ideographic element behests more nuance than do the previous three. Vital to this distinction is
the ability to indicate that <Snowden> is utilized to warrant manifestations of ideological power.
Such power is most visible in the ways in which U.S. government officials discussed
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<Snowden> alongside other notable ideographs. In particular, this last characteristic is
discernable in how <Snowden> is molded into the narrative according to the state’s perspective.
Pursuant of fortifying <Snowden> as a political abstraction, the discussion of the fourth
ideographic element is broken down into the subsections of <security>, <liberty>, and
<freedom>.
2.4.1 <Security>
While the unwarranted wielding of power can be seen throughout the entirety of the
narrative in various ways, it was through the juxtaposition of <Snowden> and <security> that the
concept was arguably most identifiable. Commonplace within the discourse was the argument by
U.S. officials that <Snowden> served as a threat to American <security>. Indicative within these
arguments was the desired control of the masses by statist institutions. Hence, the most important
role of U.S. officials was to protect the <security> of the masses rather than protect the <liberty>
of the masses, a clear shift away from <democratic> principles.
Carney set a stark contrast between <Snowden> and the <security> of the American
people on May 1, 2014:
Well, I would refer you to the Justice Department for the case against Mr. Snowden. Our
position on him and the fact that he should be returned to the United States where he will
enjoy all the rights of defendants in this country has not changed. And our position on the
fact that as senior national security officials have made clear, including intelligence
officials have made clear, on the fact that those leaks were damaging to our national
security remains unchanged. So I don't have an update beyond that. The case against him
is what it is. I’d refer you to the Justice Department for more details.
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The contrast in this case was elevated as Carney heightened the rhetorical implications of the
leaks by emphasizing the perspective of “senior national security officials”. Carney makes
similar remarks in six other briefings: July 13, 2013, August 1, 2013, October 31, 2013,
December 17, 2013, January 7, 2014, and May 29, 2014. In these utterances, Carney reinforced
the assertion that <Snowden> functioned to the detriment of American <security>. Kerry
reaffirmed this position stating that <Snowden> was a breach of American <security> on three
separate occasions, all on May 28, 2014 (CBS This Morning, The Daily Rundown, Good
Morning America). Thus, as the discourse continued over the period of two years, the position of
the White House remained steady.
The denigration of <Snowden> was crucial to the maintenance of power by U.S.
government officials who placed <Snowden> into a false binary, where <Snowden> was accused
of being antithetical American ideals. Consistently, U.S. government officials described how
much damage <Snowden> had caused, particularly within narratives of <terrorism>. Rogers
evoked elementary dichotomous rhetoric on June 23, 2013 on Meet the Press, speaking in the
literal terms of “good guys” and “bad guys”. He stated in regards to <Snowden>:
He has jeopardized our national security….. Clearly, the bad guys have already changed
their ways. Remember, these were counterterrorism programs essentially, and we have
seen that bad guys overseas, terrorists who are committing and plotting attacks on the
United States and our allies, have changed the way they operate. We’ve already seen that.
To say that that is not harmful to the national security of the United States or our safety is
just dead wrong.
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In a press briefing on July 17, 2013 Carney claimed that <Snowden> caused great harm to
American national <security>. Carney as well contended on August 1, 2013 that <Snowden> put
American lives in danger.
In a speech on U.S. intelligence operations on January 17, 2014, Obama asserted again to
how disruptive <Snowden> had been to U.S. <security>.
We cannot prevent terrorist attacks or cyber threats without some capability to penetrate
digital communications -- whether it’s to unravel a terrorist plot; to intercept malware
that targets a stock exchange; to make sure air traffic control systems are not
compromised; or to ensure that hackers do not empty your bank accounts. We are
expected to protect the American people; that requires us to have capabilities in this field.
Moreover, we cannot unilaterally disarm our intelligence agencies. There is a reason why
BlackBerrys and iPhones are not allowed in the White House Situation Room. We know
that the intelligence services of other countries -- including some who feign surprise over
the Snowden disclosures -- are constantly probing our government and private sector
networks, and accelerating programs to listen to our conversations, and intercept our
emails, and compromise our systems. We know that.
Here, Obama set <Snowden> as the antithesis to the desires of American citizens, equating
<Snowden> with <terrorism> and cyber-crime, contending that the <Snowden> “disclosures”
threatened the everyday lives of Americans, from their bank accounts to their travel plans.
Despite the discourse, there was little change in the wake of the <Snowden> revelations
regarding domestic surveillance. In fact, throughout the narrative, U.S. officials used
<Snowden> to uphold their agenda. Throughout the political and social turbulence created by
<Snowden>, U.S. officials continued to justify their secretive surveillance practices. While
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<Snowden> emphasized the interests of individual <privacy> and <liberty>, government
officials asserted that <Snowden> was a threat to <security>.
2.4.2 <Liberty>
The political contradictions existent within the discourse at the intersection of
<Snowden> and <security> are particularly poignant when compared to that between
<Snowden> and <liberty>. As has been mentioned, it is widely understood that the concepts of
<security> and < liberty> exist in an inherent state of tension with each other. Advances in
<security> are understood to negatively affect the realization of <liberty> and vice versa. In
understanding this tension, it can be assumed that <Snowden>’s revelations could have had a
destructive impact on either the general <liberty> of the American citizenry, or on the general
<security> of the American citizenry, but not both. In their attempts to absolve themselves of
culpability in response to the <Snowden> revelations, U.S. officials argued at length that
<Snowden> severely endangered both the <security> and the <liberty> of the American people.
Considering the theoretical implications of this position, U.S. officials created for themselves an
illogical and perplexing position, ignorant of the <liberty>/<security> continuum. <Snowden>’s
revelations most certainly resituated the American public within the <liberty>/<security>
continuum; however, the inherent contrast between <security> and <liberty> makes the position
of U.S. officials inconsistent as they contended that <Snowden> adversely affected both. The
rhetorical strategy of U.S. officials, albeit irrational, was nonetheless commonplace within the
narrative of a post-<9/11> America, where the tension between <security> and <liberty> is
inescapably fervent.
NSA Director General Keith Alexander claimed on June 23, 2013 on This Week that it
was a fundamental ethic of the NSA to protect <privacy> and civil <liberties>. <Snowden>,
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Alexander contended, caused irreversible damage to that process, harming American citizens and
their allies. Similarly, Obama asserted in a White House presser on December 20, 2013 that the
U.S. operates under rule of law, and is a country that cares about <privacy> and civil <liberties>.
In the same breath, while neither confirming nor denying the allegations of <Snowden>, Obama
denigrated other nations, claiming that the surveillance tactics of more authoritarian regimes are
far worse than that of the U.S. In essence Obama attempted to avert blame from the U.S.
government to <Snowden> by claiming that other countries spy on their respective citizenries
significantly more than the U.S., thus failing to not address the illegal spying done by the NSA.
As a deflection tactic, Obama’s remarks counterposed American ideals with <Snowden> by
affiliating <Snowden> with non-democratic states who have fewer civil <liberties>.
On January 17, 2014 Obama publicly addressed the Department of Justice regarding the
state of national security in the U.S., seven months after the <Snowden> revelations.
Moreover, after an extended review of our use of drones in the fight against terrorist
networks, I believed a fresh examination of our surveillance programs was a necessary
next step in our effort to get off the open-ended war footing that we’ve maintained since
9/11. And for these reasons, I indicated in a speech at the National Defense University
last May that we needed a more robust public discussion about the balance between
security and liberty. Of course, what I did not know at the time is that within weeks of my
speech, an avalanche of unauthorized disclosures would spark controversies at home and
abroad that have continued to this day. And given the fact of an open investigation, I’m
not going to dwell on Mr. Snowden’s actions or his motivations; I will say that our
nation’s defense depends in part on the fidelity of those entrusted with our nation’s
secrets. If any individual who objects to government policy can take it into their own
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hands to publicly disclose classified information, then we will not be able to keep our
people safe, or conduct foreign policy. Moreover, the sensational way in which these
disclosures have come out has often shed more heat than light, while revealing methods
to our adversaries that could impact our operations in ways that we may not fully
understand for years to come.
This excerpt performs two notably conflicting functions. First, Obama worked to emphasize his
own policy while making <Snowden> seem ancillary to the evolution of U.S. surveillance.
Obama admitted that societally, American citizens needed to find the right balance between
<security> and <liberty>, suggesting that the status quo was insufficient. Obama took credit for
wanting the surveillance practices of the U.S. government revisited, effectively disregarding the
impact of <Snowden> within that context, as he claimed that the changes to surveillance were
being reviewed before <Snowden>. Although Obama attempted to delegitimize <Snowden>
when he outwardly stated that he will not discuss <Snowden>, he was actively, in fact,
discussing <Snowden>. Second, while Obama labored to diminish the value of <Snowden>, he
justified the presence of <Snowden> within the narrative. In essence, Obama stated that although
he admitted the U.S. needed to find the right balance between <security> and <liberty>, the
answer could not be found via <Snowden>. In this, Obama fixates <Snowden> as oppositional to
democratic discourse.
2.4.3 <Freedom>
The political irony of U.S. officials is also conspicuous when dissecting the <Snowden>
discourse in relation to the <democratic> ideal of <freedom>. <Snowden> illuminated the
fluidity of these ideographs within the discourse, but as well, ignited a public debate as to the
boundaries of expressive <freedoms> as they relate to political voice. <Snowden> contended that
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by exposing U.S. surveillance tactics, he was working in the best interest of American civil
<liberties> (Starr and Yan, 2013). U.S. officials exerted the complete opposite, stating that by
disrupting American <security> strategies, <Snowden> had caused grave harm to American
<freedoms>. Carney claimed on June 24, 2013:
Let me say this about that question, which is that Mr. Snowden’s claim that he is focused
on supporting transparency, freedom of the press, and protection of individual rights and
democracy is belied by the protectors he has potentially chosen -- China, Russia,
Ecuador, as we’ve seen. His failure to criticize these regimes suggest that his true motive
throughout has been to injure the national security of the United States -- not to advance
Internet freedom and free speech.
Carney was adamant that <Snowden>’s usage of <free> speech was to the detriment of
American <security>. Carney also contended that <Snowden> operated as a detriment to
<freedom> and <free> speech. Relatedly on June 24, 2013, Ventrell, in a press briefing,
forwarded contradictory statements as he condemned the actions of <Snowden> while
simultaneously contending that the U.S. strongly supports the <freedom> of information:
Well, from our perspective he leaked classified information, and that’s a serious crime in
this country. Having said that, the United States has long been a supporter of freedom of
access to the internet, of free communication, and certainly we do these programs to help
keep the American people safe and to help keep people safe in other countries by sharing
tips on terrorists, potential terrorist attacks, and to keep others safe.
The sweeping statements of Ventrell both celebrated <free> communication and chastised
<Snowden> for using it. Correspondingly, on July 12, 2013, Psaki fumbled through a press
conference
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Sheremetyevo Airport in Moscow. Psaki iterated that the U.S. State Department “broadly
believes in free speech”, but that <Snowden> should not have been allowed a public forum.
Psaki thus forwarded an argument where <free> speech is only permissible if approved by statist
powers. This contradictory argumentation of state officials was common throughout the
<Snowden> discourse. The desired deprivation of <Snowden>’s <free> speech is indicative of
layers of authoritarianism within the U.S. federal government.
The analysis of the rhetoric of U.S. officials within the <Snowden> discourse does not
forward a normative argument as to what <freedom>, <liberty>, and <democracy> should look
like. Rather, it is to, first, reify the political contradictions advanced by U.S. officials, and,
second, to recognize the implications of those arguments. Thus, it is insufficient to say that
<Snowden> appropriately exercised <freedom> of expression. Likewise, it is an overreach to
contend that <Snowden> went too far. The most important element of the <Snowden> discourse
as it relates to ideological manifestations of power is the outright contention by U.S. officials to
renounce public discussion on the extensive and illegal surveillance overreach revealed by
<Snowden>. Within the narrative, the U.S. government rejected any possibility that <Snowden>
worked in the interests of the American citizenry. The irony of the greater discourse is the verbal
commitment to <freedom> of expression by U.S. government officials, while unequivocally
silencing the debate created by <Snowden>. U.S. officials pledged support to <democratic>
discourse, but not if it involved <Snowden>, exacting a posture which was paradoxically nondemocratic.
2.2.4 Justification
The condemnation of <Snowden> was only the beginning of the response by the U.S.
government, as U.S. officials employed <Snowden> as an abstraction used for ideological
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means. <Snowden> was existent within, and inserted into, extant narratives on concepts like
<liberty>, <security>, <freedom>, and <terrorism>. The successful scapegoating tactics of
<Snowden> by U.S. officials allowed for the further abstraction of <Snowden> into domestic
and international political narratives. Through their speaking engagements, U.S. officials
threatened <Snowden> with felonies and imprisonment, though they were mute on the illegality
of the NSA’s activities. Certainly it was unlawful for <Snowden> to reveal classified documents,
but the U.S. Court of Appeals found that the revelations regarding the bulk collection of
telephone data by the U.S. government was also illegal (Roberts and Ackerman, 2015).
Rather than engage and foster <democratic> discourse on the NSA surveillance tactics
and the information gathered, U.S. officials diverted public attention away from their
transgressions and the fundamental discussion between <liberty> and <security>. Instead,
officials promoted faux <democratic> debates focusing on <Snowden> as a political abstraction.
The <Snowden> revelations ignited discourse on fundamental tensions within American society,
but that discourse was heavily quelled within the public exchanges between U.S. officials and
members of the press. Instead of using <Snowden> as a channel through which to engage in
<democratic> discourse on the complexities of <security>, <liberty>, and <surveillance>,
<Snowden> became the focal point of the discourse. Indicative of the hegemonic power of the
U.S. governmental system, U.S. officials focused intently and exclusively on criminalizing
<Snowden> rather than on the substantive topics that <Snowden> reified.
The position of U.S. government officials was clear, albeit contradictory, and yet
seemingly active in the perpetuation of its own hegemony. In part, U.S. officials exacted the
perpetuation through the juxtaposition of <Snowden> and <democracy>. As well however,
American officials largely maintained their hegemony through an emphasis on <terrorism>,
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<Snowden>, and the associated fears therein, rather than on the substantive discourse
surrounding the actualization of <democracy> in the U.S. The diversion of the discourse allowed
for U.S. government officials to continue the preservation of power with little resistance,
including their covert surveillance tactics. The dissemination of the narrative of fear of
<terrorism> allowed the hegemonic institution of the U.S. to maintain, if not embolden, its
totalitarian practices. In casting <Snowden> as the problem, U.S. officials were quietly able to
continue covert surveillance to advance their greater global military complex.
2.3 Summary
In sum, <Snowden> encompasses all four aspects of the ideograph. <Snowden> existed
with regularity in American political discourse with far-reaching utility. The ambiguity allowed
for <Snowden> to be turned into a term with a negative valence, effectively permitting the U.S.
government to continue its questionable surveillance practices. Engrained within the narrative of
American society, officials framed <Snowden> as a threat to the American way of life, hence
justifying the activities of U.S. surveillance programs. The identifiable evolution of <Snowden>
throughout the discourse implores a synchronic analysis for the purposes of reifying the
discursive outgrowths of ideological power. The synchronic analysis is conducted through the
examination of how <Snowden> intersects with other established ideographs, namely
<security>, <liberty>, <freedom>, <democracy>, <justice>, and <terrorism>, within the context
of a propagated trial against <Snowden> as created by U.S. officials.
3. Synchronic Analysis
3.1 <Snowden> on Trial
The synchronic analysis of <Snowden> in relation to other common ideographs reveals
two distinct trials as fabricated by U.S. officials. The first referenced trial is one of actual
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legalism which would require Snowden to physically return to the U.S. and enter the judicial
system. The second is not a trial of legalism, but of public perception. The first was regularly
called for, yet never occurred through the entirety of the narrative. The second trial, was never
overtly announced, but has been consistently disseminated by U.S. officials throughout the
entirety of the <Snowden> discourse. The second trial, packaged through covert rhetorical
tactics, was propagated by U.S. officials surreptitiously throughout the <Snowden> discourse for
rights to control public perception. The consistent demands for the <Snowden> legal trial were
used to distract the American public from the ongoing media trial U.S. officials were
promulgating, and, more importantly, from illegal NSA surveillance behaviors. Throughout the
covert trial, U.S. officials prosecuted <Snowden> through the juxtaposition of <Snowden> with
the American values of <justice>, <liberty>, <freedom>, and <democracy>, equating
<Snowden> with <terrorism> and threats to U.S. <security>.
3.2 <Snowden>, <Security>, and <Justice>
Commonplace throughout the <Snowden> narrative is the assertion by U.S. officials that
<Snowden> return to the U.S. to face a trial by jury. Using phrases like “due process” and “fair
trial”, notions that imply <democratic> <justice>, U.S. officials regularly impressed their trial
against <Snowden> upon the public. On Face the Nation on June 23, 2013 Chair of the Senate
Intelligence Committee Debbie Feinstein said:
I want to get him caught and brought back for trial, and I think we need to know exactly
what he has. He could have a lot, lot more. It may really put people in jeopardy. I don't
know. But I think the chase is on. And we'll have to see what happens.”
Psaki stated in a press conference on July 2, 2013
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As you know, Mr. Snowden has been lawfully charged in U.S. courts. He is, as a routine
matter, and I know we’ve talked about this but it’s very relevant here - persons with
felony arrest warrants are subject to having their passport revoked. He remains a U.S.
citizen. We welcome him back to the United States to face the charges against him in
accordance with due process and U.S. law.
Psaki again stated that <Snowden> “should return to the United States to face these charges that
– where he will be accorded a fair trial” in a press conference on July 12, 2013. Carney uttered
similar statements in a press conference on July 16, 2013:
And it should be clear when we see discussions about -- or suppositions or discussions
about the idea that Mr. Snowden is somehow being persecuted, he is a United States
citizen who has been charged with crimes, and under our system of law, he should be
afforded every bit of due process here in the United States, and he should return here to
face trial.
In fact, the message from U.S. officials that <Snowden> should return to the U.S. to face a “fair
trial” or “due process” is repeated a total of 23 times throughout the discourse. On June 24, 2013
Kerry stated in an interview with Elise Labott on CNN:
Well, the United States, through various agencies, is reaching out to lots of countries in
an effort to try to secure Mr. Snowden. He needs to come back to America and face the
justice system based on the choices that he’s made.
The rhetorical posturing of Kerry was strongly presumptuous of <Snowden>’s culpability. On a
June 24, 2013 in a press briefing, Carney concurred:
I would say that we are obviously in conversations and that we are working with them or
discussing with them -- or rather expecting them to look at the options available to them
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to expel Mr. Snowden back to the United States to face justice for the crimes with which
he is charged.
The continued assertion of <Snowden>’s criminality worked to indemnify U.S. officials as it
directed focus toward the illegalities of <Snowden>, which assisted in the public amnesia of
unconstitutional U.S. <security> practices. The public trial of <Snowden> was intensified as
U.S. officials demanded that <Snowden> face <justice>.
The claims that <Snowden> be brought to <justice> held rhetorical significance of a
much greater magnitude than did the claims that <Snowden> face a “fair trial” or “due process”.
While at the definitional level, such legal speak can have synonymy, rhetorically these
phraseologies are work rather differently. While the phrases “fair trial” and “due process” served
paradoxically as accusations against <Snowden>, the utterances that called <Snowden> to be
brought to justice impose exaggerated guilt. Ventrell stated in a press conference on June 24,
2013 that: “we hope that the Russian Government will look at all available options to return Mr.
Snowden back to the U.S. to face justice for the crimes with which he’s charged”. Ben Rhodes,
Deputy National Security Advisor for Strategic Communications, emphatically reiterated this
position eleven times on June 27, 2013 stating that <Snowden> should be brought to <justice> as
did Obama on June 27, 2013. Correspondingly, Carney’s messages consistently mentioned
bringing <Snowden> to <justice>, uttering the phrase ten times in five different press
engagements (July 12, 2013, July 24, 2013, August 1, 2013, October 28, 2013, and February 10,
2014). In fact, Dan Pfeiffer, Senior Advisor to the President (November 3, 2013), Kerry (May
28, 2014, CBS This Morning, Today Show), Psaki (May 29, 2014), Harf (August 11, 2014, June
1, 2015), and State Department Deputy Spokesperson Jeff Rathke (June 15, 2015) all iterated
that <Snowden> should be brought to <justice>. The connotations behind “being brought to
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<justice>” functioned to project a guilty verdict upon <Snowden>. These connotations are
particularly indicative of the ideological posturing of U.S. officials. Whereas U.S. officials use
the definitional values to claim consistency throughout the discourse in regards to <Snowden>
facing “due process” and <justice>, rhetorically the phraseologies indicate the public trial being
propagated behind the façade of a requested formal legal trial. U.S. officials further indict
<Snowden> by contrasting <Snowden> with American values.
In nearly every analyzed artifact within this discourse, U.S. government officials not only
emphasized the criminality of <Snowden>, but set <Snowden> in stark contrast with American
values to forward a prosecution case. U.S. officials regularly referred to <Snowden>’s felony
charges throughout the narrative despite clear evidence reifying the illegality of U.S. surveillance
tactics. The prosecutorial posture of the U.S. government is consistently maintained throughout
the two years of discourse. On July 11, 2013, Carney contended:
But let me say that our position on Mr. Snowden is what it was, which is that we believe
that, and have communicated this to numerous countries, that he should be returned to the
United States, where he faces felony charges and is accused of serious crimes.
On May 29, 2015 Carney reiterated: “What I can say is there’s been no change in our position.
Mr. Snowden is accused of leaking classified information, and he faces felony charges here in
the United States.” Exemplified by Carney’s statements, the rhetorical posture of the U.S.
government remained unchanged over the course of the first two years of the <Snowden>
discourse.
Rogers expanded the accusation of <Snowden> on January 19, 2014 on Face the Nation
by insinuating that <Snowden> had afforded himself <security> clearances not available to the
common American.
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There's some security things that he did get around that were clearly above his
capabilities. The way he departed and how he ended up in Moscow -- now, we still have
some questions there, but I can guarantee you he's in the loving arms of an FSB agent
right today, and that's not good for the United States and it's not good for the information
to be shared with nation-states. That actually hinders and will cost us billions of dollars,
by the way, Bob, to try to rectify the problems he's caused in the military operations.
Not only was <Snowden> juxtaposed with <security> in these statements, <Snowden> was
accused of using his privileges to escape the U.S. This is a rhetorical move by Rogers to
disparage <Snowden> by counterposing <Snowden> with the average American. Although
<Snowden> claimed to have worked in interests of the American public, Rogers contends the
opposite, attempting to create a stronger prosecution case against <Snowden>. A devaluation of
<Snowden> through the association with unwarranted privilege, coupled with an accusation of
an intimate relationship with Russian intelligence (RSB), functioned to move the discourse and
public perception in favor of U.S. government officials. Obama advanced himself as the catalyst
for public debate on issues of national <security>, dismissing the efficacy of <Snowden>. By
claiming to have created the debate, Obama disenfranchised <Snowden> in the political context,
wrongly asserting that <Snowden> was an ancillary element of the discourse. Obama made
similar claims in a White House press conference on August 9, 2013 in reference to the
reevaluation of U.S. surveillance tactics as he acknowledged that while <Snowden> may have
made the discourse more exciting for the press, Obama planned to create the same change
“without putting at risk our national security”. Obama admitted that America needed to find a
productive balance between <security> and <liberty>, but that <Snowden> served as an
obstruction to that process.
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The criminalization of <Snowden> was also used as a means to elevate the position of
U.S. officials within the public debate between <security> and <liberty>. As <Snowden> was
equated with criminality, <Snowden> was cast as a detriment to national <security> and was
fashioned as an impediment to public discourse. When used in consistent repetition, the strategy
of U.S. officials indicted <Snowden> while muting both dissent against American systems of
surveillance and <democratic> discourse regarding <Snowden> and American values.
3.3 <Snowden> and <Democracy>
In functioning to criminalize <Snowden> and indemnify U.S. officials within the
manufactured trial of <Snowden>, the discourse surrounding the disclosures also challenged
inherent values of <democracy>. Analysis of the <Snowden> discourse reveals that U.S.
government officials regularly juxtaposed <Snowden> with <democratic> ideals.
On June 24, 2013 in a press conference, Carney discussed <Snowden> alongside
<democracy> and other notable ideographs:
…Mr. Snowden’s claim that he is focused on supporting transparency, freedom of the
press, and protection of individual rights and democracy is belied by the protectors he has
potentially chosen -- China, Russia, Ecuador, as we’ve seen. His failure to criticize these
regimes suggest that his true motive throughout has been to injure the national security of
the United States -- not to advance Internet freedom and free speech.
Carney’s categorization of political actors within this statement is indicative of the prosecutorial
stance of the U.S. government. While <Snowden> claimed he had acted on behalf of the people
for the betterment of American <democracy>, Carney paralleled <Snowden> with notable nondemocratic regimes (China, Russia, and Ecuador). The rhetorical posturing of the U.S.
government demarcated <Snowden> as the antithesis to American <democracy>. Thus, the
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conflation of <Snowden> with countries deemed to lack <freedoms> of expression, like China,
Russia, and Ecuador, postulated that <Snowden>, and in particular the ideals that informed
<Snowden>, were un-American. The recognition of <Snowden> as a political abstraction is
paramount here. The inference of Carney’s rhetoric attempted to place anyone, including
American citizens who supported the mission of <Snowden>, in opposition to American
<democracy>.
At an international press engagement in Senegal on June 27, 2013 Obama, exercised a
rhetorical move which again presupposed <Snowden> as the antithesis to <democracy>. In his
address, Obama counterposed <democracy> against <Snowden> as he transitioned from
<democracy> to <Snowden>, and then back to <democracy>. The language used in these
commentaries, in particular the transitions from topic to topic, was telling. In the relevant section
of the dialogue, Obama was asked a two part question. The first inquiry was regarding the 2013
Supreme Court decision to strike down provisions of the Voting Rights Act of 1964, and the
second was in regards to <Snowden>. While Obama responded in the order of the questions, the
contrast which ensued was significant.
But in the wake of this Supreme Court ruling, surely we can all agree that people should
be able to vote. They shouldn't be restricted from voting or have to jump through a whole
bunch of hoops in order to vote, and that there should be some uniformity in terms of
how that right is upheld. It's the cornerstone of our democracy. It's what makes our
democracy work. With respect to Mr. Snowden, we have issued through our Justice
Department very clear requests to both initially Hong Kong and then Russia that we seek
the extradition of Mr. Snowden. And we are going through the regular legal channels that
are involved when we try to extradite somebody. I have not called President Xi
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personally or President Putin personally. And the reason is because, number one, I
shouldn't have to. This is something that routinely is dealt with between law enforcement
officials in various countries. And this is not exceptional from a legal perspective.
Number two, we've got a whole lot of business that we do with China and Russia. And
I'm not going to have one case of a suspect who we're trying to extradite suddenly being
elevated to the point where I've got to start doing wheeling and dealing and trading on a
whole host of other issues simply to get a guy extradited, so that he can face the Justice
system here in the United States.
Obama carried on regarding Snowden and was asked if there was any more damage that
<Snowden> could do.
In the meantime, we've got other business to do. For example, we're here in Africa and I
don't want people to forget why we're here……We're seeing countries like Senegal that
have sustained democracy and have sustained peace for many years who want to partner
with us, who are making sacrifices in places like Mali to maintain regional stability.
Within the entire discourse, Obama contested that <Snowden> was inconsistent with
<democracy>. Advantageous to the prosecution of <Snowden>, Obama positioned <Snowden>
as an inhibitor of <democratic> progress. The rhetorical implication of “In the meantime” was
particularly significant, as it simultaneously emphasized <democracy> while destabilizing
<Snowden>. It demarcated the <Snowden> actions as detrimental to the progress of
<democracy> and adversative to <democratic> principles. Obama enveloped the discourse
regarding <Snowden> with discourse on <democracy>, creating a stark contrast between the
two. By moving from <democracy>, to <Snowden>, then back to <democracy>, Obama created
a distinct disparity between these ideographs.
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The juxtaposition is evident not only through the analysis of the intersection of
<Snowden> and <democracy>, but also through an analysis of the intersection of <Snowden>
and <democracy>’s principles. On June 24, 2013 Carney, expressed contempt for <Snowden>
and placed the <Snowden> abstraction as antithetical to <freedom>, a <democratic> principle.
The claims here attested that <Snowden> was un-American by association. By Carney’s logic, it
matters not what <Snowden> did, but rather who was keeping <Snowden> safe. “When it comes
to Mr. Snowden, he’s been indicted for the unauthorized release of classified information. And,
again, I think the point I made is that if his passion here is for press freedom and freedom of the
Internet and the like, that he has chosen unlikely protectors.”
Carney here admitted the tension between the U.S. government and <Snowden> although
both of these entities claimed to be working in the name of <freedom> and <liberty>. Rather
than engage the nuances of the dilemma, Carney employed a logically fallacious argument
stating that in this matter, <Snowden>, through the states within which he has found asylum, was
antithetical to <democracy>. Carney conflates <Snowden> and <Snowden>’s supporters with
authoritarianism.
Ventrell, echoed Carney’s sentiments claiming that if <Snowden> was concerned about
<freedom> of press and <freedom> of the internet, he chose some unlikely state asylums:
I mean, just to say there is a certain irony here, of course, that somebody who says that
he’s about freedom of the internet and freedom of information, of course, would seek out
some of these countries, and particularly you don’t see him standing up for the free flow
of information in some of these countries that don’t always have that.
After another related question on <Snowden>, Ventrell continued:
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Well, from our perspective he leaked classified information, and that’s a serious crime in
this country. Having said that, the United States has long been a supporter of freedom of
access to the internet, of free communication, and certainly we do these programs to help
keep the American people safe and to help keep people safe in other countries by sharing
tips on terrorists, potential terrorist attacks, and to keep others safe.
Ventrell’s flawed logic was similar to Carney’s in attesting that because <Snowden> had found
asylum in non-democratic states, his motives must have been non-democratic. Claiming that the
U.S. has always been a proponent of the <freedom> of information, Ventrell exposed an
underlying political conundrum within the discourse. This propagation is, of course, hypocritical,
as Ventrell is concurrently prosecuting <Snowden>, who, through freedom of information,
exposed covert governmental surveillance. There was an operative chasm between the actions of
<Snowden> and the constructs put forth by U.S. government officials, who, in denying the
efficacy of <Snowden>, claimed identical actions as <democratic> when they did not relate to
<Snowden>.
The generated opposition between the abstractions of <Snowden> and <democracy>,
further indicted <Snowden> within the manufactured public trial. Yet, contrary to the façade
built by U.S. officials who contended that Snowden should return home to face trial,
ideologically, U.S. officials were better served if Snowden remained abroad. In reality, officials
did very little beyond lip service to have Snowden extradited. If Snowden was a true threat to
U.S. hegemony, Snowden would have been sought with much greater fervor. Edward Snowden’s
absence actually allowed for the perpetuation of <Snowden> as a political abstraction, which
sanctioned greater statist and dictatorial powers. In Edward Snowden’s absence, U.S. officials
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were able to continue to prosecute <Snowden> in front of the American people within the greater
<terrorism> narrative.
3.4 <Snowden> and <Terrorism>
American political discourse saw an historic shift with the events of <9/11>. In the
aftermath, <terrorism> immediately became one of the most prominent ideographs within the
historical narrative of the U.S. While the American public had feared <communism> for
decades, those fears progressively waned after the disintegration of the USSR in 1991. Without
any impending threat to American hegemony at the turn of the century, <terrorism>, as an
abstraction, had little interference as it quickly began to inform the cognizance of the American
citizenry with the events of <9/11>. As <terrorism> gained salience within political discourse.
<Snowden> fits distinctively within the post-<9/11> discourse on <terrorism>, <security>, and
<counterterrorism> efforts.
In the immediate wake of <Snowden>, U.S. officials were quick to associate <Snowden>
with <terrorism> and accuse <Snowden> of aiding “the enemy”. Boehner contended that U.S.
surveillance programs were vital tools for fighting against <terrorists> and denounced
<Snowden> as a traitor on June 10, 2013. On June 23, 2013, in an interview on Meet the Press,
Rogers argued that because of <Snowden>, <terrorists> immediately began changing the ways
they communicated. Rogers went on to say that <Snowden> had disrupted <counterterrorism>
efforts to stop <terrorists> who were then plotting attacks against the U.S. and its allies (June 23,
2013). That same day on Face the Nation, Feinstein asserted that <Snowden> had significantly
damaged <counterterrorism> programs that had disrupted over fifty <terrorist> plots. In an
interview as well on This Week on June 23, 2013, Alexander issued a similar argument as he
referenced the more than fifty <terrorist> cases U.S. surveillance had disrupted. Alexander
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further contended that <Snowden> had done irreversible damage to America and its allies, and
made America vulnerable to <terrorist> attacks. On CBS This Morning on May 28, 2014 Kerry
called <Snowden> disgraceful, and accused <Snowden> of telling <terrorists> what they could
do to avoid detection. The relationship between <Snowden> and <terrorism> was further
emphasized throughout the discourse as <Snowden> was often used as a discursive segue into
<terrorism> and vice versa.
While <Snowden> and <terrorism> were often treated as separate talking points, the
transitional regularity with which they were used reinforced the relational significance through
rhetorical association, further criminalizing <Snowden> and enforcing public perception of the
trial by media. On July 2, 2013, in a State Department press briefing, Psaki was asked a question
about <terrorism> in Pakistan, after which Psaki was asked a question on <Snowden>. Likewise,
Carney fielded a question on <terrorism> and unrest in Egypt at a press conference on July 8,
2013. Directly after Carney’s response, a reporter asked to “switch” the conversation to
<Snowden>. Carney briefed the press again on July 9, 2013 and was asked one question on
<Snowden>, which was interestingly placed between a question regarding Guantanamo Bay,
where Carney addressed <terrorism> <justice>, and a question on Afghanistan and the Taliban,
staple entities within the <terrorism> narrative.
It was as if that <Snowden> served only as a means through which to discuss
<terrorism>. On the July 28, 2013 edition of Meet the Press, host David Gregory interviewed
Rogers on the NSA and American <security> generally. Rogers responded by describing
American surveillance programs, emphasizing them as <counterterrorism> efforts. <Snowden>
was not mentioned in the entire discussion until Gregory signaled closure, stating: “Chairman,
I’ve got about 30 seconds left. Edward Snowden”. Rogers moved expediently through his
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remarks on a variety of topics, predictably relating <Snowden> to Russia and <terrorism>. While
<Snowden> and <terrorism> were treated as separate topics, they were conflated through
association within the discourse. On August 5, 2013 Carney was being asked a long series of
questions at a press briefing on <terrorism>, <counterterrorism>, and al-Qaeda. Almost naturally
the discussion transitioned to <Snowden>: “And we are obviously continuing to gather
information to work with our partners and allies as we do that to combat this threat and the
overall threat posed by terrorist organizations that wish us harm”. A reporter then immediately
responded “And on Edward Snowden”. After two statements by Carney on <Snowden>, the
conversation shifts once again back to <terrorism>. As well, after answering a series of questions
on <Snowden> in a press briefing on August 12, 2013, Harf signaled for a new subject. The next
four questions were all distinctively about <terrorism>. These outlined exchanges, where two
seemingly unrelated discussions on <terrorism> and <Snowden> occur successively, happened
regularly over the course of the first two years after the <Snowden> revelations. Furthermore, in
assessing the discourse within the entirety of the 126 artifacts, only 19 artifacts do not directly
associate <Snowden> with <terrorism>, issues of national <security>, or political violence.
Such segues showcase the informative power ideology has over discourse. Functioning to
manipulate cognizance, ideological structures of American exceptionalism adamantly associated
<Snowden> with <terrorism>. The regularity of discursive transitions from <Snowden> to
<terrorism>, and vice versa, exhibit the ideological control over the progressions of thought
among the media and U.S. officials, and thus, the American public. The conflation of
<Snowden> and <terrorism> functioned not only as a scapegoating mechanism, but it created
and perpetuated a false binary within the discourse. As <Snowden> was associated with
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<terrorism>, debates were formulated which forcibly shifted discourse into faux <democratic>
discourse.
4. Discussion
The recognition of <Snowden> as a facilitator the objectives of <terrorism> operated
rhetorically to afford U.S. officials the ability to maintain their positions of power. As
<Snowden> is accused of aiding <terrorist> organizations, <Snowden> allows U.S. officials the
rhetorical leap to set <Snowden> as the antithesis to American ideals. Insofar as <terrorism> has
been established as the enemy of American values, <Snowden> too is cast as the enemy of
America. The mediated prosecution of <Snowden> juxtaposed <Snowden> against the welfare
of the American citizenry. Discursive agents propagating the <Snowden> trial became quickly
fixated upon the character concerns of <Snowden>. As the debate was steered toward
<Snowden> within the greater discourse on <terrorism>, and effectively away from
governmental surveillance, actual discussions on <terrorism> writ large were clandestinely
suppressed. American citizens were made witnesses of a dialogue where <Snowden> was argued
as a hero or a traitor. In result, the deeper conversations on the relationship between <liberty>
and <security> within a <democracy> was largely ignored. For instance, debates on
<Snowden>’s <patriotism> ignored the critical inquiries which engaged the structural elements
of <terrorism>, and the basis for <terrorism> fears altogether. Centering the discourse on
<Snowden> assumed the reality of <terrorism> and yet failed to critique capitalistic and statist
structures that created, enabled, and perpetuated <terrorist> activities.
The conflation of <Snowden> with <terrorism> reinforced the ideology of American
exceptionalism, and effectively obstructed critical discourse which questioned American
hegemony and its relationship with political unrest. Within the narrative of the <Snowden>
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media trial, the prosecution team of U.S. officials worked to classify <Snowden> with arguably
the most rebuked nomenclature of a post <9/11> world: <terrorism>. Successful rebranding of
<Snowden> within the narrative of the trial worked as well to indemnify U.S. officials of
governmental illegality, and granted U.S. officials carte blanche in the continued implementation
of domestic surveillance practices.
Like any narrative, <terrorism> needs systematic reinforcement in order to maintain
relevance. <Terrorism>’s power within the political arena can only be maintained if it is
consistently elemental within the discourse. Acts of <terrorism> alone do not advance a narrative
of <terrorism>. A strong narrative of <terrorism> does not need a <terrorist> attack so long as
the fear of a <terrorist> attack is maintained. Contrarily, <terrorism>, even when exacted, only
needs a mass medium in order to maintain relevance within the narrative. The perpetuation of the
fear allows the state to garner greater powers through the dissolution of civil <liberties> in the
name of <security> against <terrorism>, thus U.S. officials tied major events like <Snowden> to
<terrorism> and exploited it.
Throughout the 126 artifacts of the study, terms of <terrorism> (terrorism, terrorist, and
counterterrorism) are mentioned 579 times. The artifacts of this study were chosen specifically
because they were press engagements with U.S. officials where <Snowden> existed within the
discourse. Within the two years after <Snowden>’s revelations, <Snowden> appeared 770 times
within the discourse. In recognizing that the presence of <terrorism> was not a filter in
compiling the artifacts, it can be argued that <Snowden> serves significant utility for the
preservation of American hegemony within the <terrorism> story-arch. <Snowden> afforded
institutions of power the ability to continue to perpetuate the narrative of <terrorism>. As
<terrorism> was calculatedly intertwined within the discourse surrounding <Snowden>, the

96
propagation of fear grew in its salience. Since the centralized government in the U.S., a
<democratic> institution, cut the basic civil <liberties> of its citizens in the name of <security>,
such impacts are incontrovertibly substantial.
The prosecution of <Snowden> generated a paradox for the American citizenry.
<Snowden> represented American civil <liberties> and resistance to illegal governmental
surveillance. U.S. officials, however, positioned <Snowden> through public discourse in a
manner that put American civil <liberties> on trial. Unbeknownst to the American citizenry, it
has been set up against itself. While Snowden represented the revolution against governmental
overreach, U.S. officials have fabricated <Snowden> into the antithesis of American
<democracy>. Rather than recognizing covert governmental surveillance as un-American, U.S.
officials reproached <Snowden> and political dissidents broadly. The successful implementation
of the <Snowden> mythos served the purposes of hegemonic ideology as it set the American
public against itself. This position is particularly significant in the context of <freedom> of
expression within a <democracy>. According to its theorization, <democracy> inherently allows
for agonistic discourse. Ergo, <democratic> theorization sanctions, indeed welcomes, the
contestation between <citizens> who feel their civil <liberties> have been violated, and their
elected officials. The evocation of criminality in association with actors and actions like
<Snowden> is markedly authoritarian. The political ironies identified in these analyses, along
with the recognized perpetuation of authoritarianism within the <Snowden> discourse, are
illuminative of the ideological powers of <Snowden> and ideographs generally.
As was originally theorized by McGee (1980), ideographs function quite powerfully as
tools of ideology. In this case, <Snowden>, and everything associated with <Snowden>, such as
governmental dissent and citizen opposition against <security>, are conflated with <terrorism>
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and enemies of American <democracy>. Within the narrative of the <Snowden> media trial, not
only does the prosecution absolve U.S. officials of culpability, it justified the dissolution of
certain civil <liberties> through the perpetuation of the myth of <terrorism>. Effectively thus,
U.S. officials were able to turn Snowden, a civil <liberties> advocate, into <Snowden>, the
antithesis to American <democracy>.
The ideographic utility of <Snowden> informs a multitude of non-<democratic>
tendencies within U.S. governmental bodies. <Snowden> served as an illusion of <democratic>
discourse, effectively deterring public attention away from increasing infringements upon civil
<liberties> in the name of <security>. U.S. officials used <Snowden> to perpetuate faux
<democratic> discourse through a covert media trial. As well, <Snowden> was propagated to
preserve an authoritarian perspective, rooted in fear and perpetuated within a narrative of
<terrorism>. Despite the illuminative powers of <Snowden> on the illegal and non<democratic> surveillance practices of the U.S. government, the narrative of <terrorism>
forwarded by U.S. officials repudiated public dissent, effectively silencing <democratic>
discourse surrounding <Snowden>. With substantive <democratic> discourse heavily restrained,
U.S. government officials faced few impediments in the continuation of authoritarian practices,
which expanded the propagation of American exceptionalism and hegemonic constructs like
neoliberalism and neocolonialism. Thus, regardless of Snowden’s best intentions in actualizing
<democracy> and <democratic> discourse, <Snowden> was utilized to forward the fears of a
<terrorism> narrative and advance the authoritarian dominance of American hegemony. To this
end, U.S. officials and their covert surveillance practices are best suited if Snowden never returns
to the U.S.
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Although U.S. officials may claim they want a formal Snowden tribunal, they have
already prosecuted <Snowden> through a public trial. So long as Snowden remains abroad, U.S.
officials can continue to propagate the narrative of <terrorism> in the name of <Snowden>.
Through the rhetorical postulations of <Snowden> within the execution of a media trial, the
ideological institutions of the U.S. keenly used a whistleblower who publicized governmental
infringement of civil <liberties> to justify the continuation of governmental infringement of civil
<liberties> through covert surveillance.
The continued demand by U.S officials that Snowden return to the U.S. functioned to
conceal the public trial that was propagated against <Snowden>. At this juncture the embedded
powers of statist ideology are exposed. Through the implementation of a <Snowden>
prosecution, U.S. officials have been able to use unlawful <counterterrorism> efforts to exact the
continuation of unlawful, authoritarian <counterterrorism> practices. In the end, neither the
<security> of U.S. citizens in the face of <terrorism>, nor the protection of American civil
<liberties>, are the accomplishments of <Snowden>. Rather, the result of the <Snowden> trial is
the advancement of a statist ideology that functions not out of a <democratic> ethos, but solely
out of the continued hegemonic domination of a statist ideology which operated unwaveringly to
maintain the power imbalance of the status quo. Ideologically, <Snowden> functions to forward
American exceptionalism and the abstract enemy of <terrorism>, within which the ideological
structures of capitalism and statism are reinforced. As well, in response to <Snowden>, the
discourse strongly suggests that U.S. officials operated as authoritarians working under the guise
of <democracy>. Even through high profile dissent like <Snowden>, hegemonic institutions can
usurp a narrative for the maintenance of their power. Counterbalancing <democratic> ideographs
against, <Snowden> the political abstraction, through an association with the narrative of
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<terrorism>, U.S. officials used the revelation of covert governmental surveillance to further
authenticate, with the approval of the majority of the American public, ongoing covert
governmental surveillance.
Finally, this analysis formulates significant theoretical development for ideographic
criticism. While scholars have soundly analyzed political terminology and imagery, rhetorical
scholarship has not yet identified the ways in which social agents are transformed into
manifestations of ideology. Methodologically, the Snowden ideograph proposes a rich path of
scholarship for rhetoricians. From the outset, it is reasonable to theorize that a multitude of
political actors are utilized in the same manner as Snowden. Recalling agents from recent
history, the rhetorical valence of President Barack Obama is quite different than condemnatory
allusions to “Obama”. Begrudging mentions of “Hillary” palpably extend beyond a reference to
Hillary Clinton and the variety of public offices she has held. The Snowden ideograph fosters
future rhetorical scholarship around the ideological abstraction of public agents. Through this
analysis it is clear that public figures, particularly those within the political arena, transcend
beyond corporal existence. Through heavily mediated discourse public persona can often become
ideological constructs. In many instances, like in the case of Snowden, that construct operates in
a manner antithetical to the intentions of the original person. In short, <Snowden> was used to
undermine Snowden. In order to further understand ideology and the interpellation processes
thereof, significant extrapolation of these phenomena is required. This analysis illuminates how
institutions of power usurp and rhetoricize public figures for the purposes of their own
hegemony. Additional, similar research can reify the rhetorical nuances of hegemonic ideologies,
providing deeper understanding of their pathologies and political power.
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CHAPTER 5: <SNOWDEN>, WHISTLEBLOWING, AND <DEMOCRACY>
1. Introduction
The development of the <Snowden> ideograph within an overarching whistleblowing
discourse formalized a significant juncture in U.S. history. The Snowden disclosures occurred at
a time when the events of <9/11> were becoming less salient and the subsequent wars in Iraq and
Afghanistan had aged beyond the threshold of a decade. As well, information technology was
experiencing rapid development and with it a regularity of cybersecurity breaches. Additionally,
rogue truth-tellers like Julian Assange and Chelsea (formerly Bradley) Manning were garnering
international attention. Manning, for instance, while serving in the U.S. military, was arrested in
May, 2010 for releasing hundreds of thousands of war documents through WikiLeaks, which had
become an entity known for revealing secret government information.
The upsurge of challenges regarding the ethics of information <security> and the
increased scrutiny of U.S. security agencies prompted the U.S. federal government to exercise a
number of initiatives to protect its own systems of information and technology. One of those
measures was the Whistleblower Protection Enhancement Act (WPEA) of 2012, which provided
protected channels for federal employees who wished to expose governmental misconduct. The
WPEA was passed to deter the continued release of top-secret government information. The
Snowden revelations ignited public discourse on whistleblowing and the protective measures of
the WPEA.
Given the polemics over whistleblower distinctions throughout the discourse, this chapter
constitutes a synchronic ideographic analysis of pertinent, recognized ideographs as they
interreacted within the discursive tension of whistleblower classification. A synchronic
ideographic analysis examines the interplay of ideographs within a particular context. Prior to the
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synchronic analysis, this chapter first provides an overview of U.S. whistleblower protection
laws and previous U.S. whistleblowers. The chapter considers Snowden within these contexts.
The chapter also provides a brief comparative analysis of the whistleblower protection laws of
other nation states. While whistleblowing can occur in any organization, this chapter focuses
succinctly on whistleblowers, most notably Snowden, who illuminate government misconduct.
Through synchronic ideographic analysis, this chapter progresses by discussing the discursive
ideological manifestations of <Snowden> in accordance with whistleblowing vocabulary. The
synchronic analysis is formulated into two primary sections. The first part engages the
intersection of <Snowden> and whistleblowing terminology. In particular, this section
recognizes the progression of how the U.S. government approached <Snowden> within the
greater whistleblowing discourse. The second section analyzes the engagement between
whistleblowing terms and other discursive ideological manifestations, namely <security>,
<democracy>, <privacy>, <liberty>, <freedom>, and <terrorism>. Critical valuations are then
postulated regarding these findings as they relate to the relationships between the citizen and the
state within the U.S. and <democracy> writ large.
2. Whistleblower Legislation
2.1 U.S. Legislation
The first legislative effort by the U.S. to protect whistleblowers was in 1978 with the
Civil Service Reform Act (CSRA). It was the first legislation to afford federal employees of the
U.S. government with protection rights. In 1989, Congress passed the Whistleblower Protection
Act (WPA), which strengthened the CSRA by creating more explicit descriptions of the legal
protections. The WPEA extended the protections of the WPA to include contractors of the U.S.
government. While the WPEA directed government employees to report misconduct to the U.S.
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Office of Special Counsel, it legally included protections for whistleblowers who disclose
information to other sources as well, including the media. The WPEA did not, however, offer
overt legal protection to subcontractors of the government or their employees. The National
Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) of 2013 offered additional protection for governmental
whistleblowers, and even extended those protections for subcontractors of the U.S. government.
However, the NDAA of 2013, and all subsequent renditions (altered and approved annually),
explicitly excluded whistleblower protections for employees, contractors, and subcontractors
within the intelligence community.
2.2 Comparative Analysis
A comparative analysis of whistleblower protection laws around the globe indicates that
the WPA and WPEA are on par with most of their <democratic> international counterparts.
Iceland, for instance, is recognized as having some of the strongest whistleblower protection
laws in the world. Drafted in response to the Icelandic financial crisis in 2008,
the Icelandic Modern Media Initiative (IMMI) legally protects whistleblowers and journalists
alike. The IMMI offers explicit protections for the communication between whistleblowing
sources and journalists. Furthermore, the IMMI protects journalists who publish information
which illuminates the unethical or illegal activity of government officials and corporate
executives. Based on a 2013 report published by Transparancy International, funded by the
Directorate General of Home Affairs within the European Commission, a branch of the European
Union (EU) system of governance, Luxembourg, Romania, Slovenia, and the United Kingdom
(U.K.) are all rated to have “comprehensive or near-comprehensive provisions and procedures
for whistleblowers in the public and/or private sectors” (Worth, 2013, p8). The U.K. for instance,
passed the Public Interest Disclosure Act (PIDA) in 1998. Updates in 2013, among other things,
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protected government employees who disclosed information of public interest directly to news
media (Worth, 2013).
All of these whistleblower protection statutes, including that of Iceland, suspend
protections to whistleblowers who divulge information to outside sources if it is deemed vital to
national security. This has served as a point of contention outside of just the Snowden case. The
U.K., while recognized as having some of the strongest whistleblower protections in the world,
regularly utilizes its Official Secrets Act (OSA) to protect classified information from being
published. Originally passed in 1889, the OSA, akin to the U.S. Espionage Act of 1917, has been
updated four times. The U.K. government has been criticized regularly for being too generous
with classifying information as relevant for national security (Ala’i and Vaughn, 2014). The
U.K.’s legislative efforts overrule whistleblower protection laws in favor of national security.
2.3 U.S. Whistleblower History
Snowden’s existence in U.S. history is unique, in comparison to other prominent
whistleblowers. Daniel Ellsberg, former Special Assistant for the U.S. Department of Defense,
publicly exposed the Pentagon Papers in 1971, long before formal legal protections had been
outlined for whistleblowers against the U.S. government. Former senior executive of the
National Security Agency (NSA) Thomas Drake faced charges of espionage after he blew the
whistle in 2005 on fraud and misuse of funds within the NSA. Drake’s correspondence occurred
before the WPEA, but could have potentially qualified for protections under the WPA had they
not been related to the NSA. Drake contended that he had attempted to follow the appropriate
protocol but was shut down. Given the available details, Drake was exonerated of all charges
except one misdemeanor. Manning’s release of classified information could arguably be
considered whistleblowing, but Manning’s practices were much more haphazard than that of
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Ellsberg, Drake, or Snowden. Manning’s unrestrained decision to release highly classified
information pertaining to national security negated any opportunity for whistleblower
protections. Choosing WikiLeaks as the medium, an organization famous for releasing massive
amounts of classified information into the public forum, did not help Manning, and Manning was
arrested, tried, and convicted under the Espionage Act of 1917. As well, as was demonstrated in
Manning’s trial, whistleblowers are not able to use legal protections like the First Amendment
(U.S.), the Fourth Amendment (U.S.) or the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) of 1967 (U.S.).
Violations of the Espionage Act negate whistleblower protections, and Manning served seven
years in federal prison before President Barack Obama commuted the sentence.
2.4 Snowden and Whistleblower Protection
Snowden did not qualify for any whistleblower protections under the WPEA or the
NDAA. As an employee of a subcontractor within the intelligence community, the U.S.
government was not obligated to provide Snowden with any protections under U.S. law.
Furthermore, the NDAA of 2011 authorized the U.S. government to indefinitely detain
individuals without trial who were deemed as threats to national security. Each subsequent
rendition of the NDAA maintained or strengthened that dictate. Thus, Snowden could have
easily been detained without due process by those laws.
Unlike Julian Assange of WikiLeaks, or Chelsea Manning, who used WikiLeaks,
Snowden only communicated classified information with longstanding, reputable news agencies.
Many democratic theorists argue in defense of WikiLeaks. Certainly the argument for freedom of
information has its validity within liberal democracies, but it is also recognized here that
WikiLeaks often operates quite haphazardly. Snowden, on the contrary, was methodical, and
relied upon journalistic entities with reputations for high ethical standards. Snowden was the first
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internationally known whistleblower after the passage of the WPEA. Snowden contended that he
attempted to follow appropriate whistleblower protocol, but was ignored. Snowden then shared
the information he had gathered with revered institutions of journalism, The Guardian and The
Washington Post, for them to review. Both of the news outlets, and eventually others,
systematically revealed information that illuminated surveillance overreach by the U.S.
government. Given Snowden’s methods, Snowden certainly seems to fit within general
conceptions of whistleblowing. U.S. officials argued, however, that Snowden violated the
Espionage Act and threatened national security, and thus had recused himself of legal
protections. Furthermore, U.S. officials contended that Snowden was not eligible for
whistleblower protections as he did not follow the established protocol, despite Snowden’s
admissions otherwise. Given the measures Snowden took, the content of the information that was
revealed, and the international praise that followed the public disclosures, U.S. officials appear
stubbornly recalcitrant in their position to deny Snowden whistleblower status.
The complexities of the Snowden revelations reify a significant quandary in
<democratic> theory as it relates to whistleblowing. Snowden insisted that he attempted to go
through appropriate channels on at least ten occasions, but was silenced and ignored. Without
legal protections as a whistleblower, but with information that served of significant public
interest, Snowden chose to flee the U.S. to meet with journalists from The Guardian. While U.S.
officials condemned Snowden for disclosing the information and fleeing the U.S., there is good
reason to believe that had Snowden remained in the U.S., he would have been detained
indefinitely and the information never released. Snowden’s decisions were defended by former
whistleblower and former Senior Executive of the NSA, Thomas Drake, who stated that parts of

106
the U.S. intelligence community “have become a criminal enterprise” and that releasing the
information from a secure location abroad was Snowden’s only viable option (Nelson, 2013).
Snowden’s dilemma demonstrates a point of contention within <democratic>
actualization. Snowden readily admitted that he illegally downloaded and released classified
information to the media and that in so doing he violated his non-disclosure agreement.
However, it was also ruled in 2015 that some of the NSA’s surveillance measures, like the bulk
collection of phone records, were illegal. The Planning Tool for Resource Integration,
Synchronization, and Management (PRISM), a problematic U.S. security program that collects
real-time data on U.S. citizens from sites like Facebook and Google, has also been heavily
scrutinized since Snowden’s disclosures. A public advocate appointed by the Foreign
Intelligence Surveillance Court (FISC), also known as FISA Court under the Foreign Intelligence
Surveillance Act of 1978, to investigate PRISM concluded in 2016 that the program was patently
unconstitutional for violating the Fourth Amendment. The Privacy and Civil Liberties Oversight
Board made similar assessments in 2014. Despite these assessments, PRISM was nonetheless
defended by the FISC magistrate and was reauthorized by Congress in 2018 (Nakashima, 2016).
Snowden’s disclosures have shown to have significant value in <democratic> discourses
on whistleblowing, civil <liberties>, <security>, and governmental surveillance. Public
knowledge of these surveillance systems stems directly from Snowden’s revelations. The
disclosures elucidated illegal and unethical behaviors of the U.S. government, yet, the legal
structures of the U.S., or any nation state for that matter, prohibited and continue to prohibit
political agents in Snowden’s situation to take action. Snowden’s actions have been defended
and celebrated on countless fronts, including by prominent <democratic> organizations like
Amnesty International, Human Rights Watch, and the American Civil Liberties Union. Yet, the
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U.S. government continues to criminalize Snowden and defend its surveillance tactics.
Furthermore, U.S. officials refused to accept any level of accountability for their illegal actions,
and have effectively done little to alter their surveillance measures. Perhaps most alarming is the
refusal to address the shortcomings in whistleblower protections for agents like Snowden. The
laws that created Snowden’s predicament have only been strengthened since Snowden’s
revelations, further strengthening the inviability of whistleblowing against the intelligence
community of the U.S. government. As the forthcoming synchronic analysis reifies, national
defense is the measure by which statist ideology perpetuates itself.
3. Whistleblowing and the Ideograph
3.1 The Classification of Snowden
Consistently throughout the Snowden discourse U.S. officials and members of the media
grappled with the legal classification of whistleblowers. In the two public interviews by U.S.
officials the day after the Snowden saga began, White House Press Secretary Jay Carney (June
10, 2013) and Speaker of the House John Boehner (June, 10, 2013) were each asked about
Snowden’s status as a whistleblower. Throughout the first six months of the discourse, press
agents continued to inquire about Snowden’s whistleblowing status. A full reading of the
dialogue illuminates three primary postures the U.S. government adopted in relation to
Snowden’s whistleblower status. In the first phase, U.S officials abstain from discussions on
Snowden and whistleblowing. Shifting into the second phase, U.S. officials directly address
Snowden, and outwardly deny Snowden of whistleblower status. The final phase is signified by
an aversion to discussions on Snowden and the formal purging of whistleblowing from the
discourse. These three postures shift through the chronology, connoting three distinct phases
which are discussed in turn.
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3.2 Phase I: Refrain
In the first phase, U.S. officials refrained from forwarding whistleblower distinctions
altogether, and avoided direct commentary related to Snowden’s distinction as a whistleblower.
During this phase, the federal government remained publicly observational. While the U.S.
government largely abstained from commenting on whistleblowing in the opening weeks of the
Snowden narrative, the public and the press were not so reserved. Sparked by media attention,
debates on <Snowden> captivated the public. Largely, the debates revolved around how
Snowden should be classified. The posture adopted by U.S. officials helped in obscuring
<Snowden> and demonstrates Goodnight’s (1982) private sphere, where political deliberation
occurs outside of the public forum. Undoubtedly, officials were discussing Snowden behind
closed doors, but those deliberations were not offered into the public forum during the first
phase.
Spanning the immediate two weeks following Snowden’s revelations, the U.S.
government displayed a precautious posture during the first rhetorical phase. Only five artifacts
exist in this first phase, despite the regularity with which Snowden appeared in the general news
discourse. Of the five artifacts, four of them were press briefings with Carney. The other was an
appearance by Boehner on Good Morning America.
When asked in a press briefing on June 10, 2013 about public assertions that Snowden
should be considered a whistleblowing hero, Carney refrained from any formal
acknowledgement, stating “Well, I won’t comment specifically on an individual or his status.”
Similarly in the White House press briefing the following day, Carney was asked if Snowden
should be considered a traitor. Carney answered “Again, I won’t comment specifically on
someone who’s under investigation. I won’t characterize him or his status”. Later in that same
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briefing, Carney delivered a prepared statement on whistleblowers and the protections afforded
to them by the WPEA, which was enacted in November of the previous year.
The Obama administration has demonstrated a strong commitment to protecting
whistleblowers. The whistleblowers can play an important role in exposing waste, fraud,
and abuse. There are established procedures that whistleblowers can employ that also
protect -- rather ensure protection of national security interests. And I would -- if you
look at the history here, the President appointed strong advocates to the Office of Special
Counsel and the Merit Systems Protection Board, who have been widely praised. They
have collectively issued an all-time high number of favorable actions on behalf of
whistleblowers and have begun to change the culture so that whistleblowers are more
willing to come forward. On November 27th, 2012, after four years of work with
advocates and Congress to reach a compromise, the President signed the Whistleblower
Protection Enhancement Act, which provides whistleblower protections for federal
employees by clarifying the scope of protected disclosures, expanding judicial review,
expanding the penalties imposed for violating whistleblower protections, creating new
protections for transportation security officers and scientists, creating whistleblower
ombudsmen, and strengthening the authority of the Office of Special Counsel to assist
whistleblowers. Because it was clear that Congress would not provide protections for
intelligence community whistleblowers, the President took executive action, issuing a
landmark directive that extended whistleblower protections to the intelligence and
national security communities for the first time. The directive prohibits retaliation against
whistleblowers who report information through the appropriate channels and established
procedures, including a review panel of IGs of other agencies to ensure that such
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retaliation does not occur. The President’s commitment on this issue far exceeds that of
past administrations, which have resisted expanding protections for whistleblowers and in
doing so have steered away from transparency.
Carney’s statement articulated the U.S. government’s official position on whistleblowers and the
protections afforded to them. The position publicly indicates the legal arguments that U.S.
officials will begin forwarding in the campaign against <Snowden>. While Snowden is not
directly addressed by Carney, the U.S. government was positioning itself to deny Snowden of
whistleblower status.
Immediately thereafter, Carney was asked if the White House viewed Snowden as “a
whistleblower or a leader”. Carney responded by stating “I am not willing to comment on the
status of the individual under investigation.” (June 11, 2013). Carney relayed the same message
again the next day: “I've simply said what our disposition is on this, that we're not going to
comment on the subject of a recently begun and ongoing investigation into the unauthorized
disclosure of classified information” (June 12, 2013). Carney repeated this equivalent claim
again the following day.
After Carney’s press conference on June 13, 2013, ten days passed before any U.S.
official addressed <Snowden> again. The first phase includes these ten days of silence as it
represents the initially cautious posture the U.S. government assumed regarding Snowden’s
revelations and corresponding whistleblowing implications. The lack of artifacts in the first
phase reveals the hesitancy with which U.S. officials approached <Snowden>. This silence
demonstrates not only the ongoing investigation that Carney described, but also the attempts by
the U.S. to apprehend Snowden abroad. As Snowden avoided international seizure, U.S. officials
began their ideological campaign against <Snowden>.
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3.3 Phase II: Denounce
The rhetorical shift into the second phase was initiated by Snowden’s move from Hong
Kong to Moscow on June 23, 2013. Having failed to negotiate Snowden’s return to the U.S.,
governmental officials assumed a formal posture on Snowden’s whistleblowing status. The
second phase highlights a rhetorical turn where U.S. officials adopted the perspective that
Snowden was indeed not a whistleblower. Officials actively engaged in denoting the importance
of this distinction. U.S. officials agree to enter the public phase of political deliberation
(Goodnight, 1982), denouncing Snowden publicly and denying Snowden of whistleblower
status.
Chairwoman of the Senate Intelligence Committee Dianne Feinstein (June 23, 2013) and
Chairman of the House Intelligence Committee Mike Rogers (June 23, 2013) effectively
launched the second phase of the discourse by openly stating that Snowden was not a
whistleblower. In regards to Snowden’s status, Rogers contended that:
He went outside all of the whistleblower avenues that were available to anyone in this
government, including people who have classified information. We get two or three visits
from whistleblowers every single week in the committee, and we investigate every one
thoroughly. He didn’t choose that route”. Feinstein concurred, stating “Well, I don't think
this man is a whistleblower.
The second phase of the discourse is marked by an adamant denial of Snowden’s whistleblowing
status by U.S. government officials, and justifications of felony charges due to accusations of
irreparable harm to U.S. interests. The most detailed and pejorative remarks came from Jen
Psaki, State Department Spokesperson, in a Department of State press briefing on July 12, 2013.
Earlier that day, Russia had afforded Snowden a public forum in the Moscow airport. Psaki’s
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press briefing was largely a direct response to the forum. When asked if the Department of State
believed that Snowden should not have been allowed to speak publicly, Psaki stated “Our
concern here is that he’s been provided this opportunity to speak in a propaganda platform” and
that “Russia has played a role in facilitating this, that others have helped elevate it.” The press
prodded further, asking “people who are accused of crimes are allowed their right of free speech,
are they not?” Psaki eventually retorted “We certainly are upset that there was a platform for an
individual who’s been accused of felony crimes.”
The respective dialogue during Psaki’s public briefing is the quintessence of the
overarching quandary surrounding the <Snowden> discourse as it reified governmental
hypocrisy and exposed the unconditional self-interest of U.S. security agencies. Within the same
conversation, Psaki defended the right to free speech, but condemned Snowden for being granted
a public forum. The exploration of this quandary serves as a primary impetus for rhetorical
inquiry into the contestation over the term “whistleblower”. Contentions analogous to that of
Psaki manifested with Carney on August 1, 2014 as well. Carney asserted:
Mr. Snowden is not a whistleblower. He is accused of leaking classified information and
has been charged with three felony counts, and he should be returned to the United States
as soon as possible where he will be accorded full due process and protections.
After another question, Carney continued:
When you take an oath to protect the secrets of the United States, you're bound to protect
them and there are consequences if you don't. There are also procedures in place for
whistleblowers that are available to those who would blow the whistle, if you will. The
unauthorized leaking of classified information has and can do enormous damage to our
national security interests.
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In a Department of State press briefing on June 24, 2013, State Department Press Officer
Patrick Ventrell, when asked of Snowden and whistleblowing, stated:
Well, from our perspective he leaked classified information, and that’s a serious crime in
this country. Having said that, the United States has long been a supporter of freedom of
access to the internet, of free communication, and certainly we do these programs to help
keep the American people safe and to help keep people safe in other countries by sharing
tips on terrorists, potential terrorist attacks, and to keep others safe. So there’s really a
pretty strong distinction there, and we feel pretty strongly about it.
On July 28, 2013, Rogers heightened the <Snowden> rhetoric on Meet the Press:
He has disclosed programs that make it easier for terrorists overseas. And the first people
who are going to feel that damage are our soldiers in Afghanistan. We need to understand
that. This is serious and it’s real. As well as empowering Chinese and Russian
intelligence officials….He missed every opportunity to be a whistleblower when he
missed every opportunity to talk to a whole host of avenues for him.
Similarly, during the White House press briefing on August 1, 2013, Carney contended:
Mr. Snowden is not a whistleblower. He is accused of leaking classified information and
has been charged with three felony counts, and he should be returned to the United States
as soon as possible where he will be accorded full due process and protections.
It is no surprise that the U.S. government responded to Snowden in this manner. Historically,
U.S. officials go immediately on the defensive against whistleblowers, like in the case of
Ellsberg and Drake. While Ellsberg and Drake both understood their potential for extensive
prison sentences, they were both guaranteed a trial. Under the NDAA of 2013, Snowden had no
such guarantee.
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Having signed whistleblower protections into law, Obama contended that Snowden
should have used the prearranged avenues set forth by the WPEA (August 9, 2013):
If the concern was that somehow this was the only way to get this information out to the
public, I signed an executive order well before Mr. Snowden leaked this information that
provided whistleblower protection to the intelligence community -- for the first time. So
there were other avenues available for somebody whose conscience was stirred and
thought that they needed to question government actions.
Obama asserted that by not using these protections, Snowden forfeited all whistleblower defense
rights. Congruently, Feinstein suggested on the November 3, 2013 installment of Face the
Nation, that by not following protocol, Snowden forfeited any opportunity for clemency:
He had an opportunity, if what he was was (sic) a whistleblower to pick up the phone to
call the House intelligence committee, the Senate intelligence committee and say, look, I
have some information you ought to see. And we would certainly see him, maybe both
together, maybe separately, but we would have seen him and we would have looked at
that information. That didn't happen. And now he's done this enormous disservice to our
country. And I think the answer is, no clemency.
Rogers as well indicated disdain for Snowden on the December 22, 2013 episode of This Week:
He has traded something of value for his own personal gain that jeopardizes the national
security of the United States. We call that treason. And I think that letter -- I think very
clearly lays out who this gentleman is and what his intentions were clearly. And so would
I like him to come back? He should come back. He didn't use any of the whistleblower
protection avenues laid out before him. None. Zero.
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While government officials were emphatic that Snowden was not a whistleblower, the topic was
regularly addressed throughout phase two, that is, through the end of 2013. The second phase is
defined by the U.S. government outwardly contending, quite extensively, that Snowden was not
a whistleblower. The third and final phase marks a distinctive shift away from comprehensive
discussions on whistleblowing by U.S. officials, despite the continued regularity of
whistleblowing discussions in the public forum.
3.4 Phase III: Purge
The final turn, denoted when governmental proceedings resumed in January of 2014 after
the holiday break, also signified the U.S. government’s general averseness to public discussion
on <Snowden> and whistleblowing. In this last stage U.S. officials maintained their few key
talking points and deflected additional questions that pertained to <Snowden>. Whistleblower
language was noticeably absent in the third phase. Whistleblowing was not mentioned in the first
27 artifacts of 2014, and whistleblowing did not reappear in the <Snowden> discourse until May
29, 2014. Instead, officials focused exclusively on the U.S. government’s request that Snowden
return to the U.S. and face trial for three felony charges. Members of the press had regularly
inquired about Snowden’s whistleblower status in phases one and two, but not in phase three.
The purging phase moved whistleblowing discourse into Goodnight’s (1982) technical phase.
U.S. officials refused to engage the topic of whistleblowing in the public forum, having defaulted
to legalistic language throughout the second phase. The silent posture in the third phase marks
the formal disassociation of the public from whistleblowing deliberations. Forcing deliberation
into the technical sphere is a decidedly anti-democratic move as it disassociates the public from
the political forum.
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There was a clear shift by both the media and the U.S. government, when interacting with
each other, away from whistleblowing terminology at the beginning of 2014. Of the eighty total
occurrences of whistleblowing terms in the entirety of the discourse, 75 happen prior to 2014.
The final phase effectively purged the concept of whistleblowing from the narrative. The
rhetorical shift in phase three demonstrates the control that statist ideology has upon U.S.
<democracy>. Whereas theories of <democracy> unequivocally agree that media should
function as the fourth estate, U.S. news organizations yielded to the dictates of the U.S.
government and stopped pressing officials about Snowden and whistleblowing. Despite the
publication of Snowden’s disclosures, media outlets exposed their submissiveness by
participating in the development of each phase. The development of three distinct phases
throughout the <Snowden> discourse informs the subsequent synchronic analysis.
4. Synchronic Analysis
4.1 Phase I: Refrain
Through the discursive exchanges in phase one, U.S. officials established their
definitional position on whistleblowing, affording themselves carte blanche in their eventual
handling of <Snowden>. Only once was Snowden directly addressed by U.S. officials in the
first two weeks of the discourse when George Stephanopoulos of Good Morning America asked
Boehner on June 10, 2013 if Snowden should be considered a “whistleblowing patriot” or a law
breaker who betrayed the American people. Boehner then immediately used the question
concerning whistleblowing to perpetuate the <terrorism> mythos by replying: “He's a traitor. The
President outlined last week that these were important national <security> programs to help keep
Americans safe, and give us tools to fight the terrorist threat that we face.” Boehner did not
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directly address the status of Snowden as a whistleblower, but insinuated that whistleblowing is
counterproductive to American <security> interests.
Carney issued the most extensive comment on whistleblowing during the first phase with
a prepared statement in a press briefing on June 11, 2013. Within that statement, which mentions
whistleblowing terms fourteen times, <security> is referenced three times. <Security> is the only
other ideograph present within Carney’s statement. Carney defends the President’s authorization
of whistleblower protections in the interest of protecting those who work in national <security>.
While Carney never directly mentioned Snowden, the statement implied that Snowden’s actions
were harmful to national <security>: “There are established procedures that whistleblowers can
employ that also protect -- rather ensure protection of national security.” Although the discussion
on whistleblowing was minimal in phase one, Boehner and Carney were laying the groundwork
for the U.S. government’s position on whistleblowers.
4.2 Phase II: Denounce
4.2.1 <Terrorism> and <Security>
The most evident relational interplay within the <Snowden> discourse between
whistleblowing and relative ideographs was with that of <security> and <terrorism>. Throughout
the <Snowden> dialogue, <terrorism> and <security> appeared with regularity and significance.
<Terrorism>, one of the most prominent ideographs in the U.S. after <9/11>, was continuously
reinforced throughout the discourse, and was juxtaposed against U.S. <security>. <Terrorism>
and <security> operated not only in conjunction with the construction of the <Snowden>
ideograph, but also worked to jettison whistleblowing from the narrative. U.S. officials did this
by denying Snowden whistleblower status for not following WPEA protocols and threatening
national <security> by abetting <terrorists>. Thus, U.S. officials utilized prominent ideographs,
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like <terrorism> and <security>, to concurrently obfuscate <Snowden> and usurp the power of
whistleblowing.
During phase two, federal officials constructed the <Snowden> abstraction and removed
<Snowden> of all whistleblowing distinctions. In doing so, U.S. officials utilized the media
attention to reiterate the ideological threats of <terrorism> and reemphasize the importance of
secretive national <security> initiatives. Additionally, U.S. officials admitted that they were
unaware of how much information Snowden had not yet released. The campaign against
<Snowden> is also read as preemptive, in order to criminalize Snowden before the exposure of
additional information. Anticipating the continued disclosure of classified intelligence
information, especially during the beginning of the denunciation phase, U.S. officials publicly
campaigned against <Snowden> as a measure of self-preservation.
Throughout phase two, the state labored to protect itself against future public dissent.
State officials continuously reduced the acceptable designation of the public whistleblower; they
used their platform to misappropriate the discursive value of public whistleblowers writ large by
confining whistleblowers to governmental mandates. In an interview on Face the Nation on June
23, 2013, Feinstein stressed that Snowden was not a whistleblower, further asserting of Snowden
“the damage he's done is essentially to reveal a program which has worked well and disrupted
<terrorist> plots. And there are more than 50 <terrorist> plots that it has played a role in.” On
July 28, 2013 Rogers stated on Meet the Press that Snowden had bypassed all opportunities to be
a whistleblower and in doing so, had made it easier for <terrorists> overseas. In a press briefing
on August 1, 2013 Carney contended of Snowden: “He’s not a dissident. He’s not a
whistleblower.”, and further stated “The unauthorized leaking of classified information has and
can do enormous damage to our national <security> interests.” Continuing the narrative on the
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January 19, 2014 airing of This Week, Rogers reiterated that Snowden had blown every
opportunity to be a whistleblower and “has traded something of value for his own personal gain
that jeopardizes the national <security> of the United States.” Reaffirming the U.S.
government’s position nearly a year after the initial Snowden revelations, Carney remarked on
May 29, 2014 in a White House Press Briefing that Snowden failed to follow whistleblower
protocol. In that same briefing, Carney also accused <Snowden> of supporting al Qaeda and
other <terrorist> networks.
The unreserved prosecutorial stance of the U.S. government remained throughout the
<Snowden> discourse. Oftentimes, U.S. officials simply refused to engage in discussions on
specifics saying, for instance, they will not comment on individuals in an “open investigation”
(Obama, 2014, January 17). While U.S. officials largely refrained from discussing the particulars
of Snowden, a review of the discourse indicates that officials were most concerned that Snowden
revealed how U.S. security institutions surveilled the masses. U.S. officials stressed that
Snowden compromised national security by exposing to potential enemies “the nature and
methods of our intelligence collection” (Rhodes, 2013, June 27). However, those methods were
declared unconstitutional by the U.S. Court of Appeals. Phase two illuminates the campaign by
U.S. officials to dismiss public debate on <Snowden> and whistleblowing by pushing the
discourse eventually into the technical sphere.
U.S. officials redirected the discussion of whistleblowing to the ideological perpetuation
of fears of <terrorism> to assist in the denial of whistleblowing within the narrative. Thus, in the
same way that <Snowden> functioned to maintain ideological fears, terms of whistleblowing
were utilized as trigger mechanisms for the continuation of the <terrorism> narrative. When
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asked about Snowden and blowing the whistle on state sponsored surveillance, Ventrell
defaulted to <terrorism> rhetoric, stating:
Well, it is, and it is for a reason, because we’re talking about very different things here.
On the one hand, you’re talking about some of our intelligence programs, which again, I
can’t always get into detail, but broadly speaking are to help keep us safe, to go after
terrorists, and that are done in a legal way through our different branches of government,
including with judicial oversight, including through the Congress (June 24, 2013).
Obama articulated that signing off on protections for whistleblowers allowed the U.S. to
continue to safeguard itself against <terrorists>:
I’ve got a problem with what’s going on here, I’m not sure whether it’s being done
properly. If, in fact, the allegations are true, then he didn’t do that. And that is a huge
problem because a lot of what we do depends on terrorists networks not knowing that, in
fact, we may be able to access their information.
At times, government officials were asked specifically about the weakness of whistleblower
protections for intelligence community subcontractors, like Snowden. In those instances, U.S.
officials skirted interrogation and reiterated fears of <terrorism>. For instance, in a press
conference on May 29, 2014, Carney was asked “Do you acknowledge that the whistleblower
protections in the intelligence community are essentially much weaker than in any other part of
government?” Averting the question, Carney responded:
What I can tell you is that there are avenues available to somebody like Mr. Snowden to
raise those kinds of concerns and whistleblower allegations.…I think that it is fair to say
that it is the view of the U.S. government that what Mr. Snowden did was a violation of
the law, that it was a serious offense; that as many senior people in the national security
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apparatus have attested to, damaging to our national security, made it easier for or gave
insight to our enemies, to terrorists that makes it harder for the United States and our
allies to go after them….Unauthorized disclosures of classified information harm U.S.
and allied efforts to identify, track and disrupt the activities of our adversaries, including
terrorists. Many of these efforts are born of years of carefully managed intelligence
efforts. As a result of these disclosures, our adversaries, including terrorists and their
support networks, now have a better understanding of our collection methods and are
taking counter measures.
In addition to this avoiding the concept of whistleblowing, federal officials reiterated their
appeals for power as they pressed the <terrorism> narrative.
Throughout the discourse, U.S. officials used whistleblowing both as a keyword prompt
to proliferate a fear of <terrorism> and as a platform to contrast whistleblowing against the
interests of national <security>. While whistleblowing terms themselves did not authenticate
ideological manifestations of power, they functioned as linguistic mechanisms which recurrently
preempted ideological posturing. Recognizing the context and the public awareness of the
whistleblowing discourse, U.S. officials used keyword language to reinforce the predominant
fear of terrorism in the wake of <9/11>. The ideological hegemony of the state was largely
maintained through consistent discussions of external <security> threats. While this posture is
not uncommon for hegemonic states, Snowden’s revelations of illegal governmental surveillance
placed the U.S. government in a precarious position. Given that there were no legal ramifications
for any U.S. official in the wake of <Snowden>, it appears that U.S. government officials were
able to absolve themselves by controlling the discourse in their favor.
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4.2.2 <Liberty>, <Freedom>, <Privacy>, and <Democracy>
In addition to being synchronically analyzed with <security> and <terrorism> discourse,
whistleblowing utterances will also be analyzed alongside the ideographs <liberty>, <freedom>,
<privacy>, and <democracy>. Unlike <terrorism> and <security>, these ideographs were almost
entirely absent from discussions on whistleblowing in all three phases. The absence is striking
considering the regularity of these terms within the greater political discourse outside of
interactions with U.S. officials. For instance, of the examined artifacts, the term <democracy>
appeared 180 times. None of these utterances were in regards to whistleblowing conversations
between the press and state officials. <Liberty> only appeared 12 times, but never within the
context of whistleblowing discourse. The term <liberties>, as an ideographic variant of
<liberty>, was uttered 66 times within the <Snowden> discourse. Like the utterances of
<liberty>, not once was this term mentioned in the context of whistleblowing. <Privacy> was
mentioned 256 times in the entirety of the <Snowden> discourse. None of these occurrences
existed in the same comment from a U.S. official as the term whistleblowing.
The only examined ideograph to exist directly within conversations between state
officials and members of the media was the term <freedom>. It appeared 176 times within the
entire discourse. However, only 3 of these utterances occurred within relevant whistleblowing
conversations. In each of these 3 occurrences, <Snowden> was juxtaposed against the concept of
<freedom>. On June 24, 2013 Ventrell conflated <Snowden> with heavy governmental oversight
stating:
I mean, just to say there is a certain irony here, of course, that somebody who says that
he’s about freedom of the internet and freedom of information, of course, would seek out
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some of these countries, and particularly you don’t see him standing up for the free flow
of information in some of these countries that don’t always have that.
The aforementioned exchange between Psaki and the press on July 12, 2013 contained the
second utterance. Psaki never mentioned the word <freedom>, but in response to a question as to
whether or not Snowden should forfeit the right to <freedom> of speech, Psaki stated “He’s not a
whistleblower. He’s not a human rights activist. He’s wanted in a series of serious criminal
charges brought in the eastern district of Virginia and the United States.” Lastly, Rogers, on
December 22, 2013, made claims similar to that of Ventrell, asserting of Snowden: “He didn't
use any of the whistleblower protection avenues laid out before him. None. Zero. He went to the
press. Then he went to the bastion of internet freedom, China, and then Russia.” In each of these
three occurrences, <Snowden> and the practice of whistleblowing are postulated as antithetical
to the concept of <freedom>.
The presence of whistleblowing terms were not moderated in the mediated public forum,
signifying the value of the whistleblowing’s absence within media interactions with U.S.
officials. Through a variety of news media searches, media outlets congruently discussed
<Snowden>, whistleblowing terms, and democratic concepts like <liberty>, <freedom>,
<privacy>, and <democracy>, with an incredibly high regularity. LexisNexis searches were
conducted to measure the frequency of the analyzed ideographs within news media. Searches
were performed within specific date ranges as the two years of discourse provided an
innumerable amount of results. Searches were conducted for mediated stories that included
“Snowden” and any whistleblowing term which also included either <democracy>, <freedom>,
<privacy>, or <liberty>. From June 5, 2013 through July 5, 2013, LexisNexis populated 2571
news items that matched the criteria. The same search was conducted for the last month of the
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analyzed discourse, from May 15, 2015 through June 15, 2015 which populated 398 results. For
all searches, new publications of high similarity were excluded to avoid redundancy. The sheer
volume of results demonstrates the regularity of discussions at the intersection of <Snowden>,
whistleblowing, and democratic ethos. Clearly, news media and the public were grappling with
these concepts. The avoidance of this discursive intersection by U.S. officials further indicates
their attempts to purge whistleblowing, control the narrative, and silence government dissent.
Historically, one of the paradoxes of <democracy> is striking a publicly amenable
balance between <security> and <liberty>. Contemporarily, that discussion has been
concentrated to a debate between concerns of <privacy>, as a conflated subsidiary of <liberty>,
and <terrorism>, as a threat to <security>. While Snowden’s whistleblowing actions were a
primary catalyst for public discourse, the U.S. government sought to ensure that Snowden did
not provide the public with the impetus for further deliberation. While mediated public discourse
regularly admitted the importance of Snowden within the debate between <security> and
<liberty>, U.S. officials refused to acknowledge the connection. Whistleblowers are granted
narrative power when referenced as stimuli for public dialogue. Thus, while U.S. officials
frequently addressed public concerns of <privacy> and <security>, the discussions occurred at a
considerable distance from whistleblowing discourse. U.S. officials treated Snowden’s
whistleblowing in the same way they treated Ellsberg, Drake, and Manning, reducing them to
their criminal accusations and stripping them of any importance within the narrative. Within the
<Snowden> discourse U.S. officials contended that they were sincerely concerned with finding
the right balance between <security> and <privacy>, but the relative deliberative processes were
entirely unrelated to <Snowden> or whistleblowing.
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4.2.3 Legalism
U.S. officials regularly diminished the role of <Snowden> within the context of the
debate, which afforded the state control over the discourse. Carney was asked on June 10, 2013:
There’s a petition on the White House website saying, ‘Pardon Edward Snowden
immediately,’ calling on the President to issue a pardon -- 12,000 signatures last time I
saw. What is the White House reaction to such a notion and to the sense that he is a hero?
Some are calling him a hero for being a whistleblower on this. What does the White
House say to that?
The question by the press specifically asked about Snowden and whistleblowing within the
context of governmental surveillance. Regardless of the intent of the petitioners, Carney showed
no interest in directly addressing Snowden or Snowden’s growing public support. Instead,
Carney instantly disassociated Snowden and whistleblowing from the narrative, and rebranded
Snowden’s actions as disastrous, reckless, and criminal. “When it comes to the petitions, we
obviously await a threshold being crossed before we respond to it, and that threshold has not
been crossed.” Carney further stated:
I think Director Clapper has spoken about this, I think the President has, that in general,
leaks of sensitive classified information that cause harm to our national security interests
are a problem -- a serious problem. And they’re classified for a reason. And as I said I
think to Jessica, when you -- and I’m basically paraphrasing Director Clapper -- that
when you divulge information that provides a playbook, if you will, to how we -- to
efforts that this government undertakes to counter the efforts of those who would kill
Americans or attack the United States in some way, or our allies, you’re assisting them in
evading those measures.
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The following day (June 11, 2013), Carney strengthened the rhetoric, and further articulated that
Obama had already emphasized the importance of publicly addressing the relationship between
<privacy> and <security>.
As you heard the President say on Friday, he believes that we must strike a balance
between our security interests and our desire for privacy. He made clear that you cannot
have 100 percent security and 100 percent privacy, and thus we need to find that balance.
He believes as Commander-in-Chief, that the oversight structures that are in place to
ensure that there is the proper review of the kinds of programs that we have in place,
authorized by Congress through the PATRIOT ACT, and FISA do strike that balance. He
also said that he understands and believe it is entirely legitimate that some may disagree.
Some may believe that that balance ought to be shifted in one direction or the other from
where it currently is, and he welcomes the debate about that. He mentioned this very
explicitly in his speech to the National Defense University several weeks ago on the
broader topics of our counterterrorism programs, but he spoke specifically about
surveillance and the balance that we need to strike between security and privacy, between
security and inconvenience. And that is a worthy discussion to have in public and he
welcomes that debate, because it’s an important debate. And I think it’s important to note
that we have had this debate every time the PATRIOT ACT has come up for passage and
reauthorization. And it has been a spirited debate with strongly held opinions expressed
by people who are opposed to the structures that are in place that have been authorized by
bipartisan majorities in Congress, that are overseen by the courts, as well as internally by
the executive branch. So that's important and it’s healthy and we should continue to have
that debate.
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Governmental control of the narrative continued throughout the second phase of the <Snowden>
saga wherein U.S. officials assumed ownership of the debate and downplayed <Snowden> and
whistleblowing in general. In a White House press conference on August 9, 2013, Obama
exemplified such governmental control. As Obama proposed actions to address the public
concerns regarding illegal surveillance, he minimized the federal government’s culpability while
subversively acknowledging fault, and further stressing the ideological enemy of <terrorism>.
And that's why, over the last few weeks, I’ve consulted members of Congress who come
at this issue from many different perspectives. I’ve asked the Privacy and Civil Liberties
Oversight Board to review where our counterterrorism efforts and our values come into
tension, and I directed my national security team to be more transparent and to pursue
reforms of our laws and practices. And so, today, I’d like to discuss four specific steps -not all inclusive, but some specific steps that we’re going to be taking very shortly to
move the debate forward. First, I will work with Congress to pursue appropriate reforms
to Section 215 of the PATRIOT ACT, the program that collects telephone records. As
I’ve said, this program is an important tool in our effort to disrupt terrorist plots. And it
does not allow the government to listen to any phone calls without a warrant. But given
the scale of this program, I understand the concerns of those who would worry that it
could be subject to abuse. So after having a dialogue with members of Congress and civil
libertarians, I believe that there are steps we can take to give the American people
additional confidence that there are additional safeguards against abuse.
Obama carefully framed Section 215 of the PATRIOT Act in a manner that recognized the legal
impetus for reform while also indemnifying the federal government in its surveillance matters.
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Obama’s rhetoric, in a convoluted manner, afforded himself the credit for reforming the
illegal practices that he adamantly defended. Principally, this was done by discursively
convicting <Snowden> and purging whistleblowing from the narrative. Obama claimed that he
would work with Congress to “improve the public’s confidence in the oversight conducted by the
Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court”, create more transparency for these programs by
directing “intelligence community to make public as much information about these programs as
possible”, and foster additional oversight by “forming a high-level group of outside experts to
review our entire intelligence and communications technologies”. Obama assumed the onus for
the development of the contemporary debate as he assured the public he would provide “greater
assurances that the court is looking at these issues from both perspectives -- security and
privacy”, but did so by devaluing <Snowden> both directly and indirectly. He first alluded to
Snowden by stating:
The men and women of our intelligence community work every single day to keep us
safe because they love this country and believe in our values. They're patriots. And I
believe that those who have lawfully raised their voices on behalf of privacy and civil
liberties are also patriots who love our country and want it to live up to our highest ideals.
Obama was then directly asked about Snowden and his status as a whistleblower, to which
Obama responded,
So the fact is, is that Mr. Snowden has been charged with three felonies. If, in fact, he
believes that what he did was right, then, like every American citizen, he can come here,
appear before the court with a lawyer and make his case. If the concern was that
somehow this was the only way to get this information out to the public, I signed an
executive order well before Mr. Snowden leaked this information that provided
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whistleblower protection to the intelligence community -- for the first time. So there were
other avenues available for somebody whose conscience was stirred and thought that they
needed to question government actions.
Later, Obama directly referenced Snowden as well by stating:
And there’s no doubt that Mr. Snowden’s leaks triggered a much more rapid and
passionate response than would have been the case if I had simply appointed this review
board to go through, and I had sat down with Congress and we had worked this thing
through. It would have been less exciting. It would not have generated as much press. I
actually think we would have gotten to the same place, and we would have done so
without putting at risk our national security and some very vital ways that we are able to
get intelligence that we need to secure the country.
Obama’s rhetoric defended covert governmental surveillance while downplaying whistleblowers,
like Snowden, within the narrative. In essence, while Obama admitted that the debate between
<security> and <liberty> was important, Obama devalued Snowden’s tactics. The subtext of
Obama’s statements imply that U.S. citizens would be better off not knowing that they were
being illegally surveilled. Obama’s posture deprived <Snowden> and whistleblowers of narrative
power, despite the obvious catalytic relationship between whistleblowing and the relevant
debate. Obama achieved this by pointedly rejecting whistleblowing as an integral element to the
deliberations. Obama negated the significance of whistleblowing when he contended that
Snowden failed to use the appropriate protocol. Whistleblowing thus, as designated by Obama,
was delegitimized when executed outside of statist interests. Obama accosted Snowden, and
threatened future whistleblowers who operate outside the control of the state.
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4.3 Phase III: Purge
4.3.1 Discourse
Officials in phase three seemingly eliminated the concept of whistleblowing from the
discourse. Having delegitimized whistleblowing and obfuscated <Snowden>, U.S. officials
halted the elaboration of the <Snowden> narrative and avoided discussions on whistleblowing
almost entirely. With only five mentions of whistleblowing in the third phase, it seems the
concept was successfully avoided. Governmental officials certainly did not initiate discussions
on whistleblowing, and press officials stopped engaging U.S. officials on the matter. Having
reemphasized the ideological manifestations of <terrorism> and <security>, U.S. officials
utilized the <Snowden> discourse to position public whistleblowing as destructive to American
society. The extraction of whistleblowing from the narrative in the third phase symbolized the
federal government’s covert control over the <Snowden> discourse and public whistleblowing
writ large. <Snowden>, having been fabricated by U.S. officials as a political abstraction,
assisted in the dismantling of public whistleblowing against the state.
4.3.2 Legalism
Snowden and a host of legal experts contended that because the Whistleblower Protection
Act of 1989 and the Whistleblower Protection Enhancement Act of 2012 both explicitly deny
protections for subcontractors of the intelligence community, whistleblower protection laws
would not have applied to Snowden. Yet, U.S. officials continuously asserted that Snowden
would have been ensured whistleblower protections had the appropriate protocol been followed.
The difficulty for legal defense in this case is that Snowden publicly admitted to exposing
classified information. The U.S. federal government deemed the exposed information vital for
national <security>, and thus Snowden was charged with violating the Espionage Act. Felony
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charges of espionage supersede any possibility for whistleblower protection. In sum, Snowden
never had formalized whistleblower protection and cannot at this juncture be retroactively
granted whistleblower protection.
The unwavering position of the U.S. government was informed by two key legal
premises. First, U.S. officials recognized that by dropping the felony charges against Snowden or
offering Snowden amnesty, could have spurred legal trouble for U.S. <security> agencies. As it
was, the NSA had already faced multiple legal battles regarding its surveillance tactics. The NSA
narrowly escaped legal culpability in the Supreme Court case Clapper v. Amnesty in February
2013. Charged with illegally surveilling on U.S. citizens and organizations, the Supreme Court
ruled in favor of the NSA on a count of 5 to 4, stating that the plaintiffs could not prove that the
NSA had spied on them. Snowden has cited this Supreme Court case as a reason he disclosed the
NSA tactics, so as to give proof of illegal surveillance. The ACLU filed a lawsuit on June 11,
2013 in the wake of Snowden’s revelations. The lawsuit was later dismissed, but the ACLU won
an appeal to reopen the lawsuit. The case was again dismissed in October of 2015, but was
ongoing during the analyzed discourse. In June, 2017 the plaintiffs won an appeal of the 2015
dismissal. By upholding the criminalization of <Snowden>, the U.S. government can avoid
culpability. The public exoneration of <Snowden> would likely have bolstered legal cases
against the NSA. Thus, maintaining a steadfast position against <Snowden> was a protective
measure by the U.S. government for its own interests.
Second, sustaining the denial of Snowden’s whistleblower status effectively guaranteed
that Snowden would not immediately return for trial. Rejecting Snowden’s whistleblower status
strengthened the political abstraction process of <Snowden>. While Snowden stayed abroad and
at a distance, the U.S. government amplified the ambiguity of <Snowden>, which in turn assisted
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in the perpetuation of the overarching <terrorism> narrative. With the salience of <9/11> fading,
<Snowden> could be used to revamp fears of <terrorism> and silence dissent on governmental
surveillance practices. The government’s denial of whistleblowing protections for Snowden thus
served as more than just a legalistic stance. It was also a discursive distinction that advanced the
operative control of statist ideology. This can be seen through the perpetuation of the
<terrorism> narrative and the general disregard for governmental overreach, but also through the
precedent U.S. officials set on the act of whistleblowing.
5. Whistleblowing and <Democracy>
The <democratic> citizen exists in a realm of discursivity, which ultimately engages and
reflects its inherent paradox. U.S. <democracy> is still largely symptomatic of modernist
thinking as it innately engages in a classification system of false binaries. The whistleblower, as
a complex societal role, does not fit comfortably into any such dichotomy and the practice of
whistleblowing exposes the inherent paradoxicality of <democracy>, notably between <liberty>
and <security>, and <equality> within a representative government. Snowden’s revelations, in
existing after the enactment of the WPEA, placed U.S. officials in a precarious position. While
Snowden was not legally protected by the WPEA, U.S. officials contended otherwise. The
governmental reaction to Snowden indicated that whistleblower distinctions would now be
dictated by the government, and that as a concept, “whistleblower”, became a legal distinction.
On several occasions, U.S. officials heralded Ellsberg for the Pentagon Papers, but berated
Snowden, despite the incredible similarity between the two cases. One could argue that by
commuting Manning’s sentence, Obama offered credence to the information that Manning had
released.
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Using <Snowden> as their public example, U.S. officials have installed the WPEA to
protect themselves from public dissent and litigation. As per the arguments of U.S. officials
within the <Snowden> discourse, the WPEA provides the U.S. government with legal authority
over whether or not someone is considered a whistleblower. The binary created by U.S. officials,
especially as it relates to U.S. security agencies, dictates that whistleblowers are only recognized
and protected if their grievances are purged from the public forum. With this posture, the
democratic public unjustifiably loses all reasonable access to the grievances of whistleblowers.
The only option for whistleblowers who wish to call public attention to governmental
malfeasance is to go rogue, and risk their lives as Snowden did. The <Snowden> discourse
vividly demonstrated this multifaceted relationship. The press consistently interrogated U.S.
officials with an undergirding desire to classify <Snowden> and whistleblowing as either
destructive or productive. U.S. officials were adamant that public whistleblowing was
destructive. Rather than address the internal tension that whistleblowing creates for
<democracy>, U.S. officials suppressed the theoretical construct of whistleblowing and purged it
from the narrative. The unsettling nature of whistleblowing goes beyond the elucidation of illegal
activity and abuse of power. Whistleblowing challenges the ideologies that maintain the status
quo. U.S. institutions of power thrive upon ideological posturing. Power imbalance is maintained
through perpetual discursive manifestations of ideology.
Whistleblowing exists exclusively within a relationship of power imbalance. The nature
of whistleblowing implies that a vulnerable political agent is exposing the illegal and/or
unethical behavior of another, more powerful political agent. The existence of a whistleblower
thus reifies a destabilization <democracy> in that it necessarily admits an anti-democratic power
imbalance. The presence of <Snowden> demonstrates the deficiencies American <democracy>.
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While institutions of U.S. ideology may grandiloquently assert <America> as the beacon of
<democracy>, the existence of Snowden reifies a much harsher, authoritarian reality. Snowden’s
existence as a whistleblower revealed the power structures existent beyond the façade of
American <democracy, which in turn holds greater significance than the revelations themselves.
The forced expulsion of the whistleblower from the <Snowden> discourse by U.S. officials
illuminated the difficulty that <democratic> institutions perpetually face. The very existence of
whistleblowing innately challenges the ideologies that maintain the status quo.
While it arguably functions as free speech within a liberal <democracy>, whistleblowing
can expose undergirding societal authoritarianism. Any such authoritarianism is antithetical to
<democracy>. Thus, beyond the legal ramifications of affording Snowden the whistleblower
label, the acknowledgement of Snowden as a whistleblower allows the practice to become a part
of state sanctioned <democratic> discourse. Media outlets and public polls largely agreed that
Snowden was indeed a whistleblower for carefully exposing unconstitutional surveillance tactics
by the U.S. government. The precedent set by U.S. officials in denying Snowden’s whistleblower
status severely threatens <democratic> ethics. Additionally, not once did U.S. officials positively
associate whistleblowing with any other <democratic> ethos. Affirmative discursive association
of relevant ideographs with the concept of whistleblowing would connote an intricate
relationship, effectively giving whistleblowing a place within <democratic> discourse.
Throughout the <Snowden> discourse however, there was a conspicuous aversion by U.S.
officials to the establishment of this relationship.
6. Whistleblowing and Ideography
One of the research questions guiding this analysis addressed the possibility that, like
<Snowden>, the term “whistleblower” functioned ideographically within the applicable
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discourse. While the term was used regularly within political dialogue and has rhetorical utility
in support of ideology, it failed to satisfy all requirements of ideography. First, within the
discourse, there was not enough evidence to indicate that whistleblowing terms held the required
cultural nuance. Secondly, while there was an obvious confliction within the discourse as to
whether or not Snowden should be considered a whistleblower, there was little recognized
ambiguity regarding the term “whistleblower” itself. The general public and media largely
agreed that Snowden functioned as a whistleblower and while U.S. officials strongly contended
otherwise, both positions were succinctly articulated. While these entities defined
“whistleblower” differently, they were able to forward coherent definitions, meaning that
whistleblowing terminology lacked the full measures of ideography.
7. Discussion
By their nature, <democracies> must afford themselves the tools of their own destruction.
The restriction of those tools, while potentially articulated via <democratic> means, operates in a
manner antithetical to <democracy>. The U.S. government has roundly rejected appropriate
protections for whistleblowers against its intelligence community. In fact, U.S. officials have
labored to disqualify the potential for whistleblowing to even occur in this realm. By purging
whistleblowing from the narrative, U.S. officials have forcibly excluded a necessary and viable
avenue of public dissent against the state. The position of U.S. officials demonstrates the
fundamental authoritarian posture of state institutions. In effect, the maintenance and protection
of the state take precedent over <democratic> ethics. Only in matters of national security is
whistleblowing unprotected. In effect, the U.S. government is valuing its existence over
<democratic> principles. While this posture is not unique to the U.S., in fact all nation states
share the same inherent posture, the posture is anti-democratic. <Snowden> thus, demonstrates a
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prominent paradox that all contemporary <democracies> must face. States must either adhere to
<democratic> principles and defend whistleblowing within <security> agencies, or, default to
authoritarianism out of their own self-interests.
U.S. officials touted the WPEA and its internal channels as the means for whistleblowers
to actively protect themselves and the security of U.S. citizens in general. However, it is
counterintuitive to the concept of whistleblowing to exclusively support government-sanctioned
whistleblowing protocols. By denying Snowden whistleblower distinctions, the U.S. government
holds Snowden in exile as an accused felon. <Snowden> represents the ultimatum for future
whistleblowers. In essence, all future whistleblowers against the state must either blow the
whistle according to the state’s terms or risk their respective lives. While the dictates of the
WPEA are democratically derived, they are destructive to democracy. The whistleblower,
already in a contentious position, is now thrust into a perilous conundrum. By maintaining their
posture on <Snowden>, the government can now funnel all whistleblowers through their own
discreet system to avoid public humiliation and accountability. With the WPEA, the U.S.
government set itself up with tangible recourse for future whistleblowers.
The U.S. government’s denial of Snowden’s whistleblower status elucidated covert
ideological power. Systemic ideologies maintain their hegemony when their subjects are divided.
The polemics of the <Snowden> discourse were indicative of Stasis theory and the taxonomy of
Western thought (Golden, Berquist, Coleman, and Sproule, 1976). Within the taxonomy, a social
actor must first understand the facts of a case in order to correctly define the subject. Only when
the subject is classified can the social agent move onto arguments of quality and policy. As U.S.
officials contradicted public opinion in prominent media outlets regarding the definition of
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Snowden as a whistleblower, the topics of policy and quality were largely avoided and ignored
by U.S. officials.
The <Snowden> discourse demonstrates how whistleblowing is the quintessence of
<democracy>. It is simultaneously destructive of <democratic> institutions and productive for
<democratic>

discourse.
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against

the

government
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the

<democratically> constructed state with the actualization of <democratic> <free> speech. It is a
<democratic> weapon of the demos that can only be exercised to counteract manifestations of
authoritarianism. Whistleblowing, existing both within, and outside of, <democracy>,
necessarily functions paradoxically, and the recognition of this is vital to the conceptualization of
<democracy>. Certainly, as with all <democratic> ethics, whistleblowing should be approached
with appropriate caution. Unrestricted <freedom> of information requests, for instance,
necessarily infringe upon <privacy> and civil <liberties>. As with all <democratic> ideals, there
is no single resolution for whistleblowing. <Democracy> is evolutionary and potentially selfdestructive by its nature. <Democracies> must necessarily concede to ongoing challenges to their
existences. The Snowden disclosures afforded the institutions of the U.S. the opportunity to
assist in the progression of democracy. However, as U.S. officials hid behind the shield of the
WPEA, democratic discourse was largely abandoned.
A primary utility of whistleblowing is the initiation of public deliberation. The
compulsory reliance upon modernistic thinking, as existent within <Snowden>’s society,
demonstrated how public deliberation often occurs within a state of faux <democracy>, which,
for instance, cared more about the classification of Snowden, and classifying whistleblowing writ
large, than it did the actualization processes of <democracy> and NSA tactics. As U.S. officials
and members of the press proliferated discourse on the classification of Snowden and
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whistleblowers, they effectively suppressed the very discussion they were so adamant to endorse.
The more significant revelation surrounding the U.S. government’s response to Snowden was not
the disclosure of covert government surveillance, nor the emphatic denial of governmental
culpability by state officials, but rather the painfully evident crises that <democracy> innately
creates for itself. <Democracy> struggles mightily in accepting that it is symptomatic of itself. In
response, <democracy> purges whistleblowers, like Snowden, from the narrative as they expose
<democracy>’s deficiencies.
The U.S. government’s position on Snowden as a whistleblower serves as an impasse for
the progression of <American> <democracy>. The WPEA insulates whistleblowing, an
inherently public apparatus, from public exposure. While the WPEA may provide personal
measures of security for whistleblowers, it functions, arguably with greater favor, to protect
ideological structures of power and its elites. Whistleblowing, as a <democratic> utility, dies
when it yields to statist interests. As U.S. officials funnel whistleblowers through governmentally
protected channels, whistleblowers, and the <democratic> populace writ large, become further
discursively neutralized.
By publicly suppressing whistleblowing operatives, U.S. officials neutralized the
discursive power of a <democratic> citizenry. Thus, while all <democratic> ethoses exist within
a perpetual paradox, the authoritarian shift to purge any of these principles from the discursive
realm is conspicuously destructive of <democracy>, and is read wholly as an oppressive,
survivalist motion by hegemonic ideology. Whistleblowing connotes non-democratic power
imbalance, and its existence should be heavily protected by <democratic> institutions. The three
distinct phases of the <Snowden> discourse connote not only the control by the U.S. government
over the narrative, but the authoritarian censorship of democratic deliberation regarding
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whistleblowing and the outright dismissal of whistleblowing as an essential deliberative measure
of <democracy>.
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CHAPTER 6: CONCLUSION
This dissertation performed an ideographic analysis of the discursive exchanges between
the press and U.S. officials in regards to the disclosures of Edward Snowden. The Snowden
revelations exposed covert, illegal domestic and international surveillance tactics by U.S.
security agencies and generated passionate public discourse in the U.S. and abroad. The
dissertation sought to identify newly constructed ideographs with regard to the Snowden
discourse. It conducted a synchronic ideographic analysis within the Snowden discourse, and
examined how whistleblowing interacted with the identified ideographs.
The dissertation first assessed prominent ideographs within the discourse and
demonstrated how the concept of <Snowden> became a political abstraction. The interplay of the
<Snowden> ideograph was then analyzed among other prominent ideographs within the
discourse, namely <liberty>, <security>, and <democracy>. The <Snowden> ideograph became
increasingly apparent as the discourse developed. Existing with high regularity within U.S.
political discourse, U.S. officials obfuscated the term <Snowden> over time. Paradoxically,
<Snowden> was then utilized to defend the surveillance measures exposed by <Snowden>.
Thus, <Snowden> was operationalized as a rhetorical tool of interpellation. The U.S.
government used the <Snowden> ideograph to continue covert surveillance, perpetuate a fear of
<terrorism>, and absolve itself of culpability.
One of the prominent means of abstraction was the conflation of <Snowden> with
politically undesirable entities. <Snowden> was associated with foreign states like Russia and
China, which are both known to have strained relationships with the U.S, and <Snowden> was
accused of abetting terrorist organizations like al Qaeda. <Snowden> was also falsely connected
to WikiLeaks.
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U.S. officials furthered the abstraction process further by consistently positioning
<Snowden> as an enemy of U.S. security. <Snowden> was regularly juxtaposed against
freedom, privacy, security, democracy, and justice, all established ideographs which assist in the
interpellation processes of a U.S. ideology of statism. Regularly associated with <terrorism>,
<Snowden> was constructed as the antithesis of <democracy>. U.S. officials further demanded
that Snowden face appropriate justice for endangering U.S. security, despite the illegal and
unethical practices of the U.S. government that <Snowden> reified. In sum, the continuous
accusatory posture of the U.S. government and fabrication of a vast array of falsehoods
undermined the public’s ability to formulate a coherent understanding of <Snowden>.
The <Snowden> ideograph serves as a significant methodological development.
Previously recognized iterations of ideography include terms, images, and events. This
dissertation demonstrated how public figures, often political agents, can function
ideographically. Thus, rhetorical scholars are provided with an additional avenue of ideographic
criticism. The extended postulation contends that through ongoing discursive exchanges,
“names” transcend beyond simple symbolic processes. Social agents entrenched within political
discourse can evolve into rhetorical manifestations of ideology.
The dissertation also examined the interaction of the relevant ideographs with the concept
of whistleblowing. Through synchronic analysis, it was determined that U.S. officials
operationalized <Snowden> to deprive the citizenry of an essential democratic tool,
whistleblowing. Snowden’s status as a whistleblower was a primary point of contention
throughout the discourse. Citing the Whistleblower Protection Enhancement Act (WPEA) of
2012, U.S. officials denied Snowden of whistleblower status for not following established
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protocol. While Snowden would not have benefitted from whistleblower protections under the
WPEA, U.S. officials consistently claimed otherwise.
As a practice, whistleblowing functions paradoxically within a democracy, much like all
of democracy’s ideals. Although whistleblowers expose legal and ethical violations, especially
against a state, they can create public harm by inciting violence or abetting enemies. The
parameters of acceptable whistleblowing practices vary depending upon the desires of the
populace; hence, it is antithetical to democratic principles for government officials to dictate
whistleblower protocol. In practice, whistleblowing serves as a check against authoritarian
overreach of a governmental entity when the chasm of power has grown too wide. It is
antithetical to a democratic system of governance to negate the citizenry of its right to
whistleblowing, especially as it relates to infringements upon <democratic> civil <liberties>. In
dictating the regulation for whistleblower protections, U.S. officials purged whistleblowing from
the narrative and significantly decreased the likelihood that governmental malfeasance could be
publicly exposed. Subsequently, whistleblowers can be pushed into private channels and away
from media coverage, which then safeguards the state from agents of dissent. In purging
whistleblowing from the Snowden narrative, U.S. officials protected themselves and deprived the
populace of an essential tool of democracy. This move pushed the U.S. system of governance
away from democratic progression and further toward authoritarianism.
Perhaps the most unsettling consequence of the Snowden discourse is the unchanged
system of surveillance by the U.S. government. It is well-documented that humans are more
reserved and constrained when they believe they are being monitored. Thus, it matters not if the
state has actually ceased its domestic surveillance; the public is nonetheless cognitively
controlled. In many ways, this perception of control manifested out of the Snowden discourse.
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While seemingly destructive to the state, the Snowden revelations subversively assisted
in augmenting statist power. Through a variety of rhetorical maneuvers, U.S. officials navigated
public backlash, distracted the populace from the NSA’s wrongdoing, and perpetuated their
authoritarian power. Snowden thus, as an abstraction, functioned as a paradox of itself.
Snowden’s existence was nullified through the rhetorical processes of U.S. officials, and in the
process, officials substantially increased their control over whistleblowing and public dissent
against the state.
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This dissertation is a rhetorical criticism of the U.S. government’s response to Edward
Snowden, the whistleblower who exposed illegal and unethical surveillance tactics of the
National Security Agency and U.S. government. Informed by contemporary theories of
democracy, this synchronic ideographic analysis examines the rhetorical strategies of U.S.
government officials following Snowden’s disclosures. This dissertation contends that in
laboring to absolve themselves of culpability, U.S. officials obfuscated Snowden and
operationalized <Snowden> as an ideograph. This reification provides methodological
development to ideographic analysis as it demonstrates how a political figure can become a
rhetorical abstraction used for ideological purposes. The rhetorical interplay between
<Snowden> and other prominent ideographs, namely <terrorism>, <liberty>, <security>,
<freedom>, <democracy>, and <privacy>, is then critically analyzed. The analysis then
illustrates how U.S. officials purged whistleblowing from the narrative, depriving U.S. citizens
of a necessary instrument of democracy.
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